

JPRS 77196

19 January 1981

Near East/North Africa Report

No. 2249

FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS

JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22161. In ordering, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited.

Current JPRS publications are announced in Government Reports Announcements issued semi-monthly by the National Technical Information Service, and are listed in the Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Indexes to this report (by keyword, author, personal names, title and series) are available from Bell & Howell, Old Mansfield Road, Wooster, Ohio 44691.

Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.

19 January 1981

NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

No. 2249

CONTENTS

INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

Arab Migration to Oil-Rich Countries Discussed (Pierre 'Aql; AL-DUSTUR, 1-7 Dec 80).....	1
Study Warns Against Wave of Immigrants to Persian Gulf Countries (BAGHDAD OBSERVER, 15 Dec 80).....	9
Europe's Stand on Palestine Issue Assessed (Ghassan Bayram; AL-MUSTAQBAL, 22 Nov 80).....	10
Commentator Suggests Middle East Approach for Reagan (Ahmad Baha'-al'Din; AL-MUSTAQBAL, 22 Nov 80).....	17
Israel Seen Attempting To Thwart Arab-European Dialogue (David Bishay; AL-HAWADITH, 21 Nov 80).....	21

EGYPT

Sadat Confidant Reminisces About 1973 War (AKHIR SA'AH, 1, 8 Oct 80).....	25
--	----

IRAQ

Government Spells Out New Agricultural Policy (AL-JUMHURIYAH, 12 Nov 80).....	47
Iran Accused of Crimes Against Kurds of Iran, Iraq (AL-'IRAQ, 19 Nov 80).....	59
Modern National Railroad Network Projects Outlined (BAGHDAD OBSERVER, 16 Dec 80).....	62

ISRAEL

Autonomy Talks Seen as Futile (Avraham Melamed Interview; 'AL HAMISHMAR, 24 Oct 80).....	64
---	----

Chief of Staff on Syrian Involvement in Lebanon (Refa'el Eytan Interview; IDF Radio, 27 Dec 80).....	73
Commercial Agreement Signed With Greece (Jerusalem Domestic Service, 4 Jan 81).....	74
Briefs	
Activists Arrested	75
Industrial Production Up	75
Agricultural Products Catalog	75
Financial Aid Halted	76
New Settlement Planned	76
New Police Chief	76
Foreign Currency Reserves	76
New Settlements Established	76
Expropriation of Silwad Land	77
Settlements Near Jericho	77
Immigration Data in 1980	77
Rate of Inflation	77
Population Statistics	78
December Money Influx	78

LEBANON

Phalangist Official Discusses Detente, Dialogue With Syria (Karim Baqraduni Interview; AL-'ASR, 10 Oct 80).....	79
Shi'ite Leaders Comment on Situation, Imam al-Sadr's Fate (AL-'ASR, 17 Oct 80).....	85
Approach to Crisis Solution Criticized, Alternative Offered (Amin al-Siba'i; AL-HAWADITH, 28 Nov 80).....	88

SAUDI ARABIA

Maqsud Discusses Means To Enhance Arab Information in United States (Clovis Maqsud Interview; AL-MADINAH, 29 Sep 80).....	92
---	----

SYRIA

Envoy to Tehran Discusses International Problems (Ibrahim Younes Interview; KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL, 22 Dec 80)....	97
Minister Enumerates Benefits of Euphrates Dam (Hisham Bashir; TISHRIN, 11 Nov 80).....	100

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

Statistics Show Growth of UAE Economy (AL-KHALIJ, 4 Dec 80).....	108
---	-----

Briefs

Directory of Agreements Compiled

110

YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC

Machine Workshop Falls Short of Producing Automobile Engine

(Radiyah Ihsan; AL-THAWRAH, 6 Dec 80).....

111

ARAB MIGRATION TO OIL-RICH COUNTRIES DISCUSSED

London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 1-7 Dec 80 pp 36-39

[Article by Pierre 'Aql: "Studies: Inter-Arab Immigration: Reasons and Consequences"]

[Text] More Than 2.5 Million Immigrant Workers, and Complaints Increasing on Both Sides.

When Saudi Arabia Declared Amnesty to Workers Entering the Country Illegally, 100,000 Persons Registered Themselves.

After Amnesty Period Ended, 13,700 Workers Who Were Not Legally Registered Were Deported.

Immigrants Turn to the North and the West; the Reason: the Arabian Peninsula's Oil.

"The Number of Workers in the Arabian Peninsula and Libya from the Sixties till 1972 Amounted to about 800,000 Workers; so far, after the Increase in Oil Prices, the Number Has Increased Tenfold."

Extended periods of population stability have rarely been experienced in the Middle East from the most ancient of times until this day. If we were to confine ourselves to a few recent examples, we would be able to mention that vast areas of Syria and Iraq had been almost de-populated during the centuries of Ottoman [rule] and that the settlement and cultivation of those areas did not begin till after 1940. [We can also refer] to the phenomenon of Palestinian refugees which affects more than 2 million people. [We can refer] to the educational "migrations" to Arab capitals where suitable higher education can be found. [We can refer], of course, to the emigration of hundreds of thousands of Lebanese and Syrian farmers to the United States and to Africa.

If we were to expand the scope of the inquiry to Arab North Africa, [we would find] that immigration from West Africa to Sudan from the beginning of the century was not less than 2 million people. This immigration had begun previously with the encouragement of the Anglo-Egyptian administration which wanted to increase the volume of manpower. Recently, this has turned to a flood of immigrants from Chad, Eritrea and Uganda. The

Western Sahara has also experienced the immigration of a large percentage of its population because of the ongoing war. In Somalia the war joined forces with the drought and turned one fourth of the population into refugees.

These limited examples give one an idea of the nature of the "movement" which characterizes the Arab demographic situation. The new phenomenon that was added to this "fluid" situation since 1973 was that of the immigration of Arab--and also foreign--labor to a number of Arab oil countries.

In figures, the new phenomenon now includes 2.5 million Arab workers--including the families of the immigrants--and half a million foreign workers. That is, there are 3 million Arab and foreign immigrants who were attracted to the oil countries by work opportunities and high wages. If we were to add to those Arab immigrants no less than 2 million more Arabs from North Africa who are working in the countries of western Europe, the volume of Arab labor immigration may reach the minimum figure of 5 million!

The emigration of 2.5 million Arab workers to the oil countries is a large phenomenon. It is also a phenomenon that affects not only the economies of the oil countries, but also the economies of the poor Arab countries in particular. It has now become customary to hear stories about the fortunes that have been amassed by some people who worked in the Gulf. In return, however, the agricultural economy in some of the Arab countries that export labor is declining rapidly, and development opportunities are closed in other countries drained by the immigration of their modern production cadres. Even in Egypt, which is the largest of the Arab countries--37 million--there is some shortage in some labor sectors despite the relatively limited number of Egyptian immigrants. [This] subject in its entirety is relatively new. Therefore, its consequences have not yet become evident. Now, however, many questions are being raised in the Arab countries that are exporting labor about the balance of profit and loss. It is the opinion of some people that it is not certain that "the poor Arabs" will gain from this deal which at first appears to be attractive.

Let us first note that the new [wave of] immigration runs counter to the customary course of the Arab economic migrations. [This wave] is moving eastward and southward and not northward and westward as it did in the past. The origins of this new kind of immigration go back to the Arabian Peninsula, to the forties, when the early signs of economic growth began [to appear] in the sheikhdoms and states of the Gulf. The first Arab workers emigrated to these countries in response to the demand of foreign oil companies. During the early years of oil production, the returns received by the rulers [for oil production] did not contribute to major economic and social changes. The returns themselves were small and the direct or indirect distribution of these returns did not affect large numbers of the population. All this prevented the occurrence of major expansion in the labor market.

The situation began to change in the sixties because with time, the returns were piling up and were also increasing. At first the change continued to be moderate; it was structured around social services and the infrastructures which the states and the sheikhdoms began to ensure to the population. The establishment, operation and administration of the infrastructures required a considerable number of skilled workers who were not available to the local states. These structures included electricity, water desalinization, roads, airports, telephones, schools and hospitals. It is this which eventually prescribed the need for "administrative" labor to ensure the government's indispensable administrative agency which would supervise these services. Thus it was that the early sixties saw the beginning of the sweeping influx of Arab workers to the oil exporting countries both in the Arabian Peninsula and in Libya.

From the sixties and until 1972 the number of immigrant workers employed in the Arabian Peninsula and in Libya amounted to about 800,000 workers. This was the period when the groundwork for the Inter-Arab Economic Immigration Law was being laid. However, the wages of workers and civil servants during that period were not much higher than those in the Arab countries that did not export oil.

The quadrupling of oil prices in 1973-1974 was the most significant Arab economic event of the seventies. This event had a stunning effect in the area of labor exports. In only 2 years, with the advent of 1975, the number of immigrant Arab workers--not including families--increased by over 1.6 million workers. During the few years that followed the oil price increases, it seemed that the traditional sectors [of the economy] were approaching extinction in more than one oil country. The countries had concentrated on building modern sectors or on establishing industries that would constitute an alternative resource to oil later on. In this regard the petrochemical industries were the most attractive. All this created a new demand for labor. Besides, demand for labor continued to increase in those sectors that came into existence in the sixties because they were expanding continuously.

In figures, with the advent of 1975 there were 1,807,000 local workers in the oil countries of the Gulf--with the exception of Iraq which constitutes a special case--compared with 171,900 "imported" Arab workers. This is a difference of 88,000 workers only. Half of the immigrant workers were in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (883,000); then Libya (332,000); the Emirates (251,000); Kuwait (208,000); and finally Oman, Bahrain and Qatar. It is known that Oman imports and exports labor at the same time. Assuming that there is a 3 percent rate of growth in immigrant workers, it is believed that the total [number of] workers who emigrated to the oil countries this year exceeded 2 million.

Naturally, the oil wealth is the principal reason for the phenomenon of Arab labor immigration, but it is not the only reason. There are other reasons that have to do with the social structure of the oil countries. There are reasons that are not less significant--in fact, they may be

more significant in the long run--and pertain to the declining economic conditions in Arab countries that have "traditional" economies.

Let us begin with the first point. The gross national product per capita varied from 15,480 dollars in Kuwait to 250 dollars in Yemen. This vast difference--which amounts to 63 times--is growing and not shrinking. When such a difference develops between two countries that are separated by a relatively small distance, it becomes the basic driving force for immigration in search of employment. Using the gross national product as a standard, the Arab area would be divided into two groups separated by a 1,000 dollar line per capita. Kuwait heads the list with (15,480 dollars); it is followed by the Arab Emirates (13,990); Qatar (11,400); the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (6,310); the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (4,480); Oman (2,680); Bahrain (2,140); and Iraq (1,390).

If we were to look at the lower end of the list, we would find North Yemen in first place among the poor Arab countries (250 dollars); [it would be] followed by the largest Arab country, which is Egypt (280 dollars); by Democratic Yemen (280); Sudan (280); Jordan (600); and Syria (780).

The problem here is that it seems that this situation will continue for several years in the future and that overcoming it will not be possible. The long-range benefits that any one of these poor countries will reap from productive development projects will not be realized--that is, if they are realized [at all]--before several years. Re-pricing the oil, however, may [even] increase the distance immediately. It is sufficient for one to think that it is possible for Yemen, for example, to catch up with Kuwait.

Naturally, oil returns are not distributed to citizens in a manner that reflects the gross national product per capita, which is a hypothetical standard. But the oil wealth becomes an irresistible attraction, first because it provides employment for labor coming from countries where unemployment is most likely prevalent; second, because wages may be twice or three times the wages in the [labor] "exporting" country; and furthermore and third, because this wealth increases the demand for labor that is employed in the services sector which is twice as attractive socially because it is not manual labor and because of its social respectability.

Reference must be made here to the fact that the relative sparsity of the population in most of the oil countries is responsible for the relatively high gross national product per capita. For the sake of comparison [we note that] the population of Kuwait is about half a million, whereas that of North Yemen exceeds 5 million. But this is not the only indicator. Kuwait and Bahrain are the only two Arab countries where almost 50 percent of the population is illiterate: people who are illiterate make up 55 percent of the population in Kuwait and 47 percent of the population in Bahrain. At the same time people who can read and write make up

no more than 14 percent of the population in the Emirates--according to IBRD statistics for 1978; they make up no more than 33 percent in Saudi Arabia and Qatar, and 39 percent in Libya. By comparison, the highest percentage of Arab literacy can be found in the "eastern" countries: Lebanon (68 percent); Jordan (62 percent); Syria (53 percent); and so on. In the Arab Maghreb there is Tunisia where people who can read and write make up 55 percent of the population. All this means that the manpower which is more qualified for [employment in] the modern economic sectors for whose development oil returns are being spent can be found outside the oil countries, that is, in the relatively poor Arab countries.

Naturally, the population in the oil countries is growing rapidly. These countries are capable of fighting the illiteracy in their countries with extraordinary swiftness because the material capabilities are available. In the short range, however, this will not be enough to counter the inflation of the fiscal economy on the one hand. On the other hand, the educational systems that prevail in those countries--which are derived primarily from the Egyptian model--concentrate on theoretical, academic education and do not attach adequate importance to technical education. This means that those who fail in academic education turn to technical or vocational education despite the fact that the need is urgent for this latter kind of qualifications. Saudi Arabia in particular is trying to change this situation, but change is not easy because the educational system is firmly established and because it is difficult to change social attitudes that look down upon manual labor.

But the problem is more complicated from a more comprehensive Arab perspective. The educational systems in the poor countries follow the same academic model. That is, these countries which export qualified people suffer from a similar shortage of technicians and craftsmen. When they export their citizens to work in the oil countries, they do so not because they have a "surplus" of qualified people; [such labor exports] rather increase the original shortage they had in this area, and this has a negative effect on their economies and on their development capabilities.

[We have discussed] all this without mentioning the problem of employment for women. It has been noted that women's contribution to production in the poor countries exceeds their contribution to it in the countries that import labor from abroad.

There remains another problem which reinforces the need to import qualified workers from abroad. Most of the oil countries are intent upon developing their human resources and encouraging their citizens to play a basic role in the economy and in administration. Thirdly, the oil countries want to distribute the wealth to a broader section of citizens. All this drives them to encourage citizens to go into government administration with large pensions and incentives. Naturally, the citizens of those countries are attracted to such areas of employment. This, however, has negative consequences. The departments of government become overcrowded with civil servants who are working below their capacity and

who tend to stay away from strenuous work. Finally, the fact that the citizens of those countries are attracted [to employment] in the departments of government takes them out of an employment market that is primarily tight.

The Poor Countries

However, a discussion about the economies of the oil countries remains only half of the picture; [an image of] the declining economic condition of the "poor" Arab countries emerges on the other side. This situation is not much different from that in most Third World countries. Arab countries that do not have oil are characterized by a high rate of population growth, by meager average amounts of local savings, by a decline in the manner of capital formation and by a rise in unemployment and under employment. In recent years monetary inflation, the weakness of currencies, the immigration of labor to the cities and to the other Arab countries have been added to all this.

What all this means is that the best that poor Arab countries can aspire to does not go beyond maintaining the existing standards of living which are primarily low. Even this modest outcome is far from being realized in more than one Arab country. Naturally, this grim picture is of no less significance than that of the oil wealth in encouraging immigration.

It may be necessary to refer here to Iraq which represents an exception to the former division of Arab countries. Iraq is an oil rich country, but it has a large population: 11.1 million persons in 1975. That is more than twice the population of Saudi Arabia and five times that of Libya. Saudi Arabia and Libya are the two oil countries that have the largest populations after Iraq. In addition, Iraq has a large area of arable land which is expandable. This means it has a bigger supply of labor, a larger domestic market and a more balanced development capability. Until the sixties part of Iraq's manpower used to go to the Gulf to work, but [this trend] stopped in the seventies, and a counter trend emerged.

Where Is the Problem?

To the countries that import manpower, the incoming labor represents a heavy social, political and administrative burden, especially when this is accompanied by illegal immigration. When Saudi Arabia, for example, declared that it would grant amnesty to all immigrant workers who were not officially registered in 1978, the number of those who registered themselves came to 100,000 persons. Despite that, 13,700 workers who were not legally registered had to be deported the following month. In addition, the presence of large numbers of incoming workers in "traditional" societies creates social and cultural tension that is difficult to control.

On the opposite side one may recall the grievance of Prince al-Hasan, the crown prince of Jordan, which he articulated in a speech he delivered

to the International Labor Conference in Geneva in 1977. He had said that the current mode of Arab labor immigration places a low value on immigrant labor. Prince Hasan said that this constitutes an obstacle to the poor countries in the area which exchange their workers for limited economic returns. Prince al-Hasan suggested at the same conference the creation of a "compensation fund" to be financed by the countries that employ the workers. The funds would be earmarked for the development of the countries that export manpower.

The returns or the funds that are sent by immigrant workers to their countries are not meager. Besides, they did grow in recent years. In Egypt, for example, they amounted to 781 million dollars in the first 9 months of 1977, compared with 330.6 million dollars in the same period of 1976. In Sudan's case workers' returns rose from 1 million dollars in 1975-1976 to 10 million dollars in 1976-1977. It is estimated that the returns exceeded 30 million dollars in 1977-1978. The returns constitute a significant part of the economies of North Yemen and Jordan in particular.

However, those who are exporting manpower are not satisfied.

First, because the preparation of the workers was carried out at a high cost and from limited returns.

Second, because immigrant workers spend most of their money for consumption, which mostly stimulates inflation; they rarely put their money in productive investments. A study published by the International Labor Office in Geneva considers the funds that Sudanese workers are sending [to Sudan] to have contributed to raising prices twenty times more since the sixties. Whereas the housing shortage in the cities is one of the principal reasons for the immigration of the Sudanese, the funds they have been sending have raised housing costs and aggravated the housing shortage instead of alleviating it. The case is the same in Yemen where comparing the returns from workers with the rates of inflation in San'a' indicates that inflation exceeds the contribution made by the [workers'] returns to the gross national product.

Third, [workers'] returns will tend to decline and not to rise in the future. There are numerous reasons for that. The need for some categories of workers--construction workers for example--is declining, and this will bring about their return to their homelands. Wage rates will tend to fall in the Arabian Peninsula and in Libya. Furthermore, the "actual" value of the wages is diminishing with the inflation that is taking place in the oil countries themselves.

Fourth, the total economic situation in the countries that export manpower has declined instead of making progress in recent years. This gives one the impression that those countries which export manpower did not profit from the exchange.

Foreign Immigrants

Despite the presence of Indian and Pakistani workers in the Arabian Peninsula since the forties, extensive immigration [began] after 1973. This is due to the concatenation of several factors. Economic development in the Gulf peaked during this period while at the same time, the capabilities for immigration from Arab countries that do not have oil began to dwindle. The percentage of Yemeni, Omani and Jordanian-Palestinian labor abroad had reached a third. It became evident that the response of Egyptian and Syrian labor to further immigration was very meager. On the contrary, numbers of Arab workers began returning to their homelands, with the exception of Sudan which continued to be the only Arab country where immigration increased after 1973.

As a result, the flow of foreign workers, especially Asians, increased. In 1975 the number of Asians came to 359,000. At present the number of Asians may have exceeded 400,000. Similarly, the number of European and American workers came to 60,000. Most of the Asians are Pakistanis, Indians and Koreans (25 percent).

8592

C80: 4802

STUDY WARNS AGAINST WAVE OF IMMIGRANTS TO PERSIAN GULF COUNTRIES

Baghdad BAGHDAD OBSERVER in English 15 Dec 80 p 2

[Article: "Continued Influx of Persian Immigrants Poses Security Danger to Gulf"]

[Text] Iraq has warned that the abnormal growth of the wave of Iranian and Asian emigration to the Arab Gulf region carries considerable security risks for the Gulf countries and could lead to the creation of alien national entities in the region.

The warning which came in a Ministry of Planning study forwarded to the Arab Gulf labour ministers follow-up bureau said that the rises in the numbers of immigrants from Iran and a number of other Asian countries exceeded normal population growth in the region.

"The high rates of immigration growth cannot be incidental but is encouraged according to a plan for gradual domination of the region", the study said.

The study said that at a time when Arab labour force and labour skills were available the growth of foreign immigration could not be taken as a spontaneous phenomenon.

It indicated that among military and security risks "are the exploitation of

foreign immigrants for purposes of anti-Arab propaganda, espionage and sub-

tage and formation of groupings within the Arab Gulf countries leading to the creation of alien national structures in the region".

The study added that the massive demands for acquisition of citizenship rights through naturalisation could lead to highly dangerous repercussions on the political level as well as on the economic and social levels.

With reference to the vast numbers of Arab labour forces, the study said that Iraq took the initiative in facilitating the movement of the Arab labour forces and allowing them the freedom of obtaining jobs in Iraq. This Iraqi move was primarily aimed to counter the foreign immigration phenomenon.

"The freedom given to Arab workers to obtain jobs in Iraq comes within a firm conviction making Arab labour forces to substitute for foreign labour forces. So far Iraq has been the only country making such a decision and implementing it", said the study.

The study said: "It was inevitable that Iraq should play a leading and effective role in countering the phenomenon of abnormal growth of foreign immigration. It was equally inevitable to draw attention to the dangers inherent in this phenomenon.

"Arab public opinion is surely focussed on this initiative and on this role shouldered by Iraq which is not unexpected role for the thousands of Arab working people who seek jobs in the Gulf region".

The study gave reasons confirming the Iraqi role in this respect:

1. Iraq is a Gulf country with tangible weight as regards the density of population, development and cultural standards.

2. Iraq has maintained a clear-cut and strict policy and sound applications regarding Arab workers movement among Arab countries.

3. Iraq's attitude is clear regarding the demographic changes in Arab countries and Arab Gulf region.

INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

EUROPE'S STAND ON PALESTINE ISSUE ASSESSED

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 22 Nov 80 pp 38, 39

/Article by Ghassan Bayram: "The Arab-European Dialogue Shifts from Economics to Politics"/

/Text/ Before thinking of holding this conversation with Dr Ahmad Sidqi al-Dajani, member of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization, we gathered up a large collection of information on the atmosphere which dominated the meetings of the Arab-European dialogue held recently in Luxemburg and the results they attained.

There was unanimity that this time this round of the Arab-European talks had acquired great importance relative to the previous meetings of the dialogue which began in 1973.

The first evidence of this importance was the fact that the Palestine Liberation Organization, represented by Dr Ahmad Sidqi al-Dajani, assumed the chairmanship of the Arab side in the meetings of the dialogue with the Europeans this time.

The second evidence was that this time this Arab-European meeting was held a few days after the election of the new American president, Ronald Reagan, and the statements he immediately made in opposition to the establishment of a Palestinian state, describing it as a terrorist organization.

The third evidence of this importance was the fact that the Arab-European dialogue was held at an official political level for the first time this session, following the decision taken by the Common Market summit at the Venice summit in response to the demand which the Arab summit conference held in Tunis last year had previously proclaimed, when it asserted that it was necessary that the dialogue not be restricted to economic matters but would have to move over to political ones. In fact, the issue of recognizing the Palestine Liberation Organization was the fundamental focus of discussions in the Arab-European dialogue.

The fourth item of evidence is that this session of the dialogue was held in the framework of a European position which had made progress on the subject of support for Arab rights in the struggle with Israel and readiness to recognize the Palestine Liberation Organization as a representative of the Palestinian people in any peace negotiations and to support this people's right to self-determination.

Therefore, although the European side in these meetings emphasized that the relationship with the United States was a special one, by virtue of the strategic connection that exists with America, the countries in the European group, as they have asserted, were not prevented from pursuing a movement toward attainment of a just solution to the Palestinian issue and consequently responding at a later stage to the Arab demand for official recognition of the Liberation Organization as a legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

To confirm that progress had been made in this area, the dialogue meetings in Luxemburg also concluded with an agreement to hold a meeting at the beginning of next summer between foreign ministers of the Arab countries and the European Common Market countries.

It is said that as they were saying goodbye after the conclusion of the meetings, some officials on the European side of the dialogue told the head of the Arab side, Dr al-Dajani, "We are proud to have worked successfully together and have been pleased with your attendance. We will be more pleased when we respond to your invitation to visit the capital of the Palestinian state, which we expect, and hope God will help us see, emerge together in our lifetimes."

In the light of all this, Dr al-Dajani, who was noted for his prominent role at these meetings, gives a clearer picture of the results the meetings of the dialogue reached in the midst of all the circumstances and premises in which they were held.

At the start of our conversation I asked Dr al-Dajani, "This is the first Arab-European meeting in which the Palestine Liberation Organization, represented by you, has assumed the chairmanship of the Arab side. What are the dimensions and the significance of this?"

He replied,

"There is much significance to the fact that the meeting was held with the organization chairing the Arab side, and it is linked to the nature of the Arab-European dialogue and the timing of the meeting.

"The first of these items of significance is the real, actual recognition by the nine European group countries of the Palestine Liberation Organization and its role within the Arab party. It is well known that cooperation between the European countries and the Palestine Liberation Organization has been the focus of Israeli and world Zionist pressures and the focus of pressures from the United States of America. When the notion of the dialogue gained currency following the 1973 war and preparation for it started, the European party soon set out the issue of the representation of the Palestine Liberation Organization in the Arab side as a result of these pressures. Five years passed before the dialogue was undertaken, during which the Palestine Liberation Organization became a basic element in the attainment of progress in the dialogue's course.

"We might also point out that this meeting, whose Arab side was chaired by the organization, was the first dialogue meeting to be held on the political level, since both parties to it were headed by a responsible minister from each party. It also took place as an act allowing resumption of the dialogue and an expression

of the agreement of the Arab and European wills, after the countries of the group had responded to an Arab demand to devote special attention to the political aspect of the dialogue. The date for the meeting was set at a time when the Zionist campaign against the Palestine Liberation Organization had intensified and statements by American candidates to the presidency followed one another in succession by distorting the picture of the organization to toady to the Jewish vote. This meeting was held in order to demonstrate how the Western European countries might interact with the Palestine Liberation Organization, and a number of diplomats and journalists who attended and participated summarized their impressions by stating that this meeting was a decisive response to the statement by the elected president, Ronald Reagan, on the Palestine Liberation Organization."

/Question/ It is a coincidence that the Arab-European dialogue meeting was held a few days after the election of the new American president, and also after his statements attacking the Liberation Organization and describing it as terroristic, thus almost categorically, or categorically, rejecting the establishment of the Palestinian state. To what extent has this had an effect on the atmosphere of the discussions, especially from the European side, particularly since this time the Europeans represent governments, not just parties?

/Answer/ The date of the meeting had been set before the issuance of Reagan's latest statement; there is no doubt that the statement cast a pall over the European movement, but the meeting made this movement clearer to the Europeans as regards dealing with the Palestine Liberation Organization.

We know that the European position on this matter has advanced during the past 5 years, not as much as we want but in the direction we want. The Arab party to the dialogue has been able to move the European side to this advanced position and bring it to the conviction that it is necessary to exert effort to affect the position of the United States of America. I categorically believe that the meeting implied a direct response to these statements on the one hand; on the other, it strengthened the Europeans' confidence in the soundness of their movement on this matter and the need to intensify their efforts in this matter to affect the American position on the Palestine Liberation Organization.

/Question/ The Common Market countries started a movement to attain an acceptable formula for negotiations between the Arabs and Israel with Liberation Organization participation, but then regressed and made their resumption of this movement contingent on the American elections. The question we would like to raise now is, does the European group still take the position of pursuing this movement, will the advent of Ronald Reagan, with the positions he has announced, cause this European group to waver again, or what?

/Answer/ First I would like to welcome your use of the expression "movement," since what the countries of the European group are doing is still restricted to a movement and has not yet reached the status of an initiative. I am often amazed at the talk which has been raised about the existence of a European initiative. Let me return to the question and observe that when we, as Arab countries collectively and as the Palestine Liberation Organization, which is a part of the Arab group, formulated our will and set forth on the dialogue with the nine European countries, we realized the nature of the balance of forces in our era and the

position of Western Europe among the various forces in our world. We in the Liberation Organization--and I can say on the Arab side in general--have in no way whatever been negligent of the special relationship which binds the countries of Western Europe to the United States of America by virtue of numerous factors which there is no room to describe in detail. Nor have we been negligent of Western Europe's position on the Soviet Union and the nature of their relations, also as a result of numerous factors. We have embodied the effects of this in the course of the dialogue. As a specific example I can mention what happened in early 1977. We began the dialogue at the general committee level in Luxemburg (May 1976) and presented our specific political demands to the European party. The foreign ministers of the European countries met and formulated a European political position in which they made some progress. It was their intention to make a declaration at the meeting of the dialogue held in Tunisia (February 1977) but then Mr Walter Mondale, the vice president of Carter, who was new to the presidency, officially requested them to put off the declaration until the new American administration could take time studying the issue. This is what happened, and the declaration was postponed until 29 June 1977, when it was issued in London.

The most important thing in our Arab orientation toward the dialogue with Europe and our request that the nine countries play a European role in having a just peace attained is our awareness of the extreme difficulties which relations between the United States of America and the Soviet Union are going through. These difficulties have come about in the wake of the United States renunciation of the Soviet-American statement, which brought about a suspension of the joint discussion on the subject of the Arab-Israeli conflict by the two countries. It is clear that we in our comprehensive struggle to liberate our occupied territories cannot accept this quiescence and that movement must be pursued. We are not at all exaggerating the volume of this European role, but we do not eliminate it from our calculations.

/Question/ In the light of what you have referred to regarding the game of the international balance of forces, and in the light of the special nature of the European relationship with the United States of America, do you expect that the nine market countries will at the present time or in the foreseeable future be able to transcend the international position they declared at the Venice summit and proclaim a permanent, explicit stand on the justice of Arab rights and recognition of the Liberation Organization and of an independent state for the Palestinian people?

/Answer/ Let me go beyond the word "game" of international balance of forces and propose the use of the word "equation." I can frankly record that we do not expect the Europeans to transcend their position. In fact, we are striving to create facts which will impose progress on this position, and this development will be realized gradually. There is nothing longer than the journey of political struggle.

The past 5 years we have struggled, with reliance on our people's armed struggle, their continuous resistance of occupation, and positive Arab efforts, to bring the European position to a recognition of self-determination for the Palestinian people, which is the next to last relationship. It will be necessary for us to continue the process during this period and use the cards in our hands to attain what we want. This time I anticipate that it will not take long because our struggle is on the verge of being totally convincing to the international position.

Here I would like to note that our movement toward Europe increased greatly after we had achieved significant victories in the international context with the third world, of which we are a part, and the countries of the socialist system, with which we are bound by friendship. We had to achieve this success in Europe in order to control the international isolation of the United States of America, which is standing entirely alongside Israel, in order to open up to various groups of the American people and impose change. We have in the Vietnamese experience an example worth benefitting from.

While we are in the process of talking about the international balance, it remains for us to point out that we are not divorcing the European position from its place in the international picture. We fully realize that Europe needs to interact with the Soviet position. I was glad to notice that there is firm conviction among European officials that the attainment of a comprehensive just peace will be achieved only with Soviet participation.

/Question/ Why has no idea emerged yet in practice on establishing an Arab-American dialogue--an Arab dialogue with representatives of influential forces in American society, especially the two main parties and other American institutions?

/Answer/ The "Kissinger" policy in 1975 succeeded in restricting the American government and inhibiting it from any positive movement imposed by its Arab relations in the direction of dealing with the Palestine Liberation Organization as a representative of the people of Palestine. Here we might refer to the secret annex to the second Sinai agreement. Since then, the United States of America has imposed an unacceptable condition for dialogue with the Liberation Organization, namely prior recognition of Resolution 242. We have clearly stated that we will not accept a conditional dialogue and we will make up for dialogue as long as that is not feasible in the proper manner, by struggling among circles of the American people to open up to their various groups, with our eyes on the goal of having the Palestine cause enter into the conscience of the American individual, cause him insomnia and press upon him. Here I must record that the effort we as Palestinians and Arabs have exerted in this area is still paltry; we must increase it several-fold. I can also record that a change in our image has come about in American society; I have just finished reading a thorough study on this issue which was prepared by an American scholarly organization, in which I observed a change in the image of Israel and a change in the Arab image. It is worth noting that our image is changing mostly in Jewish-American circles; the reason is clear, and that is that they follow our struggle more and are more preoccupied with it. The study underlined the fact that 85 percent of Americans are well acquainted with Mr Yasir 'Arafat, the chief of the Palestine Liberation Organization. The study also made clear the extent of the distortion Zionist media are imposing on the image of our struggle. We in the Liberation Organization are concentrating our efforts in this field and have realized progress in black American groups and anti-war and progressive circles, to some extent in circles of the Jewish group, in some intellectual circles, in some circles of Americans of Hispanic origin, and in some American church circles.

However, we still have a great deal to do through our Palestinian community, which numbers more than 120,000, and our Arab community, which is greater than 2.5 million. The establishment of the Palestinian Congress was a positive step in this field.

The Arab countries still have to do what they resolved to do on this matter at the 10th Arab summit conference in Tunisia, regarding necessary activity among groups of the American people.

/Question/ We observe that this penetration, if that is the proper expression, of American society, has not crystallized in a manner which can produce effects and influence the American position. Are we still at the beginning of the road or is Zionist influence still greater and more influential?

/Answer/ For a group of reasons, among them these two reasons, we are still at the beginning of the road, because Zionist activity has been concentrated there for many years and because we have also not yet properly used the cards the Arab nation possesses to influence American interests inside the United States of America itself. Perhaps this is the most important reason, because it entails influencing the balance of forces in the region and changing this balance to our advantage.

/Question/ In the light of the discussions witnessed by the dialogue conference and the discussions and exchanges of views which took place in the wings, does the European group intend to offer an initiative on the Middle East crisis at a subsequent stage, or is it still confined to circumstances and considerations which prevent that?

/Answer/ I can say that the European group is determined to follow through on its movement, because that movement is occurring as an expression of its conviction that European security is linked to the security of the Arab region and thus to the Arab-Israeli struggle and because at the same time it feels the existence of vital interests linking it to the Arab region. I also believe that the Arab group will take its time with this movement, so that it can become liberated from the restrictions I have referred to and can arrive at an internationally acceptable concept which will not face a veto from one of the two big powers. I remember how our brother Abu'Amr frankly described the American pressures on the European position in his meeting with Mr Gaston Thorn, and I observe that this spokesman for a number of European leaders answered by stating, "We acknowledge the existence of these pressures, we are seriously trying to free ourselves of them and we may perhaps succeed."

/Question/ You are one of those who believe in the feasibility of continuing the Arab-European dialogue, although Western Europe still wants to get a kantar from the Arabs and give them only a dram.

/Answer/ I am one of those who believe in the logic of intelligence, the comprehensive common sense of the revolution, the role of thought in action, the intrinsic nature of the Arab nation and the genuineness of the Palestinian revolution. This in its totality tells us that we must deal properly with the Europeans and the various forces in our world, that it is in our power to do so, and that the Europeans will never be able to take a kantar from us even if that is their wish but must respond to our just demands. Perhaps you will agree with me that this latest meeting gave proof of the soundness of this Arab platform. During it, the Europeans responded to a fundamental Arab demand by embarking on the dialogue at the

political level and to another demand which was that a meeting be held between the foreign ministers of the Arab countries and the European group. It was made totally clear to them that they must respond to the Arab party's demand to recognize the Palestine Liberation Organization officially so that the dialogue can bring about progress in their position vis-a-vis the Israeli occupation and exercise a practical policy to confront it.

11887

CSO: 4802

COMMENTATOR SUGGESTS MIDDLE EAST APPROACH FOR REAGAN

Paria AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 22 Nov 80 pp 10, 11

/Article by Ahmad Baha'-al-Din: "Days with a History: President Ronald Reagan's Keys to Understanding the Middle East Issues"/

/Text/ Let us try to arrive at an understanding of the "Ronald Reagan phase" through the mind, not emotions; through logic, not overreaction.

It is the American people that chose Ronald Reagan, not the Arabs, the Russians, Israel or the Italians!

Thus the Americans chose him by this overwhelming /sic/ majority for reasons of their own, first and last.

Why did the Americans choose him by this overwhelming majority?

The former British minister and ambassador to America and well known economist, Peter Jay, says that the American people, like all peoples, do not compare economic theories or ideological interpretations when they choose between two candidates-- they vote either through hope or through fear, through generosity or through selfishness, according to the prevailing mood and the general psychological state of the people at a given time. If the people are in a state of psychological relaxation and hope and do not feel problems, they will choose a moderate candidate. If they are in a state of crisis and fear and do not feel secure, they will choose the candidate who responds and addresses himself to these instincts. Therefore the American people inflicted a smashing defeat on Goldwater in 1964 and the same people elected the most conservative candidate in a half century in America, Ronald Reagan, by a tremendous majority in 1980.

The massive propaganda about Russia's superiority in some nuclear weapons areas, the gains the Soviet Union has made from Ethiopia to Afghanistan, the beginning of independence in Western Europe and its rebellion against American leadership, America's impotence in the face of Iran's detention of the hostages, and its impotence in the face of the Iraq-Iran war constitute the foreign situation which has made the American voter listen to voices calling for a policy of superiority over Russia, the use of force, and the resolute protection of America's interests.

As for domestic affairs, there are increasing inflation, growing unemployment, and tremendous taxes; consequently the American voter has listened to the candidate

who talked to him about "the good old days" when prices were low, taxes were small and the intervention of the government was slight, promising the return of these bygone times!

Proof that the issue is deeper than the fall of Carter and the victory of Reagan is the defeat of all members of the American Congress who are considered liberal in tendency, including those whose defeat was not at all predicted, and the success of people on the American far right.

It has often happened that an American voter preferred a "Republican administration" and a "democratic Congress." However, this time, for the first time in generations, he has chosen a right-wing conservative Republican president and a right-wing conservative Republican congressional majority.

In my appraisal, Ronald Reagan will not solve any domestic problem in America, because he has not brought anything new and because the economic crisis is more complicated than he has tried to tell people. He may very well push America into economic straits of the kind into which Mrs Thatcher has pushed England. Consequently he, like many rulers, will try to find his glory and salvation in foreign policy.

What do you suppose are Ronald Reagan's "keys," on the international stage, especially as regards us in the Middle East?

At the outset it is necessary for us to forget the statement that Ronald Reagan is a "cowboy" and "former actor" and remember that in politics he is senior to Jimmy Carter, at least.

Carter governed the state of Georgia once, and Reagan governed the bigger and more important state of California for two consecutive terms.

Moreover, Reagan is a long-standing presidential candidate. This is the third time Ronald Reagan has presented himself for the presidential elections of the United States. He has been the leader of the Republican Party right wing since Barry Goldwater lost in 1964. He is a candidate for the presidency who has been speaking, writing, meeting and touring without letup for 12 years.

Consequently he is a man with a set group of political convictions. He has his aides, his friends, his colleagues in thinking and his men on whom he will rely.

As regards Israel, Ronald Reagan, like any candidate for the presidency in America, has done his share of the job of winning the confidence of Israel; American presidents have not differed much in that.

However, the English-language magazine MIDDLE EAST has already pointed out that for the first time there are two people with Israeli citizenship, known specifically for allegiance to the Israeli far right wing, in the apparatus assisting Ronald Reagan on Middle East affairs; they are:

Uri Ransan, who previously worked as Israel's consul general in New York, then became the president of a center of international studies there.

Edward Luttwak, Israeli by nationality, who works in the Center of Strategic Studies at Georgetown University, has firm ties with the military organization in Israel, and is the proponent of military action against Arab oilfields.

Then he also has:

Robert Tucker, professor of Political Science at Johns Hopkins University, who in his writings has bluntly appealed for an American strategy of occupying oil fields.

Joseph Chorbá, the rabbi and old friend of Rabbi Meir Kahane's, founder of the well known terrorist group in Israel, who worked in American air force intelligence and whom some consider a "spy" for Israeli within the American military establishment.

Ronald Reagan, who won by this overwhelming percentage, which was not restricted to one group to the exclusion of others, feels that he is not indebted for his victory to a specific group and consequently has, and wants to have, the right to seek the assistance of a broader circle of experts in his government. However, he also feels that the masses' vote gave a mandate bespeaking a strong current toward the right and consequently that he is entitled to have those whom he asks to work for him pledge loyal to him and these right-wing ideas.

The most famous example of this is Henry Kissinger. Kissinger played a part in supporting Reagan--he, Nixon and their friends did--by making it clear that veteran experts also attested to Reagan's probity, responding to the most important charge against him, which is his lack of expertise in foreign affairs. Reagan has displayed a personal desire to have Kissinger as his secretary of state, as has Alexander Haig, former commander of the Atlantic Treaty and Kissinger's assistant when the latter was national security advisor in the White House. Some months ago AL-MUSTAQBAL published the news that when Joseph Sisco was doing the rounds in the Middle Eastern capitals and meeting rulers, he did so in the name of Ronald Reagan; this news item was correct.

However, Reagan cannot appoint Kissinger easily, because the people of the extreme right, Reagan's main base, are severely opposed to that and do not forget that he is the proponent of the policy of detente, which they do not accept.

Therefore we find that "the Kissinger media" are frequently mentioning nowadays that while Ronald Reagan's thinking has moved a little toward the moderate right, Kissinger at the same time has turned a few degrees from the center to the right!

Thus it is to be expected that Ronald Reagan's position on international issues in general will be a mixture of far right beliefs, expertise, practices and advice from people like Nixon, Ford, Kissinger and their men.

What are the general "ideological" premises of the camp Ronald Reagan represents?

The most important element is to stand up to the Soviet Union. All other conduct in the world, for all its vastness, will be subject to this consideration.

One can stand up to the Soviet Union only from a position of strength, and therefore the United States must achieve significant superiority in weapons before talking about anything else.

Once significant military superiority is attained, this prime requirement will demand that the allies, in Europe specifically, show discipline in ranks in confronting the Soviet Union.

This requirement will lead to a suspicious, dissatisfied view of "talk" about neutral and nonaligned countries.

Anything called a "liberation movement" will be looked at with greater suspicion. Ronald Reagan stated long ago, "Every gang that wants to expand its activities calls itself a liberation movement." However, in reality this right wing sees only an extension in one form or another of Soviet influence in all that is "non-aligned" or "liberation Movements".

Therefore:

In what light, "in principle," will Ronald Reagan view the Middle East situation?

He will view it firstly in the light of the struggle with the Soviet Union, in order to prevent Russia from realizing any gains in the region, and will attempt to push it back if possible.

In connection with that he will view it as being firmly linked with the security of the prime raw material required by the West, namely oil.

No more, no less!

Guaranteeing "American interests" in the region is the basis.

Consequently, President Ronald Reagan will ask a fundamental question of those around him:

What is more dangerous to American interests in the region--the Soviet tide, and its probable consequences, or increasing Arab resentment of America, and its consequences?

If the former danger is more serious, America will concentrate on the arms race, acquiring advance bases, a military presence in the area, and the demand for "obedience" before "satisfaction" from all the countries in the region!

If the latter danger is the more serious, then America might find itself impelled to exert the "pressure" against Israel which the Arabs want, for the sake of a reasonable resolution to the Palestine issue and a kind of just peace in the region!

Here the stage beckons to Arab action, if that is at issue!

If the Arab danger remains "talk," as it was for 50 years, the answer will be in kind, that is, "talk about talk," and the gaining of further time to plant Israel's feet every place that is now under its feet.

If the Arabs have something else besides talk, we will be waiting.

11887

CSO: 4802

ISRAEL SEEN ATTEMPTING TO THWART ARAB-EUROPEAN DIALOGUE

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 21 Nov 80 p 30

[Article by David Bishay: "Arab-European Dialogue Welters in Delay; Israel Infuriated because the Chairman of the Arab Delegation is Palestinian"]

[Text] Last Thursday Dr Ahmad Sidqi al-Dajani, member of the Executive Committee of the PLO was seated beside Paul Helminger, Luxembourg's minister of state for foreign affairs as they faced a group of international journalists at an official press conference. The former was there in his capacity as chairman of the Arab League delegation to the Arab-European dialogue; and the latter was there in his capacity as chairman of the European Common Market delegation.

On the same day Lord Carrington, Britain's secretary of state for foreign affairs was issuing a statement that sought to capture the attention of U.S. President-elect Ronald Reagan. He was assuring Mr Reagan that, at least at the present time, the countries of the European [Common] Market would not undertake any radical action vis a vis the question of the Middle East, especially with regard to their recognition of the PLO, until Reagan becomes the actual president and an agreement is reached with him about the policy he intends to adopt towards this problem.

Thus, in one or two sentences Britain assured its ally, the United States, that nothing new would happen on the question of the Middle East at the European Common Market Summit Conference which will be held early next December. This conference was expected to issue a statement defining these countries' positions on two important matters: the first is the official recognition of the PLO as the legitimate and only representative of the Palestinian people, and the second is these countries' support for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state.

But before the first session between the Arab and European delegation was convened in Luxembourg on Wednesday, 12 November, significant communications were made between Washington and the principal countries of the Market--Britain, France and the Federal Republic of Germany. Luxembourg was also included in the communications because of its position as

current chairman of the European side. In these communications the United States called the attention of its allies to three matters it considers fundamental.

First, since the United States is on the verge of a new administration with specific views regarding the subject of the Middle East and the PLO, it would be more appropriate for the European allies not to take any step that would be considered a clear violation of western solidarity on world problems.

Second, the problem of official recognition of the PLO and of the right of the Palestinian people [to have] their independent state is premature. It would be better if this matter were postponed until an agreement is reached on the autonomy question in the context of the Camp David accords. The European position would thus complement and not contradict these accords.

Third, Washington thinks that the countries participating in the sessions of the Arab-European dialogue should not undertake any action that would be construed as official recognition of the PLO in its capacity as chairman of the Arab delegation. These meetings are to take place in an atmosphere that is far away from the ceremonial so that the European position would not be used in the propaganda the organization makes for itself. The United States had not made its object the sessions of the Arab-European dialogue as much as it was aiming at the next summit meeting of the European [Common] Market countries after being assured that these countries, or most of them, were determined to issue a statement that would define their position more specifically than it was defined by that statement which was issued by the Venice Conference last June. At that conference the European countries had emphasized the need for the PLO's participation in the negotiations that would solve the Middle East problem. They also emphasized the need to give the Palestinians their full right to determine their own destiny.

After that Gaston Thorn, Luxembourg's minister of foreign affairs, in his capacity as chairman of the ministerial council of the European Common Market countries, made his well-known visit to the countries of the Middle East. This visit included talks with Yasir 'Arafat, and it became expected, if not certain, that the Common Market countries would declare their new, advanced position on the PLO and on the Arab question after the summit meetings on the 1st and the 2nd of the coming month.

This could have been realized had U.S. President Jimmy Carter been re-elected. According to U.S. sources Carter's administration did not object to the Europeans assuming positions which the United States could not assume publicly. But Carter lost, and in less than 2 months the Reagan administration will take office. The calculations and the balances were turned upside down.

What irritated the Europeans more was Israel's position and the attempts

it made to disrupt the Arab-European dialogue meetings. Ever since the beginning of last month Israel has been inundating the Common Market countries with letters warning against this meeting, emphasizing that despite the fact that the Europeans are claiming that the purpose of the dialogue is economic cooperation, the Arabs' objective is to achieve through this dialogue political cooperation that would impair the security and safety of Israel. When the Europeans ignored Israel's earnest request that the meeting be cancelled, the latter turned to demanding that the meeting be postponed until the PLO's term of presiding over the session of the Arab League expires. This was based on what was mentioned in Israel's message: "How can you say that you do not recognize the PLO officially when your delegation, which is an official delegation, negotiates and holds talks with an official delegation chaired by a representative of the PLO?"

The Europeans looked into the situation together, and they concluded that it was necessary not to postpone the dialogue session after it was delayed 2 full years. However, to preserve appearances it was also decided that the representatives of Qatar and Oman would be [present] along with Dr Ahmad Sidqi al-Dajani: the first, on the basis of the fact that Qatar had chaired the session of the Arab League before the PLO, and the second, in his capacity as representative of the country whose turn to preside over the session will follow that of the organization. However, this did not prevent Dr al-Dajani from fulfilling his function as actual chairman of the Arab delegation. Throughout the 2 days of the meetings it was Dr al-Dajani who led the discussion on behalf of the Arab delegation. At the final press conference it was he who responded to the journalists' questions on behalf of the Arab delegation. Furthermore, he was the one who signed the final communique of the round of negotiations.

The meetings tried to stay away from political subjects or at least not to discuss them in detail until a dialogue session for the ministers of foreign affairs is convened next year. This is the meeting that will cause the principal problem for Israel and for the administration of the newly elected U.S. president.

The preliminary agreement was based on convening this ministers' meeting in June. The Europeans asked the Arab delegation whether the PLO will be presiding over the session of the Arab League at that time or Oman would have succeeded it. The reply came in one word: maybe. Thereupon, the Europeans began their attempts to be ambiguous about the date of the meeting and to postpone it as much as possible until Oman should preside over the session of the Arab League. A meeting with a delegation chaired by Dr al-Dajani, member of the Executive Committee, is one thing; and a meeting with a delegation of ministers of foreign affairs of Arab countries chaired by Faruq al-Qadumi, the PLO's minister of foreign affairs is another. The two principal objectors to the situation were the Netherlands, the Common Market country that is most sympathetic with Israel and will be presiding over the session of the Common Market countries during the first half of next year, and Britain, which will succeed the Netherlands in presiding over the group. Accordingly, Britain

will be hosting the ministers' conference that is to be convened. Until this problem is solved, and it is a problem that concerns the Europeans, attention was turned to the next summit conference of the Common Market countries. At present experts of the European community are preparing five plans to define the positions of the European Common Market on the following subjects: 1. the subject of self-determination for the Palestinian people--a draft plan submitted by Britain; 2. the security of Middle East countries--a plan formulated by France; 3. the withdrawal from the occupied lands--a joint formulation; 4. Jerusalem--a joint formulation; [and] 5. the general principles for solving the Middle East problem--a joint formulation also.

It is the French opinion, which is supported by West Germany, to have the Common Market countries publish a summary of these principles at the next summit conference. However, the remaining countries of the Market think, and some of them insist, that any statement about these political principles should be postponed until next spring, the date for the next summit. In the meantime the policy of Reagan's new administration vis a vis the problem, and especially the PLO, the rights of the Palestinians to determine their own destiny and to have a sovereign, independent state, would have become clear. On the basis of this policy the Europeans can then adjust and amend their policy to suit that of the United States.

In a special statement he made last Thursday, Lord Carrington acknowledged that "the totally unknown element in President Reagan's expected world policy is his policy towards the Middle East." Whereas Carter's administration had accepted the European positions on the problem, there are no indications of what Reagan's positions [will be] except what was said during the elections campaign, and [these statements] most likely do not reflect the real policy of the new administration.

A U.S. source commented on Carrington's opinion by saying, "In this case the Europeans will have to persuade the new U.S. administration about the policy that must be followed towards this question. Lord Carrington would be the best person for this mission."

There is then nothing left for the Arabs and the Europeans alike but to wait for what Reagan's new Middle East policy will bring before positions are defined and the shape of future actions is determined.

8592
CSO: 4802

SADAT CONFIDANT REMINISCES ABOUT 1973 WAR

Cairo AKHIR SA'AH in Arabic 1, 8 Oct 80

[1 Oct 80 pp 15-18]

[Part One of the Memoirs of Presidential Adviser Sayyid Mar'i on the October War: "Secret of the Unexpected Meeting of 4 Ramadan in President Al-Sadat's House"]

[Text] In publishing the following memoirs by Presidential assistant Sayyid Mar'i, AKHIR SA'AH discloses details of the surprise meeting of the National Security Council under the chairmanship of President Al-Sadat on 4 Ramadan—six days before the battle. At that meeting, the president asked each official for a full and true picture of the domestic situation. He told them: "I am interested in hearing your views as honestly as your consciences will permit you to express them. History will not have mercy on anyone." After that the president presented a comprehensive picture of the Arab and international situation. The general consensus at that meeting was that there was no alternative to a military battle. The question was when to do battle. President Al-Sadat knew the answer to that question. Consequently, the October war was a decisive turning point in the situation. Its impact affected the entire region and catapulted the Arabs into the "sixth power" in the world. In the following pages, Sayyid Mar'i describes those decisive days that preceded the battle and gives an account about how the Egyptian command put the latest touches on the great crossing operation despite the internal climate of anxiety and soul-searching. He recounts how the people concerned patiently and quietly prepared for zero hour on 6 October and how President al-Sadat took "the decision" at his own historical responsibility.

During those days in 1973, which were later destined to become a historic period, President al-Sadat, though swamped by growing responsibilities and burdens, kept instilling in us a sense of inexplicable optimism in the midst of a mounting state of psychological tension and anguish at home caused by the long waiting for a battle of liberation that was nowhere in sight. That situation was exacerbated by a substantial increase in Israeli attempts to exploit that state of internal

tension in Egypt as a counteraction against the political and diplomatic efforts President al-Sadat was making against Israel in the international arena. The president personally followed up those efforts and watched with satisfaction as their impact began to grow day after day.

Then something strange happened with the advent of the month of Ramadan. It has been an old custom of President al-Sadat to go into seclusion during that month. This particular month, however, he did not go into seclusion or cut down the number of official meetings and activities. Instead, he called a meeting of the National Security Council in his house at Al-Jizah. He scheduled the meeting for 4 Ramadan or 30 September, 1973. The National Security Council members who attended the meeting were: The two vice presidents, Husayan al-Shafi'i and Dr Mahmud Fawzi; the two presidential assistants, 'Aziz Siqqi and I; Speaker of the People's Assembly Hafiz Badawi; Muhammad Hafiz Isma'il, the president's national security adviser; Presidential adviser Ashraf Ghurbal; the late Minister of War Ahmad Isma'il; Dr Abd al-Qadir Hatim, the Minister of Information; the director of intelligence and several ministers.

It was not an unusual meeting, for it was customary to call the National Security Council into session now and then to discuss the general policy, the international outlook and the military situation and to draw up a strategy of action in the light of changing circumstances. President Anwar al-Sadat opened the meeting with an outline of the international situation as it stood at the time. The president said that Israel is behaving with unbridled liberty and license in the entire Middle East. Its continuous provocations, such as its raid against the Beirut international airport, the murder of the three Palestinian martyrs [in Beirut], the shooting down of the Libyan civilian airliner over Sinai, etc, constitute a defiance of the region and the world as a whole. He also said that on 4 February 1971 he made his famous initiative from the dais of the People's Assembly to re-open the Suez Canal for navigation as a public token of his desire to avoid war, but that his initiative went down the drain as a result of Israel's arrogance. After that, he declared 1972 the year of decision, but the delay in Soviet arms shipments prevented it from becoming so. He added that since the beginning of this year--1973--the situation in the region is growing more dangerous. Some of our international friends, he noted, are eagerly and diligently working in favor of re-opening the Suez Canal for navigation, in the belief that they would be doing us a service. Meanwhile, the majority of the international community, prominently the United States, is under the impression that we will never fight. Indeed, he continued, the United States has come to consider us something of a corpse, while the Soviet Union is procrastinating about fulfilling the contracts of our arms purchases.

From Ras Muhammad to Damascus

The president added: "On the other hand, the political picture is different from that projection. During this year, 1973, we have achieved major victories in terms of reviving our cause and gaining international support--to the extent that the U.S. is now the only state which uses the veto against us in the Security Council. This in itself adds to the isolation of Israel. The American veto was in fact a victory for us because 15 members of the council voted for us, while only the U.S. supported Israel. On a different level, the African summit in Addis Ababa has taken an excellent stand in favor of the Arab cause. So did the

summit of nonaligned states. Despite the continuation of Israeli occupation for the sixth year and Israel's intensive psychological war against us, we managed to build up an overwhelming international current of sympathy for us and opposition to Israel."

Turning to the Arab dimension, President al-Sadat said that for months now he has been making serious endeavors in the Arab world amidst a frenzied atmosphere and that he has tried to purify that atmosphere as much as possible. The sentiments of all Arabs, he said, are virtually in sympathy with us, and we should not give anyone the opportunity to rejoice at our misfortunes, because all Arabs are fully aware that the battle is ours and that we should wage it jointly and equally. The president added, "When I look at Ras Muhammad in Israeli-occupied Sinai and measure the distance between it and any city in Upper Egypt, I am struck by the fact that it is equal to the distance between Ras Muhammad and Al-Madinah, Damascus or Beirut. Everyone knows that. Our efforts on the Arab level have borne fruit in the past few months, and we now have to decide on our own the future of this state of no-peace no-war. Our battle with Israel will not be a battle of one day or one week. It will depend on many factors in the domestic situation."

Report on Supply and Communications

The president then asked the Minister of Supply, who was attending the meeting, to report on the supply situation. The Minister of Supply said: "The wheat supplies which we have are only sufficient for about 15 days of consumption. We expect fresh shipments of wheat from abroad. These would be sufficient for two months, but they have not arrived in Alexandria yet. As for other supply materials, we have enough to last us a month."

President al-Sadat remarked that he had issued instructions to have a supply level of no less than two months at all times. How is it then that the wheat supply level was allowed to dwindle to 15 days only? The minister replied that this is due to delays in shipments and in finding cargo ships, but he assured the president that the arrival of the shipments is imminent and they they would boost the supply level to the two-month point.

The president then asked the Minister of Transport for a brief report on the transport situation. The minister said that it is not good, that there is a shortage in railway trains and cars and that the railroad tracks in some areas of the country have to be repaired or replaced. Commenting on this, the president said: "Inasmuch as we face enormous economic problems and inasmuch as these problems are multiplying, we must assume that Israel is taking this factor into account and is betting on the passage of time as a major factor in the collapse of our internal front. All what Israel has to do to achieve that goal is to maintain the military fait accompli and freeze the issue politically. We have now reached a juncture in which we must make a choice and a decision."

Anxiety at Home

President al-Sadat then said: "I am interested in hearing your views as honestly as your consciences will permit you to express them. History will not be merciful with anyone." The late Lt Gen Ahmad Isma'il, then the Minister of War, said:

"Our forces have received extremely great training, and their combat level is very high. But--if we are thinking of going to war, it should be understood from now that we will deal Israel severe blows and receive equally severe blows from it." Mamduh Salim, then the Minister of the Interior, said: "As far as the internal situation is concerned, I should point out that there is a state of anxiety. A cure can be devised, and it does not necessarily have to be predicated on a military move. As for the political and military situations, Israel is developing militarily and has begun producing many kinds of military hardware. At a time of detente between the Soviet Union and the U.S. we must think of how to exert pressure on the two superpowers. At any rate, the people will offer the proper sacrifices when necessary. Our preparations are now complete and we are now in a state of complete preparedness."

Hafiz Ghanim said: "The sacrifices that we can make are the main thing." Hasan al-Tuhami said: "The presence of international support for our cause will be of no use to us in war. The efforts that are being made in the Arab arena have not achieved their objectives yet. Considering that the war responsibility should be a collective Arab responsibility, I suggest that we concentrate our efforts on the Arab arena for six more months in preparation for the battle."

'Aziz Sidqi commented as follows: "The element of time should be taken into account. It will be difficult to maintain the internal front for a long time. The spirit of defeatism will increase, and this will happen for the first time since the war of attrition which caused America a great deal of concern at the time."

Hasan al-Tuhami repeated his suggestion that the Arab states be asked to share the responsibility, saying that we should first go to the Arab states and bring them into the picture. President al-Sadat replied at this point: "This means that if we here in Egypt decide to go to war against Israel then we should notify the Arab states of that decision. Such action would weaken the strategic importance of the decision."

The debate then centered around the possible solutions and whether a political or a military settlement is a more necessary means of action. Lt Gen Ahmad Isma'il said at this point: "A political solution without a military one will get us nowhere. On the other hand, our financial capabilities would make it difficult for us to liberate the entire occupied territory by military means. The Soviet Union is giving us arms in very small doses. And if we do not receive new arms in a fairly short time, our present weapons will begin to erode and become unusable and obsolete. This means that even if there is to be a political solution, it can only result from a military battle. I expect that we and the Israelis will fight that battle ferociously. Brother Mamduh Salim said a minute ago that we are at the highest level of preparedness. This is inaccurate, for we have shortages in many areas. Our basic weaponry is from the East, but some of our complementary equipment and material are from the West. There is a lot to be done if we are to be as comparably armed as Israel. Yet, all possible solutions have to start with military action. They must come through war. It will not be an easy or a short war, and our losses will be great, but Israel's losses will be greater."

The president's adviser, Dr Ashraf Ghorbal, then spoke. He said: "I agree with Lt Gen Ahmad Isma'il that war is inevitable under any circumstances. The war which

we would wage will be a new war. This would be necessitated by the present cease-fire. We must know that a new war should be limited in time and area and that the superpowers will not allow it to expand or go on. As for the political settlements that are being proposed, we should take into account that they have the approval of both the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Therefore, nothing is left for us but the battle. In that battle, we should achieve the most possible gains in the shortest possible time before we are politically forced to stop fighting. In other words, political settlements in today's world are based on the fait accompli existing at the time--that is to say, on the new reality which would result from the battle." Ashraf Ghurbal paused for a moment, then turned to President al-Sadat and said: "Mr President, we must draw Israeli blood. We must win with Israel's blood. There will be no solution any other way." He went on: "The whole world is with us, and yet, in the end, reality will prevail over logic and reason. It has become necessary to put an end to Israel's arrogance, defiance and aggressiveness. We have international support and the Arab situation has improved a lot, although there is always room for further improvement. The Arab states should at least help us in providing us with an adequate supply reserve, and Arab oil will inevitably play a role. It is not important that the Arabs should nationalize the oil. This, in fact, would be a futile move. What matters is for the oil not to reach Israel's supports in particular.

Speaking in his usual quiet manner, Dr Mahmud Fawzi, the vice president, now addressed the group for the first time. He said: "What interests me here is to remind the brethren of some history. When Britain, France and Israel attacked Egypt in 1956, the U.S. strongly intervened against them. Its intervention at the time was not just due to the fact that America resented competition from Britain and France, but was motivated by its desire to prevent the return of those two powers to the Middle East, having successfully ejected them from the region and inherited their political and economic influence. It was America indeed which had driven Britain and France out. When it intervened in the wake of the 1956 aggression, America sought to make sure that they stay out of the region for good and that their inheritance would pass on to it. That was the paramount consideration behind America's action. But that was in the past. As for the future, I imagine that we should now set up an operations room for every single activity that has to do with preparing for the battle. In disagreement with some of the views here, I feel optimistic because we are actually stronger than we feel and our situation is better than the picture which comes out of this conversation. The last point I would like to make is that, in talking about the Arab arena, we have not clarified thus far what is it that we want from the Arabs and to what extent."

After a pause, Lt Gen Isma'il spoke again. He said: "Israel is already aware that our armed forces are regaining their strength and consolidating their preparedness. Subsequently, we must consider the proposition that Israel, in that case, might itself initiate war operations against us and not wait until our state of preparedness is complete. In other words, there is a possibility that Israel may take the initiative. We should prevent this. Our military operations should have the element of surprise and should be done in a manner that Israel would not expect."

Muhammad Hafiz Isma'il said: "I believe that it is necessary for us first to collect some basic data about the enemy." Replied Lt Gen Isma'il: "That's a sound idea, but we should realize our limited capabilities here. If we had

long-range reconnaissance aircraft, we would be able to gather that kind of information. But we do not have that kind of aircraft and our present capabilities do not enable us to map out the entire area of Sinai. At any rate, when the battle comes, we will hit hard and be hit hard too."

For the first time since letting the debate take its course, President al-Sadat again addressed the council members. He said: "There are several considerations which have to be clarified. I had planned to go to war in November of last year (1972) and ordered Lt Gen Muhammad Sadiq (the former War Minister) to prepare for that date. I clearly ordered him to do so in the presence of Sayyid Mar'i and Hafiz Isma'il who are present here. A month before the set date, that is last October, I discovered that he had made no preparations. This is one. The second point has to do with the two superpowers. I should make it clear that neither the Soviet Union nor the U.S. will offer us any help. Our problem today is that we are in a purely defensive position. We have not moved away from that position, not even to prove that we are still alive. This means that we are in a dangerous phase. The continuation of such a phase will surely spell our doom, and Israel will not even have to fire a single shot. The supply problems can be solved. The basic problem is that of the armed forces. The basic question that I have addressed to the armed forces is this: Do we face up to the Israeli challenge or not? That was my main concern and preoccupation. We are economically overburdened. Our supply situation is insecure. Hafiz Isma'il wants to do another round. Kissinger has asked for another meeting with him. Kissinger, however, believes that we have become a lifeless corpse. Before Kissinger, William Rogers told Gromyko in June of 1972 that Israel is the victor and should reap the fruits of its victory. We do not exclude the possibility of talking to the Americans, but any talks with them would be of no value unless we do it from a position of strength."

Dr Mahmud Fawzi remarked at this point: "This is true. Our negotiating position at present is, with due respect, below zero. The old Japanese warrior used to go to battle with two swords--one long, one short. He would first use the short sword. If he lost it, he would then use the long sword. Our upcoming battle is that of the short sword."

Dr Ashraf Ghurbal said: "If I were to choose how to get to a new line in the depth of Sinai--either by negotiations or by doing battle, I would choose the course of doing battle. Once we reach a new line through war, then we can reach a further line through negotiation. But it would be impossible for us to reach any line through negotiations alone. The question then is that it is quite essential for us to reach a new line in Sinai by military action. The foreign powers will not allow us to move militarily beyond a certain point, and that time they will insist that the political agreement which would be worked out would preclude any further military moves by us."

The president then related a short story. He said: "In the summer (a few months before the present meeting), I was in Burj al-'Arab. An American visitor who considers himself to be fully knowledgeable about the situation came to visit me. He asked me: Until when do you intend to remain in the situation in which you are now? Why cannot the Arabs recognize the facts, namely, that they were defeated in 1967 and that Israel is strong enough to dictate its will to the Arabs any time it wishes to do so. So why do not you accept a settlement on the basis that you are a defeated state?' I told him in reply: 'You say that we are a defeated

state. True, we were defeated in a specific period of time--the 1967 war, but you cannot assume that we were a defeated state when we carried out the 1969 war of attrition. You cannot also assume that we are a defeated country now, for a simple reason, namely, that we have not lost the adequate means and capabilities to regain our strength.' The American visitor then said: 'Mr President, I hope that you would not be offended by this expression--but you are a dead horse. Therefore, you have to accept the settlement that Israel would offer you.' This is the way the world sees us. Unless we can basically change that view, there will be no use."

It appeared to me at this point that the atmosphere was turning into one of real preparation for a military battle. But--would the battle come soon? Would it come after days or after a month? Or after six months? The meeting ended on this note, but I was still uncertain as to what the outcome was. And so each one of us left the meeting with his own ideas and impressions.

After everyone has left, I went up to the president's office in the upper level of his house in Al-Jizah. I found him seated, a look of utter solemnity on his face. I sat down silently, and for several moments, no one talked. Then the president broke the silence. "Sayyid," he said, "we will fight." I said spontaneously: "No question about it, Mr President, war is the only alternative."

But the question marks kept nagging me again: when will the war take place? What would its scope be? We have all believed since the 1967 aggression that war is the only solution, that what was taken by force can only be regained by force. But, on this day, 30 September, 1973, the question remains: when can a war be mounted? The president, as he disclosed at the meeting, had asked the former war minister to prepare for a war in November 1972. That is a year ago. But he discovered a month before that date that the minister had made no preparations. Now, on 30 September, 1973, the Minister of War Ahmad Isma'il sounded more confident--indeed, more determined and realistic. He said: We will hit the enemy hard and the enemy will hit us hard too. How hard? How extensive would those blows be? When? Up to this moment, the president indicated that he prefers to assume the responsibility on his own. He let everyone at the meeting express his views freely and candidly, but the man who will take the decision before history and take the responsibility for that decision will be Anwar al-Sadat alone. This is the real situation while I am sitting here with the president in his house of 30 September. He told me: We will fight. These are words that we have always said and believed.

I told the president: "According to the picture that I see before me, there's actually no alternative to war. But, surely, we will not wage war before we have made complete preparations and completed all the necessary training." The president quietly replied: "Of course, of course. At any rate, when we go to war, you will have a specific role to play." I said: "We are your soldiers, Mr President. What role would that be?" He replied: "You will be given instructions when the time comes. At that time, Hafiz Isma'il will be in touch with you on a continuous basis."

Instructions in a Secret Envelope

After that conversation I was convinced that a new war was near, but I could not tell whether it was imminent or not. When I returned home that evening at around 9:30 p.m., I must have been visibly nervous, for my wife asked me if anything was the matter. I told her that everything was all right, but in fact I was quite anxious and apprehensive. The political situation made going to war necessary, but the situation in the areas of supply and transportation--indeed, the domestic situation as a whole make it necessary that we prepare for this war for some 6 months at least. And when the war does break out, will the army be prepared this time? Has the president verified this matter personally? How would the Americans and the Soviets react to a new war? I suddenly found myself besieged by hundreds of question marks. To relieve the tension that was building up within me, I put on my clothes again and went to my other house near the pyramids, hoping to get some peace and quiet there. From there I called up a number of friends and asked them to join me in the morning. Next morning, they all came, and we had lunch together. We talked about everything except politics.

In the evening, I received a telephone call from my house at Al-Zamalik. A messenger from the office of Hafiz Isma'il was waiting for me with an envelope which has to be delivered to me personally and immediately. I told the messenger to wait until I arrived.

The envelope contained four kinds of information:

- 1) How to establish contact with the president's office in the event of war.
- 2) The new telephone numbers in the president's office.
- 3) How to establish contact with Hafiz Isma'il, the president's national security adviser.
- 4) How to establish contact with the ministers.

The envelope also included a list of code names assigned to senior officials. The code names were all chosen from Islamic history. For example, Hafiz Isma'il's code name was 'Umar Ibn al-Khattab, mine was 'Uthman Ibn 'Affan. This was one of several measures taken to insure complete secrecy. At that moment, I became certain that the war was closer than I ever thought.

On the next day of Ramadan--October 1973--the president summoned us to an urgent meeting at Al-Tahirah palace. When I went there, I found that the meeting included much fewer people than the previous meeting. This time, those attending were Dr 'Abd al-Qadir Hatim, Deputy Prime Minister for Culture and Information, Dr 'Abd al-'Aziz Hijazi, Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs, Minister of the Interior Mamduh Salim, the president's national security adviser Hafiz Isma'il and Dr Ashraf Ghurbal, the president's adviser for press affairs. At that meeting, "war" responsibilities were assigned. Once again, the president did not reveal a date for the coming battle, but on that day it became unquestionably clear to us that we will be going to war within days if not within hours. At that meeting, too, the president asked Dr Ashraf Ghurbal to be in charge of overseeing the media. He asked him to move his office to the television building

where he would oversee all statements, announcements and programs about the battle. He told him that, when the war breaks out, he wants short and accurate statements that are 100 percent truthful, even if the facts were not in our favor. He also told him that all data and information will be made available to him immediately so that he may be able to answer questions from foreign or Arab newsmen.

I was more apprehensive than ever before when I returned home after that meeting. What made it worse is that I was unable to tell anyone about what bothers me, not even my wife. As I look back at that time now and try to figure out why I was so overwhelmed by anxiety, I have to admit that the major cause was the nightmare of the 1967 war--a nightmare no Arab--official or nonofficial--can escape or deny. I kept asking myself: could Israel spring a surprise attack against us this time? Would Israel's air supremacy demoralize our fighters? Can the Egyptian fighter make up for the vast quantitative and qualitative gap in armament between Egypt and Israel? And the Bar Lev line--to what extent would we be able to destroy it. Scores of similar questions whizzed in my head--and I was not at liberty to reveal them to anyone or even to sound them out to myself.

Everything According to Plan

From that moment on, I stayed home until I heard the first war communique at 2:05 o'clock on 6 October. The communique was brief, concise and reserved. It was a model for all subsequent statements and communiqués which have all maintained an air of objectivity, calm and balance as if the early achievement of the war was not the crossing of the largest water barrier in history. For the first time in 6 years, the war looked to me as something deadly serious, shaking and very real. More than that, it stirred in me the thrill of pride and dignity. The mere simple fact that we took up arms against the Zionist occupation was enough to bring back a sense of self-esteem and manliness that was lost and tested for 6 long years.

The minutes passed slowly, nervously, anxiously and yet joyfully. Afhruf Ghurbal's balanced perspective, objectivity and calmness instilled in the war communiqués a spirit of quiet elation and cautious confidence and caught the attention of a world long used to discounting our credibility. This time, however, the world had to turn away from Israel and listen to us to find out the truth.

A Meeting With the President

I could not resist my urges to be close to where the action is beyond 7 P.M. So I got dressed and drove to where President Anwar al-Sadat established his headquarters during the battle. The trip took a longer time than usual because of the blackout. The jubilation which I sensed among the people in the streets was counterbalanced by a sense of substantial reservation. For the first time after long patience and silence, Egypt was seeking revenge.

The president was at Al-Tahirah palace. The security precautions and measures along the route from my house to the palace convinced me that my friend Mamduh Salim must have planned them in his mind a thousand times. Civilians and military men alike exchanged congratulations with me. Although no one knew exactly what was going on in Sinai at that particular moment, they all knew with their sixth sense, nevertheless, that the dignity and pride of Egypt were the driving force behind those sons of Egypt who were fighting in the sands of Sinai.

I found the president sitting in the lower annex of the large salon smoking his pipe. His calmness answered half of my questions at once. But I still had some questions on my mind. "Mr President," I said, "what is the news?" He answered: "Thank God, thank God. The news is great." He then fell silent, while a flood of questions was rushing into my head trying to get as much reassuring information as possible. I waited a while, then I asked: "Is everything proceeding according to plan, or are there any surprises?" Once again, the 1967 nightmare was forcing itself upon my subconscious. For a while, the president did not answer, as if what was happening then in Sinai was not the greatest action any president in our times has ever conceived and planned. Then he said: "Thank God, thank God. Everything is going according to plan." Again, I asked: "Have our forces crossed the Suez Canal?" This time he answered with the smile of a commander who is fully confident of his soldiers' abilities: "Yes, we have crossed the canal. We have crossed the canal most certainly." "Have we crossed with infantry or tanks?" I asked. The president drew on his pipe, then said: "We have crossed with infantry!" Suddenly, my heart fell. The 1967 incubus was assailing me again. The only way we can wipe out that incubus is to wipe it out with our blood, with the courage and bullets of our infantrymen who were now crossing the canal shouting: "Good is greater! God is greater!"

An hour passed and the minutes were ticking away as aides walked in and out with papers and more papers. And out there Egypt was writing a new history with the blood of its sons. Yet my first question to the president after two hours was: "Mr President. What is protecting those soldiers?"

The president suddenly realized that the one who was talking was not one of his aides but me—one of millions of simple Egyptians who are not familiar with military matters and who may have sons or brothers fighting right now in Sinai. He suddenly realized that, like millions of other people, I was a citizen who is finally gripped by a sense of regained pride and who wants to make sure that nothing will rob him of that sense again. Calmly, confidently and slowly, the president said: "The soldiers who have crossed are called in military language infantrymen. There are enemy tanks in front of them, but they have been attacking enemy tanks with small guns called (RPG or RPJ or RBJ). With these small guns they have destroyed a very large number of Israeli tanks." His words sounded in my ears as the sweetest symphony I have ever heard. I said: "So our sons have actually crossed the Suez Canal?" Replied the commander who was confident of the bravery of his soldiers: "Yes, yes. Thousands of them have crossed the canal. They have already set up pontoon bridges across the canal and captured the largest part of the Bar Lev line." I said anxiously: "And what about the Israeli air force, Mr President?" He turned to me as a teacher turns to someone who is learning his alphabet and said: "We have taken it into our account, Sayyid. Relax." I persisted: "And our tanks--when will they cross to the other bank?" He said: "Listen, Sayyid. This telephone here will ring at 10 o'clock sharp. The speaker will be Lt Gen Ahmad Isma'il who will give me the OK that our tanks have crossed the canal."

It was a polite hint for me to keep quiet, for nothing can be worse than some assistant putting tens of questions to a commander who is leading the battle of a lifetime. But I felt that I was not asking questions--only trying to seek reassurance. If it were up to me, I would have asked the president to repeat

his answers a hundred times. It was a moment in history--in the history of our country and nation--in which we wanted history to freeze. Defeat had been slow, bitter, torturing, hateful. And now, in a wink, all this hideous legacy was banished. In 6 hours, the Egyptian fighter had swept aside 6 years of an oppressive nightmare from the history of his nation. What courage is that! What miracle!

The telephone rang on the end table besides the president. Unconsciously, I looked at my watch. It was 10 o'clock sharp. If only I could describe the feelings of a person who has been waiting 6 years for a telephone call when the call finally comes! If only I could describe to the reader the rush of tension, anxiety and anticipation which welled up in me at that particular moment. Even if I could, I would not be able to convey the importance of that telephone call. I looked at the telephone, then at the president's face, then at my watch, then at the telephone, then at the president again. The president must have realized all the emotions that were churning inside me, for he asked me to answer the telephone. I picked up the telephone. Yes, it was Lt Gen Ahmad Isma'il. I could not muster the courage to ask him anything in the presence of the leader who had planned the entire battle, so I handed the receiver to the president. A one-way conversation ensued. Every now and then the president would say: OK, Ahmad...Very good... These are light casualties...And how are the boys?... That's right, Ahmad... Great, Ahmad... Great, indeed... Congratulations. The president said the last word as if he were saying it to every one of the thousands of fighters who have crossed the canal to the other side. When he said it, my heart was filled with reassurance for the first time, and I felt a strong urge at that moment to convey the same word to all the people as warmly, as confidently as the president had uttered it.

(To be continued in the next edition)

[8 Oct 80 pp 16-19]

[Part Two of the Memoirs of Presidential Assistant Sayyid Mar'i About the October War: "A Mission to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States in the Midst of the Battle"]

[Text] President al-Sadat was watching the international situation with very calm nerves and a sense of great, but cautious, optimism. He ate sparingly. It was the president's habit on a normal day, except for the days of fasting, to have breakfast then eat nothing until 7 P.M. when he would have dinner, which is his main meal. Therefore, he ate very little when the fast is broken during Ramadan. He was always alert, but not nervous. And he always looked to be in deep thought. On the second day of the battle--less than 36 hours after the battle started--the president told me: "You are assigned to a very important mission. You have to visit the oil-producing countries." I asked him: "What do you have in mind?" He replied: "First, do not dictate any views to anyone. Second, I am not asking for a specific policy. All what I am asking is that they carry out their role in the battle as they see fit. Three, I would like for the oil question to be viewed as a question which can serve our cause." I asked whether he wants the oil-producing countries to cut off the oil flow completely or just reduce production. He replied: "This is left to the discretion of the Arab brethren themselves. Egypt has no particular requests in that regard. Egypt has

proceeded to play its role for the sake of the Arab cause. Our brethren should determine the rest and choose what they can do for their countries and the Arab nation as a whole." The president then spelled out a number of guidelines which I wrote down on a sheet of paper and put in my pocket.

When I returned home, I began to think about the oil question. It was a new subject to me and I had no idea about it. I kept asking myself how could I leave the matter to the oil-producing countries. Moreover, the leaders of those countries are bound to ask me what does Egypt want and how does it want them to act. It was necessary that the picture be clear in my mind. I had to know the oil production of the Arab oil-producing countries and the amounts of oil received by the United States and the other Western nations as well as the Eastern bloc states. I had no knowledge of any such things. I called President al-Sadat and told him that Dr Mustafa Khalil has a lot of data about oil and I sought the president's permission for Dr Khalil to accompany me on the mission to the oil-producing countries. The president agreed and told me that he has a copy of the study which Dr Mustafa Khalil had prepared and that he would send me that copy immediately.

I called up Dr Khalil and asked him if he could come over to my house. Just before he arrived, the president's copy of the oil study was delivered to me. Dr Khalil noticed the files as he entered my study and he jokingly asked me how did I get hold of the study which had taken him 6 months to prepare. I told him the story, adding that I would not be able to complete reading the three files of the study that night, so could he tell me the gist of his findings?

So Dr Khalil briefed me in detail about the roots of the world energy problem, the problems of oil imports and exports, world reserves, the Arab oil situation and the ways in which oil can be used for political ends. Dr Khalil's discussion and my questions and queries lasted 5 hours. We ended our conversation at 1:30 in the morning. We agreed that he would write a brief memo outlining the means and ways in which Arab oil can be used in support of our present battle, and that we would meet again in the morning in my office at the People's Assembly to discuss the memo.

At 10:30 in the morning, Dr Mustafa Khalil came to my office with a 13-page memo. While we were discussing it, I received a telephone call informing me that the Arab Trade Unions Federation is preparing a statement in which it would call upon all Arabs to destroy oil pipelines immediately so that oil would not go to the states that support Israel. I rejected that kind of thinking on the spot and said that we are studying the oil question and devising solutions which can be more conducive to the fulfillment of our objectives as well as more consistent with the interests of the Arab world.

Discussion About the "Oil Weapon"

I called up the vice president Dr Mahmud Fawzi. After explaining to him the mission which was entrusted to me by the president, I asked him if Dr Mustafa Khalil and I can call on him for consultation before our departure. In his usual gentle manner, Dr Fawzi invited us to come immediately. As we sat down in Dr Fawzi's office, Dr Mustafa Khalil suggested that Dr Fawzi ask one of his

aide to read out the memo so that he may be freed to explain some of the major points in the memo.

In his memo, Dr Mustafa Khalil argued that the Arabs should not say that they will use oil as a weapon, nor should they say that they will use it against all states indiscriminately, because that would antagonize the entire world. He then says that the war will not last forever and that when the war comes to an end, that will be the time when the world's support of our cause in the political negotiations which are bound to follow the war will be a crucial factor. With regard to the United States, the message which should be conveyed to it, through the use of oil, is that Israel is not the protector of American interests in the Middle East. Subsequently, we, the Arabs, should avoid harming America's interests in the region because that could result either in a greater American dependence on Israel or in a direct American military intervention to protect Washington's jeopardized interests. Therefore, any possible use of the oil option should be designed to persuade America that Israel is not the protector of U.S. interests in the Middle East, that the Arabs can guarantee those interests.

The conclusion which we arrived at through discussing the memo is that the pan-Arab interest requires the Arab states not to use their oil as a weapon with which they can threaten anyone at will, but that common sense and sound reason dictate that the Arab oil be declared a strategic economic commodity.

Shortly before the October war, negotiations took place between the Arab oil-producing states and the major oil companies over a modest Arab request--to raise the price of oil from \$3.00 to \$5.00 per barrel. The Arab request was modest, because the proposed increase would barely cover the increase in the world prices of other commodities and cope with the decrease in the value of the dollar. Yet the Western oil companies rejected that request. As a result of their adamance, the negotiations failed and were suspended on 16 September, 1973. But it was agreed that a new round of negotiations will be held in Vienna on 9 October. On 6 October, the war broke out.

Warning From Faysal to Nixon

On the same day on which we were meeting in Dr Mahmud Fawzi's office in Cairo, representatives of 20 Western oil companies, under the chairmanship of George (Percy), chairman of the board of Esso, were meeting in Vienna, Austria, with representatives of 6 oil-producing countries, primarily Saudi Arabia. For the second time, the oil companies told the oil producers again that they reject the proposed increase in the prices of Arab oil "for the most part."

This, on the economic level. On the political front, President Anwar al-Sadat said shortly before the October war that "the Arabs are capable of giving and denying.... The whole world should know that." His warning, however, went unheeded. More than that, King Faysal Ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz, may God have mercy on his soul, had sent a subtle letter of warning to the U.S. President Richard Nixon through the U.S. ambassador in Riyadh. In sum, the letter said that Saudi Arabia's position on the question of pumping oil is well-known, but that Saudi Arabia might have to review its position in the future if the Middle East crisis is not settled justly and equitably. But once again, the Saudi warning was ignored.

Accordingly, it was clear to us as we met in Dr Mahmud Fawzi's office in Cairo on 9 October, 1973, that there must be a serious and credible Arab position on the question of oil. But should that position express itself in the form of a total suspension of oil pumping? Should be taken against all states indiscriminately? Should be taken immediately? Finally, it was agreed in our discussions that the Arabs should use oil in a manner that differentiates between friend and foe and in a manner that would not paralyze West's economies. Secondly, the goal should strictly be the protection of the Arab cause. It should be done merely as a warning. Therefore, the most desired action is to cut down Arab oil production enough to give a warning. Furthermore, each Arab state concerned should determine on its own how best to go about fulfilling that objective. Egypt should not tell that state what to do, for each state should be free to determine the course of action that is most consistent with its own interests within the framework of the overall Arab cause.

The meeting ended at 3:30 in the afternoon. It was clear by then that I should embark on my mission post haste. Time was running short. I decided that my tour should include Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain and Abu Dhabi and should be concluded as soon as possible.

Do Not Hit That Plane

I called up Lt Gen Ahmad Isma'il, the Minister of War, to tell him about my mission and to ask him for a military aircraft to take us--Dr Mustafa Khalil and I--to our destinations and for a senior military officer to accompany us. President al-Sadat had suggested that a senior officer travel with us to explain the military situation to the Arab kings and heads of state. Maj Gen Sa'd al-Qadi was selected to accompany us, and Lt Gen Isma'il told me that al-Qadi will carry with him maps and a complete array of data and information to explain the military situation to the Arab leaders. As for providing us with a military aircraft, Lt Gen Isma'il said that he preferred that we use a civilian aircraft, because a military plane would be easier for the enemy to identify and try to shoot down. He suggested that we travel in an Egypt Air Boeing. I said jokingly: "But a civilian Boeing airliner will be slower and easier to hit." He replied: "Don't worry about that. The danger that your aircraft will be hit will not come from Israel because Israel does not dare penetrate our air space." I quickly asked: "How's that?" He laughed and said: "Our security measures require our anti-aircraft artillery to shoot immediately at any military or civilian aircraft which enters our air space." I asked what is to be done in that case. He said: "Relax. Your aircraft will be the only aircraft which will not be shot at by instructions from me." "So, there are then security measures?" I asked. The man, whose soldiers were at that moment fighting their greatest battle in Sinai, said: "Of course there are security measures, and they are being enforced by the minute and the second. Do you think that Israel's fear of penetrating our air space up till now is accidental?" "No, of course not," I said. "May God be with you. Well, shall we get our suitcases ready?" Ahmad Isma'il said: "No, not now. I need 10 full hours, not because of security measures but because all our civilian airplanes are in Saudi Arabia and Sudan. I will have to summon one of them to Cairo to fly you on your mission. Anyway, be prepared to go to Cairo airport early tomorrow morning. You will find the airliner, which will be the only one in the airport, waiting for you."

After that telephone conversation, I went to see President al-Sadat to brief him about the arrangements that I have made and to receive his final instructions. The president asked me to first visit the Saudi monarch, King Faysal, then the Amir of Kuwait, then Abu Dhabi, Bahrain and so forth. He also asked me to advise the Arab leaders about the major outlines of the political, military and oil situations. Then he repeated his earlier admonition: "Keep in mind that Egypt is not asking for anything. Do not embarrass anyone or commit anyone to anything. Egypt only seeks to present the political and military situation and offer suggestions and alternatives as to any Arab action involving the use of oil. Egypt leaves the decision to each sisterly Arab country so that each country will act in the manner that it deems appropriate and favorable to its conditions and circumstances within the general framework of the fundamental cause that links all of us together. We do not want oil to be used as a weapon with which others can be threatened--only as a means of protecting our cause. In that sense, reducing oil production is politically and economically better than suspending the flow of oil. We have no specific request as to the degree of reduction because this is up to the Arab brethren themselves." The president then wished me success and I returned home to prepare my luggage.

The Mission Begins in Saudi Arabia

When the car took me to Cairo's international airport at that early hour of 10 October 1973, the people in the street seemed to have been born again. The battle--which was not making world-wide headlines--has given them a new zest for life. It seemed to me that they were smiling for the first time in their life. By that time, the Bar Lev line--the pride of Israel's military knowhow--had collapsed in 6 hours. Egyptian troops had crossed the Suez Canal to the other side and were sure to stay there. The Israeli air force has failed in its attempts to turn our soldiers back one inch. On the third day of the battle, a complete Israeli brigade--commander, officers, soldiers equipment and all--was captured by the Egyptian forces. With astonishing succession, African nations were breaking off diplomatic relations with Israel. The entire Arab world was pledging support to Egypt and Syria in their war and endeavor to regain lost Arab pride.

At 8:30 in the morning, the civilian airliner took off from Cairo airport with me, Dr Mustafa Khalil, Maj Gen Sa'd al-Qadi and Dr 'Ali 'Abasi on board. We landed in Saudi Arabia at about 11 before noon. We were informed immediately that His Majesty King Faysal will receive us as soon as we have had some rest. The Saudi officials who received us upon our arrival and accompanied us to the Guests Palace congratulated us and sought out information on the progress of the battle. Their questions betrayed the anxiety, eagerness and joy of every Arab citizen at that time.

In the afternoon we went to see King Faysal, accompanied by the king's adviser Rashad Far'un and Prince Nawaf Ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz. As we entered the king's office, he received us with these words: "Congratulations. Congratulations. Congratulations." Then he added as we sat down: "I want to be reassured about the situation in Egypt and Syria." I began to reassure him, then I introduced Dr Mustafa Khalil and Maj Gen Sa'd al-Qadi and explained the purpose of our trip. We then proceeded to discuss the political situation in all its aspects, Egypt's view of the situation, especially with regard to the prospects of the American

position and our projections for the future of things. After that Dr Mustafa Khalil explained the dimensions of the world energy crisis and their relationship to Arab oil, then the role Arab oil can play in the battle, in accordance with the guidelines which were spelled out in the memo he had prepared in Cairo.

King Faysal then spoke. He said: "I want to be reassured about the military situation." I told his majesty: "President al-Sadat has sent along Maj Gen Sa'd al-Qadi for that purpose. He carries with him all the necessary charts and information not only about the Egyptian front, but also about the Syrian front too." Maj Gen al-Qadi stood up and spread out his maps and charts on King Faysal's desk and proceeded to explain the developments of the war from the moment the Egyptian forces struck across the canal until that particular moment. His Majesty then said: "And Syria? I want to be reassured about Syria." Maj Gen al-Qadi spread out another map and proceeded to explain the military situation on the Golan front, the prospects there and the Syrian advances on the first and second days. The Saudi monarch then said: "I pray to God to make progress continuous on the two fronts. I ask God that I may live long enough to pray in Jerusalem. God be with you. God be with you."

With this, the meeting came to an end, for we were still in the month of Ramadan and the hour of fast-breaking was only half an hour away. We returned to our quarters to wait for sunset. It was not the first time that I meet King Faysal, for I had come to know him many years ago. But it was the first time that Mustafa Khalil meets him in a non-protocol fashion and sits down with him to talk. While I was describing to my friend Mustafa the characteristics of King Faysal's personality, we were visited by Prince Sulayman, Prince Sultan and Shaykh Kamal Adham.

Oil's Role in the Battle

The Saudi brethren sat down with us and expressed their profound sentiments of congratulation and pride over Egypt's great military feat. Their desire and eagerness to be reassured about the Egyptian advance along the Suez Canal front were far greater than we had expected. They were up to date with all the statements and communiques broadcast over Cairo Radio and they were following up news agency reports about the fighting on the Egyptian and Syrian fronts. They were visibly concerned about the Syrian front, but they were fully convinced that the mere outbreak of the war has in itself led to many, radical changes in the region. They kept saying: "Egypt has made the Arabs feel proud again."

After the fast-breaking meal, King Faysal summoned us to another meeting with him. The meeting was also attended by Rashad Far'un, the king's adviser, and Prince Nawwaf Ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz. The king enquired about Egypt's views on the role of the United States and Saudi oil. I told his majesty: "Egypt knows that on 3 May, that is some five months ago, you received the chairman of the Aramco group in Saudi Arabia and later received the directors of the 4 companies that make up Aramco and that you told them that time is running fast and that you will not permit the isolation of Saudi Arabia because of America's failure to support the Arab cause. You also told them that the Americans have to realize soon where their interests are, otherwise they will lose everything. Yes, Egypt knows all that. It also knows that despite that early warning on your part, the U.S. did

nothing at all. Therefore, we believe that, as far as oil is concerned, the U.S. should be warned that its oil supplies may be cut off if it does not modify its position. The second step would be to actually reduce oil production by a percentage that would give credibility to your warning. This is as far as the oil situation is concerned. With respect to the political situation, I suggest that your majesty write a letter to the American president Richard Nixon who knows that you mean what you say, your majesty."

The Saudi monarch asked me: "Do you believe that a 10 percent decrease in our oil production is enough to look like a warning?" I said: "Yes, your majesty. In fact, Egypt prefers an initial reduction of 5 percent that would be gradually increased if the warning is not heeded." The king said: "'Umar al-Saqqaf (Saudi foreign minister) is now in New York for the U.N. meetings. We will instruct him immediately to meet with the ministers or ambassadors of the Arab oil-producing countries, then for all of them to request a meeting with President Nixon." The king turned to his adviser Rashad Far'un and asked him to send off a message to 'Umar al-Saqqaf immediately, then asked me to dictate to Rashad Far'un the text of the message which Egypt would like to see delivered. It was, indeed, a gracious gesture by King Faysal. It appeared to me at that moment that the battle has become his battle--indeed, the battle of Saudi Arabia as a whole. The king then said: "I want to be reassured about your economic position. You have made us and made all Arabs hold their heads high. Do you need anything?" I told his majesty: "The Arab brethren have come to our support as soon as the fighting broke out. The latest support came from Libya and Col Al-Qadhdhafi." King Faysal replied: "It behooves him to do so and to increase his assistance to Egypt instead of spending his money on fomenting trouble in the Arab countries." I told the Saudi monarch: "At any rate, Egypt will never forget the backing it has received from Saudi Arabia, under your leadership." He quickly said: "Not at all. We are not helping and assisting Egypt. We are helping and assisting the Arab cause which is the cause of every Saudi citizen. This is not assistance or aid, but a duty. It is our duty and our share of the responsibility for the Arab cause. I feel responsible for the Arab cause." The king paused for a while then he said: "You have not answered my question about your economic situation." I answered: "My instructions from President Anwar al-Sadat are that I am not to ask for anything." "Yes, yes," he said after a brief silence. "At any rate, we will immediately place at your disposal \$200 million."

After I thanked him, he suggested that we discuss further the political and oil situations. I told his majesty that Egypt leaves it up to Saudi Arabia to determine what position to take in accordance with the dictates of the Arab cause and in consistence with its interests at the same time. Whatever the case may be, I said, Saudi Arabia can perhaps direct a political warning to President Nixon as a first step. At this point, the king bowed his head in thought, then turned to his adviser Rashad Far'un and asked him if the American ambassador has returned from his trip. The adviser said that the ambassador was still out of the country but that the charge d'affaires is available. The king said: "Then summon him immediately after this meeting."

Dr Mustafa Khalil addressed the Saudi monarch. "With regard to the oil situation," he said, "I wish to point out to your majesty that the oil companies which have rejected Saudi Arabia's proposal to hike prices several weeks ago will now have to respond immediately to your proposal in the light of the new changes and

developments. Secondly, we should deny oil only to the state which takes a clearly hostile attitude towards us, so that we may continue to gain the sympathy of world opinion." It was clear that his majesty was fully aware of the soundness of that idea. When we told him later that Egypt, in the light of Saudi Arabia's position, would probably call for an urgent meeting of the Arab oil ministers in Kuwait for the purpose of adopting a common stand, the king emphatically agreed. Then he asked me: "Where are you going after Saudi Arabia?" I told him that we would be going to Kuwait, then the rest of the Gulf states. He said: "God willing, you will find a receptive climate in each of those states. I want to tell you that when you call for a meeting of the oil ministers and when you propose a 5 percent reduction in oil production--and whatever the decision of the minister will be, Saudi Arabia will cut down production by 10 percent."

Changing the subject, the king then asked: "To what extent will the Egyptian forces advance in Sinai?" I nodded at Maj Gen Sa'd al-Qadi who said: "We will advance to as far as our air cover permits us." The king asked if he could see that on the map and Maj Gen al-Qadi obliged by pointing out to him the positions of rocket launchers which are protecting the advance of the land forces in Sinai. He explained the importance of moving those launchers and missile systems forward as the land forces strike deeper. In so doing, he noted, the Egyptian forces will be constantly and effectively protected from attacks by the Israeli air force. As Maj Gen al-Qadi spoke, King Faysal's face was radiant with joy and he would intermittently say things like: "By God, Egypt has made all Arabs raise their heads in honor," "Egypt is the pride of the Arab nation," "We did not wish for a more brilliant battle," "God, give me enough years so that I may pray in Jerusalem."

This was one of the rare opportunities in which I saw King Faysal visibly excited. His was the excitement of a leader who deeply believes in God, the justice of his cause, Arabism and the inevitability of Arab victory. As the meeting ended and we stood up to shake hands with the Saudi monarch and to thank him and bid him farewell, he said: "I am not as fully confident about the Syrian front as I am about yours. What Syria has done is splendid. Perhaps Egypt can do something to lessen the pressure on the Syrian front." I said: "God willing, God willing." The king added: "Please convey to my brother President al-Sadat my admiration, best wishes and prayers to God wishing him victory."

It was 11:30 at night when we left King Faysal's office. The king's adviser Rashad Far'un caught up with us in the grand hall and whispered in my ear that the \$200 million promised by King Faysal will be transferred immediately to Egypt's account. I told him: "Do you know how much the fighting going on in Sinai costs per hour? \$10 million. Israel this morning announced that the fighting in Sinai is costing it \$10 million per hour. This gives you a simple idea about the magnitude and cost of what is occurring now in Sinai." Rashad Far'un pensively shook his head. "At any rate," I added, "we thank Saudi Arabia for its noble attitude." We then rode back to our guest quarters. Shortly after midnight, we received word that an emissary from King Faysal is waiting for me in the lower hall of the Guest Palace for an urgent matter. I went down right away to find the shortest and most eloquent message I have ever received: "His majesty King Faysal wishes to inform you that he has decided to double the sum of money which Saudi Arabia will place at Egypt's disposal from \$200 million to \$400 million. His majesty repeats his greetings to President al-Sadat and prays for his

victory." Thus ended our night. In the morning, we began packing up again for our next stop--Kuwait.

The Amir of Kuwait: We Are Proud of You

We landed in Kuwait at 1 P.M. on 11 October. There to receive us was Minister of State 'Abd al-'Aziz Husayn who told us that the Amir of Kuwait will receive us immediately after fast-breaking. We rested for a while at the guest house and listened to the radio for the latest developments on the Sinai and Golan fronts. After the fast-breaking meal, we went to the Amir's palace. He and the foreign minister received us in the grand hall. After the greetings, he enquired about the military developments in Sinai and the Golan heights. Once again, Maj Gen Sa'd al-Qadi spread out his maps and charts and proceeded to describe the strong points of the Bar Lev line on the east bank of the Suez Canal, how the Egyptian forces destroyed each stronghold and the prospects of the military situation. The amir asked for more details and information, a proud look on his face. He enquired about the number of tanks which took part in the battle, the number of Israeli tanks which have been destroyed, the lineup of the Israeli tank assault, the Egyptian battle plan, etc. He also wanted to know how has the Egyptian air force managed to make its big strike in the early moments of the battle. Throughout Gen al-Qadi's explanation, the Amir of Kuwait would say things like: "Egypt has made every Arab raise his head high," "We are proud of you," "We implore God to make His victory complete," "It's time we teach Israel a lesson it will never forget."

When we turned to a discussion of the political situation, we discovered that King Faysal's words to us in Riyadh 24 hours earlier that we will find a receptive atmosphere in each of the countries which we will visit were true. His highness the amir told us that he has been advised of the outcome of our talks with King Faysal. After a while, and without having said a word about financial backing, we heard the amir say: "Kuwait has decided to place \$200 million at Egypt's disposal immediately."

In Qatar, Bahrain and Abu Dhabi

We spent the night in Kuwait then proceeded to Qatar on the next day. As soon as we arrived in the guest house, his highness the Amir of Qatar sent his crown prince to bid us welcome and to tell us that the amir is waiting to see us. At that meeting, we sensed the same degree of enthusiasm, happiness and pride which we had seen in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. We also sensed the same desire to know everything about the military operations and the same hopes that victory will be ours. Qatar decided on its own to place \$50 million at Egypt's disposal. But that same evening, the figure was increased to \$100 million. Again, the aid was pledged to Egypt without our asking for it or even mentioning it one way or the other. The scene here was a repeat of the scene with King Faysal. We also found out that King Faysal had advised the leaders of the Gulf countries about our mission before we have even arrived there.

Next destination: Bahrain. After our meeting with the amir, the crown prince insisted that we break the fast in his house. We were surprised to see that the banquet was enormous, that the food was enough for 20 dinners, not just one.

After the dinner, we went out to the porch, where the crown prince and several ministers proceeded to ask us about the oil situation. Would the cause be served better by a complete stoppage of the oil or by a mere decrease in output? Would it be more effective if a decision is implemented forthwith or after a while? And so forth. It should be noted here that this conversation came at a time when Bahrain, driven by its loyalty to Arabism, had already taken a pioneering initiative, when the war broke out, to ban all American ships from entering the port of Bahrain. One can appreciate the significance of such a decision when it is known that America was using a base in Bahrain under a 10-year agreement.

Bahrain took that position on its own volition and quite a while before our arrival there, and the Bahraini stand was warmly received throughout the Arab world. And now as we were sitting with Bahraini officials on the porch of the crown prince's house, they were telling us candidly: "We do not have oil, otherwise we would have immediately stopped pumping it. But we have the port and it is very vital to American interests. Our decision with regard to the use of the port is the least we can do in support of Egypt which has made all Arabs feel proud."

The next day we proceeded to Abu Dhabi. Shaykh Zayid, the Amir of Abu Dhabi, was away in London, so we held our discussions with the crown prince who exhibited the same spirit of nationalism and pride which we have seen elsewhere. The crown prince told us that although the UAE is suffering from a lack of liquidity, it will not shirk its responsibility in support of Egypt because Shaykh Zayid believes that this is not just the battle of Egypt and Syria, but of all Arabs. And so, while in London, Shaykh Zayid took that noble step which President al-Sadat has later frequently cited, namely, that of borrowing the sum of \$100 million from British banks to place it in Egypt's account. Although our time was short, the crown prince suggested that we visit Dubai. We agreed to do so. To save time, the UAE placed a helicopter at our disposal.

Dangerous Adventure in the Fog

Fog was beginning to blanket the airport as we prepared to take the helicopter to Dubai. The pilot, who was a Pakistani military officer, remarked that the fog might be denser in Dubai and might prevent us from landing there. We asked him to try anyway, but when we approached Dubai the fog was so thick that we could not see the airport below us. After a few attempts, the pilot said that landing was impossible and that there is no choice but to return to Abu Dhabi. But when we returned to Abu Dhabi, the fog had become so dense that the pilot announced that he would not be able to land there either. We were at a loss. Our worry increased when the pilot said that he has enough fuel for 3 minutes of flying only. We told him to try to land, but he nervously said: "I can't see the airport and I'm afraid that if I tried I might land on top of a house or in the waters of the ocean."

We felt helpless. It was a weird and paradoxical situation. Here we are, having escaped death in the war front in Egypt, we are now facing death in the fog hundreds of miles away from the front where a real war is going on. The seconds that passed after that seemed like generations. We simply resigned ourselves to the will of God, murmuring: "I bear witness that there is no God but Him, that Muhammad is His messenger." When the pilot finally began to descend, it was not

because he saw something below him but because he was running out of gas and had no other choice. Suddenly, the helicopter hit something hard below, and we froze in our seats. Yes, it was land. We had landed in the airport although the fog still made it invisible. We thanked God for our safety and took a car back to the guest palace.

In the morning, a UAE Vicount was placed at our disposal to take us to Oman. The flight to Oman took two hours. Sultan Qabus was waiting for us in a large gilded salon atop his palace--a Yemeni-style castle. Because the sultan's education has been basically in military affairs, he was quite interested in following up the military details which were, of course, presented by Maj Gen Sa'd al-Qadi.

Saudi Arabia Cuts Off Oil to America

Meanwhile, 4 Arab foreign ministers, led by the late Saudi Foreign Minister 'Umar al-Saqqaf, went to Washington from New York for a meeting with President Richard Nixon. At the same time, Arab oil ministers had been meeting at the OAPEC headquarters in Kuwait. Several trends emerged at the meeting: 1) Saudi Arabia and Kuwait were of the opinion that America should first be warned before production is reduced. 2) Iraq argued in favor of nationalizing the interests of those states which continue to support the Israeli aggression, suspending all oil shipments to them and withdrawing funds deposited in countries which support Israel. 3) Algeria, Libya, Bahrain and Qatar opted for any decision proposed by Egypt. 4) Syria called for a 50 percent reduction in the production of Arab oil. 5) Finally, the UAE said that it would go along with anything the conferees decide, including the suspension of all oil shipments to the U.S. While the conference was in session, Shaykh Ahmad Zaki Yamani received instructions from King Faysal which he handed to his colleague the Egyptian Oil Minister. The instructions were brief and simple: Saudi Arabia agrees to Egypt's suggestion in favor of a 5 percent reduction in oil output on a monthly basis, but will nevertheless declare a 10 percent reduction in the flow of Saudi oil after the conference.

Meanwhile, Abu Dhabi declared that it has decided to suspend immediately all oil exports to the U.S. That meant that Abu Dhabi's oil production would be cut down by 12 percent. The successive Arab positions turned out to be the most magnificent demonstration of Arab solidarity in the modern age.

In Washington, the gist of the message which the late Saudi Foreign Minister 'Umar al-Saqqaf conveyed to President Nixon was this: If the U.S. does not stop its aid to Israel within two days, Saudi Arabia will impose an embargo on its oil shipments to the U.S. Nixon, however, said that America is committed to support Israel. And at a news conference in Washington, an American reporter told the Saudi Foreign Minister: "The U.S. does not need your oil. The Saudis can drink their oil." 'Umar al-Saqqaf calmly replied: "Fine, we will do that."

On the next day, the royal palace in Riyadh issued a brief official statement. It read: "In accordance with the statement issued by the Royal Court on 22 Ramadan (17 October) announcing an immediate 10 percent reduction in Saudi Arabia's oil production and the government's intention to keep a watch on the situation, and in view of the increase in the American military support for Israel, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has decided to suspend oil exports to the U.S. for adopting that position."

We took the airplane back to Cairo. After a short while, we all saw the scene that I will never forget. It was noon. The sky was clear and visibility was excellent. Ahead of us to our right stretched the Sinai peninsula. From our cabin windows we saw a full-scale tank battle. Rockets were zooming back and forth. Tanks were firing at each other. The shells flashed and boomed as if they were all converging on us. No imagination can conceive the massive nature of that battle. Looking down from our cabin windows, we were mesmerized by the sight to our right as a flood of emotions of apprehension, pride and honor raced through our veins.

Finally, our plane landed at Cairo's international airport. I headed immediately for a meeting with President Anwar al-Sadat to report to him about the trip.

9254

CSO: 4802

GOVERNMENT SPELLS OUT NEW AGRICULTURAL POLICY

Baghdad AL-JUMHURIYAH in Arabic 12 Nov 80 p 7

[Article: "First Deputy Prime Minister Issues Instructions on Development of Agricultural Mechanization in Next 5 Years"]

[Text] Mr Taha Yasin Ramadan, member of the Revolutionary Command Council and first deputy prime minister, has issued instructions on methods for developing the mechanization of agriculture in the country in the years 1981-85.

The instructions spelled out the general framework for the development of the mechanization and specified areas of activity within the General Agricultural Mechanization Organization and development of the organization, the principles which must be applied in the mechanization field in agricultural cooperative societies and means for developing mechanization within the private sector.

They include means for providing reserve materials for agricultural machinery and equipment and for expanding post-sales services and banking facilities for the Cooperative Agricultural Bank.

Following is the text of these instructions:

Based on the agreement of the Office of the Chairman of the Office of the President, in its letter No 12787 of 1 October 1980, for the purpose of remedying the problems and obstacles the mechanization of agriculture is suffering from in the country, and to develop it, we have decided to issue the following instructions:

Instructions on Methods and Scope for Developing Mechanization of Agriculture in the Country

First. The general scope of development of the mechanization of agriculture in the country is defined as follows:

1. Government organizations will be restricted to ownership of large high-production machines and an effort will be made to rid government organizations of small machines through sale or ownership transfer in accordance with a schedule preventing the occurrence of disruptions in implementation of the agricultural plan.
2. Emphasis will be placed on studying the elements composing costs and efforts will be made toward all means to reduce these costs in a manner serving increased production in all government sectors owning machines.

3. Public sector machines will be tentatively rented out at cost for all agricultural operations except for several such as pilot farming and processing crops where prices are below cost.
4. Integrated statutes and codes will be set forth in accordance with the circumstances and nature of every region in the country, and wages will be gradually linked to output in a manner guaranteeing that good personnel are retained, output is increased and quality of output is improved.
5. Efforts will be made, through the Agricultural Machinery Center in al-Suwayrah, in coordination with the competent machinery industry institute, to develop agricultural machinery and equipment research, study and investigation activities and to select machinery which is suitable for the soil in the country.
6. Efforts will be made to develop the appropriate atmosphere, encourage agricultural cooperatives to possess agricultural machines in a manner guaranteeing that the machinery functions properly, and stimulate the activity of cooperatives without having them bear losses.
7. The private sector will be granted scope and will be encouraged to own agricultural machinery by being granted facilities and services in accordance with rules spelled out for that.
8. Efforts will be made to prepare maintenance shops in numerous areas of the country in cooperation with the private and cooperative sectors in a manner ensuring that good services are provided for agricultural machinery.
9. Centers specializing in agricultural machinery will be established to graduate specialized staffs, and centers for training and accreditation in this specialized field will be increased in coordination with the Ministries of Higher Education and Scientific Research, by the following methods:
 - A. Opening departments in the engineering faculties of universities (al-Sulaymaniyah, Mosul and Basrah) for agricultural mechanization, along the lines of the Agricultural Mechanization and Agrarian Reform will help set out the curricula for study in this department and departments will be opened in accordance with the actual needs on the basis of a clear plan.
 - B. Converting three technical institutes specializing in agricultural mechanization in Mosul, Babylon and Maysan and setting out their curriculum in coordination with the competent bodies in the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform, Requirements will be weighed carefully in coordination with the bodies concerned.
 - C. Forming a committee under the chairmanship of the Minister of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform, with representatives of the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research, the Ministry of Education and the General Federation of Agricultural Cooperative Societies as members, in order to follow up on the execution of this task.
10. The effort will be made to link wages to productivity in a number of sample productive units and positive results shown by practical application will be applied in general fashion in accordance with the statutes accompanying these instructions.

11. The Agricultural Agencies and State Farm Organizations will continue to intensify experiments of mechanizing processing and flatland crops in a broader fashion and broadcast the experiments after conforming that it is possible to apply mechanization to private activity, in cooperation with the specialized machinery industries institute of the Ministry of Industry and the Agricultural Mechanization Institute in al-Suwayrah, which is subsidiary to the General Machinery Organization. A program will be prepared by the parties concerned for this purpose and the process will include the basic machinery and used in agriculture, such as:

Cotton pickers, sugar beet pickers, mowers, hay balers, sunflower harvesters, garbanzo bean and lentil harvesters, fruit pickers and so forth.

12. The General Agricultural Agencies Organization will sell off small machinery and replace that with large machinery, in accordance with a plan prepared for this purpose. This approach will also include a reduction in the land areas of cooperatives and in the special activities served by the agricultural machinery owned by agricultural organizations.

Second. In order to develop activity in the General Agricultural Mechanization Organization and determine its spheres of activity, the following is authorized:

1. The selloff by the General Agricultural Machinery Organization of machines with small horsepower and productive capacity and their replacement by machines with large horsepower and productive capacity within 3 years. This process must not, however, result in any disruptions in the implementation of the agricultural plans, and consideration will be given to the following:

A. Emphasis on the operation of tractors in assured rainfall areas and the Governorates of Wasit, al-Qadisiyah, al-Najaf, Babylon and Diyala.

B. The selloff of machinery in governorates which use small machines because there is no space in them for the use of high-horsepower, high-productivity tractors, and conversion of the machinery rental stations in al-Anbar, Salah-al-Din, Karbala', and Basrah to repair and maintenance stations as a first stage in 1981. That will be followed by the conversion of four other stations in 1982, when the private sector will be prepared to replace these stations after it has taken title to the agricultural machinery.

C. The Agricultural Mechanization Organization will be competent to offer services only in the field of the mechanization of wheat, barley and rice crops.

D. It will be necessary to reduce the staff and equipment (vehicles and service equipment) now present in the General Agricultural Mechanization Organization in the light of the contents of Paragraphs A and B above.

2. The supply of rice harvesters in a manner guaranteeing that the area of mechanical rice harvesting increases, through the method of:

A. Retaining the current capacity of the General Operating and Maintenance Agency.

B. Importing 400 harvesters with good technical specifications for private activity by the end of 1982 and adopting all measures which will ease the process of selling

them and making them available to peasants.

C. In the event of total depreciation, it will be possible to have the abovementioned harvesters, whose operation modification for grain harvesting and sales will be assumed by the General Agricultural Mechanization Organization, owned and operated by private activities.

3. A commitment by agricultural entities to determining the areas to be serviced by operating and maintenance stations within the capabilities available to them, with priority given to the servicing of collective farms, pilot farms and agricultural collectivization and the exploitation of capabilities surplus to needs in other contexts within the schedule. These areas will be handed over by a date no later than 15 January of each year, and the entities benefiting from the mechanization services offered by the stations will be committed to such matters lying within their duties as provision of fertilizer and seeds and the attendance of peasants at worksites.

4. Application of the principle of decentralization in the operation of operating and maintenance stations. One of them will be linked to the General Agricultural and Agrarian Reform Authority as an experiment and its preferability to the central administration system followed now.

5. Performance of a review by the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform of the organizational structure of the General Agricultural Mechanization Organization in a manner which is in harmony with the tasks and duties assigned to the organization and facilitates its mission of performing its productive activities.

Third. The following principles will be followed in the field of agricultural mechanization in the agricultural cooperative societies:

1. Before the ownership of agricultural machines and equipment is handed over to the agricultural cooperative societies, it will be necessary to prepare an expanded study containing all the information related to the land, machinery and people and confirm that there is an actual need to own the agricultural machinery and equipment. The study will include the following.

A. Abundant information on the land area fit for farming, its nature and type and the type of crops, in order to determine the type and number of machines which will be adequate and suitable for this and determine the type of tractor attachment in the desire to create a balance between the property of societies and individuals and socialist sector property.

B. The number and types of machines and equipment available to the private sector and society members.

C. The ability of operating and maintenance stations and mechanical units in the region to respond to society requests.

D. The existence of cooperative consciousness and belief on the part of general society and authority board members in the ownership and administration of the machines.

2. The management of the agricultural machinery belonging to the cooperative agricultural societies will have to be improved through the method of:

A. Training society members, and likewise the technical staff supervising the societies, to be able to drive, maintain and keep up tractors and tractor attachments, in order to seek recourse to them during the work season, in exchange for bonuses which will be paid out to them.

B. Assigning the departments concerned to supply spare parts in adequate amounts during the year for distribution to all agencies in the governorates.

C. Compelling operating and maintenance stations and mechanical units in the governorates to provide services for agricultural cooperative society machinery at appropriate rates.

D. Assigning a bookkeeper to every society possessing tractors. He will be responsible for the society's books, including those bearing on the machinery and related matters.

E. Establishing repair shops and sheds for maintaining and sheltering the machinery in mutual agricultural machinery societies to perform services on society machinery and members' machinery alike.

3. The societies will commit themselves to providing the drivers or mechanics a society wishes to appoint for rental and maintenance stations on probation in order to evaluate their technical competence. The maintenance station will be responsible for their failure on the job as a consequence of their lack of technical competence.

4. The rates the General Agricultural Mechanization Organization receives for operating its machinery in sowing and harvesting activities will be reviewed; these will be at cost.

5. Old or depreciated machinery in the possession of the societies which the society is not using will be sold. A committee will be formed by:

A. The General Agricultural Cooperation Authority.

B. The General Federation of Agricultural Cooperative Societies.

C. The cooperative Agricultural Bank, with the goal of carrying out this task.

6. Efforts will be made to establish a society specializing in mechanization with the objective of consolidating efforts and organizing work. It will be necessary that the work start in one governorate by way of experiment.

7. The General Training Authority will set forth a plan to train society members to be able to drive, maintain and keep up tractors and tractor attachments; this will be considered one of its basic tasks.

Fourth. In order to develop agricultural machinery in the private sector, the following will be observed:

1. The importation of tractors, harvesters and agricultural machinery whose successful operation is proved by the private sector will be determined in a manner conforming to the soil and circumstances of the country.

2. The body selling the machinery will be compelled to provide stationary and mobile repair shops in locations near the areas where the machinery operates and to provide reserve materials close to these shops.

3. The body importing the machines will provide adequate suitable diverse agricultural machinery to meet the peasants' needs in accordance with the needs and the soil of each governorate.

Fifth. The Agricultural Cooperative Bank will provide the following banking facilities:

1. Peasants belonging to a cooperative agricultural society and groups desiring to purchase a harvester, tractor or pump will borrow the full value of this equipment and that will be paid to the selling body by the Agricultural Cooperative Bank.

2. Individuals wishing to purchase new agricultural machinery and equipment will borrow its value in full in the event they offer collateral of approximate value. In the event they do not offer such collateral, they may pay the selling body 10 percent of the value of the harvester and 15 percent of the value of the tractor, pump and attachments, or attachments alone, directly, and the Agricultural Cooperative Bank will pay the rest of the price to the selling body.

3. Tractors, harvesters, pumps and their attachments will be considered mortgaged to the Agricultural Credit Bank until the final installment is paid off.

4. Borrowers will offer a personal bond to the Agricultural Credit Bank.

5. Interest rates on the loans which are disbursed for the purpose of purchasing new, imported or locally produced harvesters, tractors or pumps, with their attachments, as well as their attachments alone, will be as follows:

A. Loans to the private sector, 3 percent instead of the 6 percent in effect now.

B. Loans to cooperative individuals, 2 percent instead of the 3 percent in effect now.

C. Loans to societies and society collectives, 1.5 percent instead of the 2 percent in effect now.

D. Loans to collective farms, the current 1 percent.

6. In case of rice harvesters, the interest rate will be 1 percent for all sectors.

7. The loan amounts will be paid off in 8 years in the case of tractors, pumps and attachments and 10 years in the case of harvesters.

8. The interest rates on loans disbursed for the purpose of buying a second harvester or thresher with attachments will be at the same rates as those listed in Paragraphs Five and Six and for the period contained in Paragraph Seven. Interest on machines in excess of that amount will be at double the rates listed in Paragraphs Five and Six and the loan amounts will be paid off in installments of 5 years for tractors and 7 years for harvesters.

9. Cooperative members will benefit from the above terms when borrowing to exercise two of the following activities pursued on an individual basis:

A. Agricultural mechanization.

B. Fruit tree cultivation.

C. Animal resources.

10. Personal bonds will be accepted from people belonging to agricultural societies if they wish to borrow from the bank to set up orchards or develop the animal resources they own.

11. People contracting to work agricultural lands in accordance with Law No 1 for the year 1974 who do not belong to agricultural cooperative societies will be treated as the private sector is with respect to all purposes for which they apply for loans, as regards the provision of bonds for bank loans.

Sixth. Efforts will be made to provide reserve materials for agricultural machinery and equipment and develop and expand post-sale services by means of:

1. Adopting the following measures to provide reserve materials in the long term:

A. Reliance on the General Agricultural Machinery and Equipment Import Agency computer system to control storage and reordering, a committee of the National Computer Center, the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform and the above general organization will provide a study on the steps required to carry that out.

B. The General Agricultural Machinery Organization will determine a new period for machinery, equipment and implements in the light of local use and maintenance conditions in the country (not as is currently in effect) or in the light of international classifications, with the objective of evaluating the real need for reserve materials and determining schedules for importing them.

2. Adopting the following in order to provide reserve materials over the short term:

A. Until the computer is used, reliance will be placed on the following principles in storing and providing reserve materials:

A minimum inventory of no less than 1 year, including an emergency inventory of 3 to 6 months.

A maximum inventory of no more than 2 years.

Consideration will be given, on arrival of the reserve materials, to the level required for the reordering period required to import these materials and get them to storehouses, in order to avoid reaching the minimum.

B. Detailed annual import schedules will be prepared for reserve materials in accordance with customs subheadings and they will be implemental during the import year; importation will start as of 1 July of the year preceding the following import year, after the bodies which are not authorized to import directly have presented their annual requirements to the importing bodies 6 months prior to the start of the

import year, including the specifications and quantities of reserve materials.

3. Reliance on the appropriate systems for importing reserve equipment and materials, which will require:

A. Importation by the General Agricultural Machinery and Equipment Importing Agency of material to cover reserve material requirements for a period of 2 years on contracting, with consideration for the shipment of the equipment during the period in which the importation of the new agricultural machinery and equipment is contracted for, and striving to back up the storage level in periodic fashion with respect to all equipment.

B. Binding suppliers to include in contracts for the purchase of agricultural machinery and equipment a supply of reserve materials for this equipment for a period of 10 years or for the period stipulated for the life of the machinery.

C. When contracting with suppliers, the importing body must strive to provide reserve materials with the imported agricultural machinery for a specific period.

D. When signing large import purchase contracts -- long term contracts -- importing bodies must request the companies to open a warehouse Secretariat with reserve materials whose volume will be determined in the light of need.

E. Importing bodies will seek to function as the agent of the company supplying the reserve materials.

F. Importing bodies will continue to import from a number of suppliers and will not restrict themselves to one supplier.

G. Importing bodies will be granted the powers to register and issue permits for reserve materials of up to 50 percent of the recommended import program for the following year as of 1 July.

4. The following measures will be followed in the field of storage and accreditation of warehouse staff:

A. The General Agricultural Design and Construction Agency will set forth the design for prefabricated warehouses in accordance with up-to-date specifications.

B. On dealing with reserve materials, consideration will be given to have them move relatively slowly and to rely on adequate flexibility. That will be met by calculating the value of the annual depreciation of reserve materials into the supply for 2 years at the rate of 8 percent per year, with priority given to last goods out for book purposes, in order to cover the costs of reserve materials which are not moving.

C. The warehouse secretaries will be given acquisition allocations ranging from 10 to 20 percent and no less than 10 dinars, according to the volume of the job, until a central decree is issued regulating allocations in this regard.

D. The General Training Authority will set forth the bases and programs for training in the field of import, warehouse and marketing activities in coordination with the importing departments, the National Consultation and Administrative Development Center and representatives of universities.

5. With the objective of developing maintenance and repair service in the socialist and cooperative and private sectors, the following principles and rules will be relied upon, by sector:

1. The Socialist Sector

A. The General Agricultural Machinery and Equipment Importing Agency of the General Agricultural Mechanization Organization will continue to follow up on the construction of seven fixed shops for the repair and upkeep of agricultural machinery and equipment: five of these will be shops for the repair and upkeep of harvesters, in the Governorates of Nineveh, al-Ta'min, Wasit and al-Qadisiyah, and two will be for the repair and upkeep of worn-out tractors, one in the Subdistrict of al-Karimah in the Governorate of al-Anbar and the other in Abu Ghurayyib in the Governorate of Baghdad. These shops will provide post-sale services for the repair and maintenance of imported agricultural machinery which is imported by this agency.

B. The General Agricultural Machinery and Equipment Importing Agency will include in the contracts its signs to import large numbers of machines and equipment the condition that suppliers are to establish maintenance and repair shops, in order to provide technical services without engaging in commercial activity; implementation is to take place as follows:

B-1. Shop sites are to be determined by this agency in accordance with needs by the regions in which the agricultural machinery and equipment are concentrated.

B-2. The supply company is to provide 25 percent of the requisite staff to operate these shops and this agency will provide 75 percent of the total employees, who will be Iraqis and people from Arab and friendly countries.

B-3. Iraqis will be trained by the supply bodies.

B-4. The supplier will provide these for a period of not less than a year.

B-5. After the period stated in the contract, ownership of the shop will devolve upon this agency, so that the shop will be run by it or in accordance with the conditions of the contract.

C. The Agricultural Machinery and Equipment Importing Agency will supervise the activities of the abovementioned warehouses while they are being managed by the supply companies in the following areas:

C-1. It will provide such necessary facilities for establishing warehouses as allotting land, planning sites, providing construction materials, granting permits and other facilities the work will require.

C-2. It will follow up on the provision of reserve materials necessary for maintenance and repair activities.

C-3. It will price reserve materials and services offered.

C-4. It will provide a specific percentage of staff in accordance with the contents of Paragraph B-2 above.

C-5. It will provide technical supervision for the quality of services provided.

D. Socialist sector importing and marketing organizations, agencies and companies will be bound to offer post-sales services for the machinery, equipment and apparatuses which are imported or produced by them during the warranty period and for a future period. That will be included in their contracts.

E. Some operating and maintenance stations belonging to the General Agricultural Mechanization Organization where the operation of high-horsepower and high productive capacity agricultural machinery is not possible because of the nature of farming in their areas will be turned into stations specializing in activities of maintaining and repairing agricultural machinery and equipment and training peasants.

F. A permanent committee will be formed consisting of representatives of the Ministries of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform, Commerce, and Industry and Mines whose task will be to determine shop sites and set out a work plan for shops in order to coordinate bodies importing machinery with bodies marketing machinery produced locally as regards the provision of post-sale services in a manner ensuring that the needs of all governorates in the country are covered in accordance with the volume of machinery, equipment and apparatuses present in them.

G. The General Training Authority of the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform will hold concentrated courses to impose training and to accredit people working in it in the field of maintenance and repair in a fashion which will enable them to perform the task in a manner guaranteeing that the agricultural machinery and equipment is maintained and kept up in shops close to the sites where they are located.

2. The Cooperative Sector

The establishment of cooperative societies in the maintenance field will be encouraged in accordance with the Cooperative Law, and people with crafts and tradesmen will be encouraged to join the societies under a plan set out for this purpose by the General Cooperative Federation.

B. The Industrial Bank will lend the necessary sums for the cooperative societies to engage in their activities and will grant them the privileges included in the Industrial Investment Law No 22 for the Year 1974. These loans will include the

coverage of costs purchasing work equipment and materials and the necessary shop buildings, by bond of the cooperative fund.

C. The General Agricultural Design and Construction Agency will prepare model designs for maintenance and repair shops in cooperation with foreign suppliers, provided that a reserve materials warehouse be attached to each shop; they are to be provided to the cooperative societies according to their needs.

3. Private Activity

A. The General Agricultural Machinery and Equipment Importing Agency will grant private sector agencies right to the dispose of the reserve materials it imports on a retail basis, as is the practice in the other commercial department of the socialist sector.

B. It will offer financial facilities and work accessories for shop owners as follows:

B-1. The capital and governorate municipality secretariats will prepare sites for the construction of modern shops and will provide such basic services for the shops as water, electricity and communications, or it will construct such shops and sell or deed them in installments over periods ranging from 15 to 20 years and rent them out over long terms at incentive rates, to the private sector, which will be bound by the principles and rules spelled out by the government.

B-2. Socialist sector agencies will import the machinery and equipment necessary for these shops and will sell them in installments in accordance with rules to be spelled out.

B-3. Private activity will be governed by Industrial Bank loan.

B-4. The General Labor and Vocational Training Organization will be bound to train people working in maintenance shops run by the private sector in order to develop their skills.

B-5. The owners of shops will be given reserve materials directly in accordance with the allocations determined by the Ministry of Trade.

B-6. The owners of maintenance and repair shops will be given socialist sector agencies and they will be provided with the materials their shops need at wholesale price.

Seventh. Importation of the requisite agricultural machinery and equipment.

1. Implementation of the recommended plan for the importation of agricultural machinery for the years 198 ~~illegible~~-85 through importation of the following amounts; in addition to those now existing: 4,700 large tractors, 16,500 small tractors, 1,400 grain harvestors, 500 rice harvesters and 2,500 tractors and attachments for fruit tree cultivation.

2. Reduction of the administrative tax rate on imported machinery and equipment from 7 to 5 percent of the cost and storehouse base.

3. Abrogation of the price stability reserve and the General Agricultural Machinery and Equipment Import Agency commission, which total 2 and 7 percent, respectively.
 4. Tractors to be imported will have a high horsepower and productive capacity ranging from 150 horsepower in the case of the large ones and from 70 to 80 horsepower in the case of small ones, except for fruit tree cultivation tractors.
 5. Wheat and barley harvesters to be imported will have productive capacity ranging from 3 to 4 donums per hour is a general average and rice harvesters will have a productivity greater than 1 donum per hour.
 6. The General Agricultural Machinery and Equipment Import Agency will give priority in agricultural machinery supply to requests for the purchase of a single machine, then will supply requests in excess of that.
 7. The General Agricultural Mechanization Organization will import large machines and offer them for sale to the public sector.
- Eighth. The Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform will seek gradually to apply the system of linking wages to production (as attached overleaf) in the field of agricultural mechanization.

/Signed/ Taha Yasin Ramadan

First Deputy Prime Minister.

11887

CSO: 4802

IRAN ACCUSED OF CRIMES AGAINST KURDS OF IRAN, IRAQ

Baghdad AL-'IRAQ in Arabic 19 Nov 80 p 7

[Article: "What's Behind the Persian Aggression Against Our Kurdish Citizens in the Autonomous Zone?"]

[Text] The racist Iranian regime has not refrained from pouring its racist chauvinistic hatred against the Kurds of Iran. Indeed, it has extended to the autonomous Kurdish region of Iraq, with the bombardment of the peaceful Kurdish towns and villages and the defenseless citizens in them.

After the human slaughter and the endless mass attacks to which the Kurdish people in Iran have been exposed at the hand of this tyrannical gang, and after the expulsion of thousands of Kurdish families, there as a result of Khomeyni's attacks of violence and terror carried out against the people of Iranian Kurdistan who claim as their legitimate right self determination, the Iranian racists have taken up an aggressive course. They have adhered to this course to the degree that their airplanes have begun to launch repeated air raids on the towns and villages of the autonomous region of Kurdistan directed at civilian lives and buildings in them. These have led to the martyrdom and wounding of a number of Kurdish people in Iraq.

These treacherous, cowardly actions emphasize the extent of involvement by the band of the rotten Khomeyni in the crime and its craving for bloodshed. Likewise, they embody the state of hysteria in which this group lives as a result of the successive defeats from the assaults of our heroic army in Saddam's battle of Qadisiyah and the Iranian Kurdish armed bands in the region of Kurdistan, as well as the violent resentment of all other Iranian peoples for Khomeyni's shaken regime.

During interviews conducted by the Iraqi News Agency with several citizens in the Kurdistan Autonomous Region, Mr Muhammad Muhiy al-Din a member of the political bureau of the Revolutionary Kurdistan Party, responsible for the party's third section, said: "The Khomeyni gang, after it had set itself directly upon the Iranian peoples who obeyed the Shah's regime, began to carry out all sorts of violence and terror against the Kurdish nation in Iran which is demanding self rule as its legitimate right, and which participated honorably in all the uprisings of the Iranian people, especially the popular Iranian revolution against the rule of the former Shah."

[Mr Muhiy al-Din] added: "After the incessant mass attacks and the expulsion of thousands of families, the Kurds of Iran were forced to take up arms and confront Khomeyni's troops and guard in defense of the right to self rule."

While the collapsing Khomeyni regime was largely preoccupied with trying to confront the proud armed opposition inside Iran, it was sustaining a new defeat as a result of its embroilment in hostilities against Iraq in which Saddam's Qadisiyah army was able to record the most glorious battles of heroism and self-sacrifice. Khomeyni's response, as usual, was to escalate his terror and his crimes against the helpless civilians. He directed his planes to bomb the Kurds. But this time it was not just in Iran. Rather, it included the towns and villages in Iraqi Kurdistan as well and caused the killing and wounding of many helpless civilians.

Mr Muhammad Muhiy al-Din stressed that our Kurdish people, who are enjoying their national rights in the autonomy framework under the protection of the July 17th Revolution, stand stronger than at anytime since the revolution in order to reinforce the national unity and to attack the racist Persian enemy and make him kneel in submission to our just demands. Mr Kamal Sabir Kawani, a member of the National Assembly from the governorate of Irbil and president of the local federation of trade unions said:

"The crimes of repeated bombing of residential areas and civilian economic facilities in most of the Iraqi Kurdistan region and other Iraqi towns by the planes of the imposter Khomeyni are attributable to the successive defeats which our heroic army has dealt the forces of the ignorant racists. It is also attributable to the pride of the popular resistance in Iran, especially in the region of Kurdistan where the Iranian Kurds took up their armed struggle because of their being dispossessed of their right to self-determination, just like their Kurdish brothers in Iraq who continue to insist on defending Iraq's land and waters whether through armed confrontation on the battlefronts or through strengthening the internal front, exerting the greatest of efforts to increase the production and development of the national economy, and supporting the war effort.

Yunis 'Abdallah Haddad, president of the Central People's Council in Irbil province, says that, since the issuing of the March 11 decree and the implementation of its articles by the leadership of the party and the revolution, its dispatch in announcing the autonomy law and the outgrowth of its constitutional institutions and their pursuit of their functions, and with the participation of all the people in a true national unity and in building revolutionary Iraq, and with the achievement of comprehensive growth in the autonomous region of Kurdistan, imperialism has made, by means of the client regime of the Shah, and after him the regime of the new shah, a new attempt, by instigating the puppets, mercenaries and reactionaries, to impede the progress of the pioneering experiment. This experiment has grown in strength and vigor day by day, thanks to the rallying of all the masses around our historical leadership, headed by our struggling president, Saddam Husayn, and its total desire to defend autonomy. This is what pushed this madman to send his guard and his mercenaries to attack the Kurdish people driving them out by every kind of suppression of their rights, killing their women and their children and demolishing their homes. The malicious Khomeyni was not content in this with everything not altogether Persian. His planes started bombing civilians in Iraq Kurdistan, oblivious to the fact that our Kurdish people in Iraq lie side by side with their Arab brothers in ambush against all who have been tempted to do harm to the autonomy program and the achievements realized under the protection of the July Revolution and its leading party, the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party, headed by our struggling president, Saddam Husayn.

Shaykh Khurshid al-Barzani from the minor village of Qadisiyah in the region of Qashtabah stresses the fact that the hatred of Khomeyni's gang of charlatans against everyone who is not Persian and for all Muslims is a further continuation of the historical evidence of the way of the racist Magian Persians. He said that this hatred is what induced Khomeyni to launch an oppressive, endless war against the Kurdish people in Iran and kill hundreds of children, women and old men.

He added that what rights the Kurds in Iraq enjoy under the auspices of the autonomy were achieved for the first time in the history of the Kurdish people. The rights which our Kurdish people enjoy have begun to form a focal point for the non-Persian Iranian peoples demanding the same rights.

He stressed that these criminal acts indicate the bankruptcy of the Khomeyni gang which has suffered the bitterness of defeat at the hand of our brave army which demonstrated the unity of our national ranks with the Arabs and the Kurds and the ethnic minorities, and our conviction that the national honor and sovereignty is dearer than blood. We stand determined and resolved to defend our legitimate right to our lands and our waters behind the leadership of our struggling president Saddam Husayn. Shaykh 'Abd al-Bari Sulayman 'Abd al-Salam al-Barzani from the village of Quds al-'Asriyah says:

"The mass slaughters and tacks of violence and terrorism against the Kurdish people in Iran, among which was the massacre of Sanadaj perpetrated by Khomeyni's guard and troops against the Kurdish residents of the city is the sure proof of the racism and barbarism of this imposter and falsity of his religious claims.

He added that the state of anarchy that encompasses Iran as a result of the blows suffered by Khomeyni's mercenaries in all parts of the region of Kurdistan at the hand of Saddam Husayn's soldiers and as a result of the state of despair and hysteria pervading it, prompted the defeated regime to send in its planes against the Kurds of Iraq, killing and wounding many helpless civilians in various areas of Iraqi Kurdistan.

The Barzanis' assurance of resolute resistance was renewed for the sake of everyone enticed by the acquisition of the autonomy by the July Revolution under the leadership of the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party and the struggling president, Saddam Husayn for our Kurdish people. He announced their attention to the most complete preparations in order to take up arms and fight alongside our triumphant army against the racist Persian enemy.

9614

CSO: 4802

MODERN NATIONAL RAILROAD NETWORK PROJECTS OUTLINED

Baghdad BAGHDAD OBSERVER in English 16 Dec 80 p 2

[Text] With the growing use of trains as means of cargo transport and travel among different parts of the country, the Iraqi authorities keep up modernisation of the existing railway network and sponsoring ambitious technical studies for the initiation of a highly advanced network of railroads.

A special executive technical commission for modern railroads, recently established, has now embarked on elaborate technical studies and drawing up technical designs for a new railway networks to be implemented in accordance with most up-to-date techniques.

The blue-prints now being worked out would link other parts of the country with the existing network as well as with the Arab Gulf region, Mediterranean ports and Europe. Technical feasibility is emphasised too for future linkage with east Asia.

The studies conducted by the commission include execution and maintenance of the project and qualification of Iraqi technical cadres for operating the network and maintenance. Immediate phases of the project aim at connecting the national network with Kuwait, Jordan and Turkey.

As integrated sections of the projected network, the commission is preparing designs and feasibility studies for three railway lines: The 80-km Kirkuk-Sulaimaniya line, the 90-km Suleiman Pek-Khanaqin line and the 85-km Kerbala-Ramadi line. Designs for these lines are expected to be finalised in the first quarter of 1982.

Studies involving the implementation of the third and fourth sectors of a semi-circular railway scheme around Samawa city, a 30 kilometres line, are nearing completion. The execution work is scheduled to begin in the first quarter of 1981. The scheme involves the building of three bridges on the Euphrates and its tributaries.

Commission sources said that other parts of this project whose designs and contract documents were expected to be completed next year include a two-lane railway line around the city of Baghdad with Sulaiman Pek in the south west of Baghdad. This circular line also includes the construction of cargo warehouses, workshops and a principle railway station.

Another scheme, part of the major network, with designs expected to be completed in the middle of 1981, is the Baghdad-Kut-Basrah-Om Qasr railway line. This 910-km line comprises a two-lane rail-road Baghdad-Kut-Nasiriya-Basrah-Om-Qasr. Another scheduled line is the Kut-Amara-Basrah.

Under the project, two new railway stations will be constructed in Basrah and 44 stations along the line in cities and towns in addition to a railway complex in Shuaiba including workshops and platforms. An 89-km line will branch from Shuaiba to Fao and a housing scheme made up of 1700 units will be constructed. The third scheme is the Baghdad-Kirkuk-Arbil-Mosul railroad, a 600 km line including a branch-line from Baquba to Khanaqin, principle station in Kirkuk, Mosul and Arbil as well as 35 stations along the line.

The other scheme, the 300-km Kirkuk-Baiji-Haditha line, regarded a strategic scheme is linking the eastern parts of the country with the western parts and through it three other lines Baghdad-Kirkuk, Arbil-Mosul and Baghdad-Mosul lines are to be linked.

The other scheme whose designs are undertaken by the commission is the semi-circular scheme linking Musayyab with Kerbala, Najat and Samawa to a length of 250 kilometres. It includes building of new principal stations and workshops. After the completion of these schemes, they will be equipped with most up-to-date mobile units and supplied with a fleet of about 25,000 railway trucks, 100 passenger wagons and about 400 modern locomotives.

Passengers trains are expected to run at an initial speed of 140 kilometres per hour to be increased to 250 kilometres per hour. The commission has been authorised to introduce the highest standard of automation and to invite the technical expertise of international experts in the largest required scale.

The commission sources said they were given authorisations to equip these schemes with most up-to-date central control facilities including the introduction of sophisticated gadgets and machinery and extensive use of computers for control of train operations.

CSO: 4820

AUTONOMY TALKS SEEN AS FUTILE

Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR in Hebrew 24 Oct 80 pp 4-5, 19

[Interview with MK Avraham Melamed by Dorit Gefen: "We Are Not All Righteous"]

[Text] At this time, when two ministries, which for many years have been controlled by the NRP, are making dubious headlines concerning irregularities in financial matters and perhaps even more serious ones (Ministry of Religious Affairs), I went to MK Avraham Melamed, a member of the Knesset Finance Committee and the Knesset State Control Committee, and asked him, among other things, about the system of budgeting through the municipalities and the local councils.

Melamed, a sharp-witted and clever Jew, silences me with a smile and says in a friendly tone that if we talk about this subject then we must talk about the entire system of appropriations, and 'AL HAMISHMAR would not print it. "I have statistics that the kibbutz movement received three or four times more than all of religious Jewry, including the Neturei Karta. This was done through the Ministry of Absorption, the Ministry of Transportation, and many ministries. I am talking about cultural, educational and sports structures."

Melamed is not happy talking about these things in their actual context--the Ministry of Interior. He recalls a conversation at which he was present (about 17 years ago) between the late Pinhas Sapir and the late Hayim Shapira. According to him the system did not begin in the Ministry of Interior. It was only a channel for the Treasury, through which the money was passed.

Melamed relates: "Sapir said to Shapira in that conversation: Give 15 million pounds to Tel Aviv University. Fifteen million pounds at that time was the equivalent of 2 billion today. Sapir said: I will give you the money, and you forward it through the Tel Aviv municipality. Shapira answered: But only 2 weeks ago I gave money to the university through the Tel Aviv municipality. Sapir responded: It's not important. Send it through Be'er Sheva, Haifa or another municipality.

Sapir did this, this was the system. They built Tel Aviv University through all the municipalities of Israel. There are museums, even one of your heritage. Its director is a friend of mine from Bet Zera'. Should I mention names? There are some 60 municipalities and local councils which maintain it. The same thing applies to Lohamei Hageta'ot, Bet Shturman, Hama Senesh, and others. That is the system. The Ministry of Interior is not the only one involved in this. I had the

State Comptroller testify for me on this matter. I have fought against the system because it discriminates against me. What do we (the NRP) have? The Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Religious Affairs, and the Ministry of Education. However, the others have more than 10 ministries. And the Ministry of Interior also gave [money] to other institutions, youth movements, the Shomer Hatza'ir, the United Movement, and Tzavta. Cheech [nickname for Shlomo Lahat, Mayor of Tel Aviv] did not publicize his second list. However, the Ministry of Interior will certainly bring the whole matter to the committee. It will show that it is not even 5 percent.

[Question] Who was interested in finding out about this matter precisely at this time? Is this the work of someone in the NRP in the context of its internal situation?

[Answer] I don't believe so, however it is also possible. I think that they have simply launched a total war against the NRP. Here is DAVAR in the forefront of things. Do I have to tell you how DAVAR was built? Let them be shocked! They are the ones who found out about the system? The Alignment? They introduced it. This hypocrisy eats me up. Why did I come out against it, I went to protect Burg? He can do this alone! Only because of the hypocrisy. All of us are not righteous people. There are improper systems which have been introduced by various people, and they must be changed. The righteous, saintly Ministry of Defense. I spoke out against it. On the radio. They didn't let me appear on television. The Ministry of Defense did not only pass [money] to Sede Boqer and to various institutions, they built cultural institutions, primarily in the collective settlements. The Ministry of Defense--what is the connection?

A municipality, that is something else. It transfers money. It always has an answer. My children go to school there, and children from there go to school here. They already find some connection. There is someone in charge of the district, and he certainly found a connection. Not a close one, but it makes no difference--some connection.

[Question] The exposure of this system possibly explains several phenomena which are not understandable at the time. For example, how did the NRP manage to win votes in the Arab area. How do you explain this?

[Answer] I received the first votes from the Druzes, my neighbors at Nir 'Etsyon. I certainly did not give them money. I explained to them that our problem is the same as theirs. The state is a secular one. The young generation lives in secularism, and we protect their interests. We have an identity of interests. I am amazed that their entire older generation has not voted for us. It is because of the bribery of MAPAI, Toledano, and others. Toledano, what funds he had! There is no one in the Land of Israel who will say that Burg or Kubersky conducted themselves in a personal manner.

[Question] And Abu-Hatzeira?

[Answer] The police are investigating. Can I speak for the police?

MK Melamed says of himself that he has a good memory. I can attest to the fact that he knows how to avoid perplexing questions. He conducts himself on the matter of appropriations in accordance with the verse "awaken not nor stir up." This shows you that the system has spread among all of them.

No Ethnic War

[Question] Let's turn to the situation in your party. The impression is that today the factions are like wolves to each other. Initially it was the Likud U'Temura faction, and now they are trying to tarnish the reputation of Minister Burg, one of the leaders of Lamifne. Are we not witnessing a situation in which each one is saying: Let me die with the Philistines?

[Answer] It is very far from that. I think that the results will still be the opposite. I would not describe our internal party situation as ideal. This would be incorrect. However, it is not as it appears on the outside. There was a time when they wrote about us that we were the most united party. This also was an exaggeration. And today they are exaggerating when they say that the factions are like wolves to each other. True, what happened has happened, and there are those who try to make intrigues between the factions. Someone can think that so-and-so, as an influential minister, could have conducted himself in such a way as not to permit intervention in certain investigations. This certainly fouled the atmosphere. However, the truth is that before this things were not so ideal, and today they are not so bad.

The communications media have ganged up on us, and in my opinion, unjustifiably. They have not brought up specific actions but instead have begun to search from all sides. Everything. Even the rabbinical courts, which certainly are not involved with the financial matters. Everything together. The religious community has gotten the impression that they are ganging up on it. And the more a minority has the feeling--correctly or incorrectly (I am virtually convinced that it is incorrect)--that there is a conspiracy against it, the more it unites. Today there are very strong signs of uniting, and I feel it. Something good will eventually come out of this. There are those who have never voted for us, who have voted for the secular parties, and they are saying: This time if they gang up on you, we have a moral commitment to vote for you.

[Question] You do not want to comment on the Abu-Hatzeira case and the Ministry of Religious Affairs because the police are investigating. However, the case has taken on an ethnic tone, and there has been an attempt by circles close to the minister to present the entire case as an attempted ethnic conspiracy. Since there is a very large segment from the eastern communities in the NRP, don't you think that if, Heaven forbid, Abu-Hatzeira is placed on trial, it is likely to adversely affect a large potential of your voters?

[Answer] I, like you, still believe and will believe that he will come out all right. In any case, however, the problem is not a partisan one but rather a general national one. If, Heaven forbid, and I hope it doesn't happen, the ethnic matter in Israel becomes involved in this, it will be a national problem. This is a very serious and acute problem, and I think that everything must be done to persuade and explain that this should not, Heaven forbid, be made into an ethnic issue.

[Question] However, we have seen that in the NRP members of the various factions have come out in an act of identification. This has even split the factions. Isn't this worrisome?

[Answer] It is a sign that the issue is not only an internal partisan one. People from other parties have also participated. The main anger was actually against the communications media, who attempted to judge a person and minister in Israel even before there was any proof. This angered them. They forgot that there have been other similar cases. Our communications media are accustomed to condemning a person prematurely. They have forgotten that this has already happened, thank Heaven, to pure Ashkenazim. Their feeling at that moment was that there was a kind of "vendetta" by the communications media against a person who is a senior minister and a representative of the ethnic communities. Then it happened. We are obliged to do everything we can without connecting it to a party so that, God forbid, this feeling should not develop. We have to nip it in the bud.

No Leader's Crown

[Question] Before this entire incident, there was talk of an "Oslo 2." The main objective of that organization, which later collapsed, was to get rid of Dr Burg, who today, as a result of his position, seniority, and other rights, is still considered the NRP leader. The objective of this organization, in which, incidentally, Abu-Hatzeira was also a member, was to crown Hammer. Much water has flowed in the NRP since then, and these plans were rejected or suspended. Don't you, also as a member of the Burg faction, think that the time has come for him to resign? And who in your opinion is worthy to inherit this crown, if such a crown exists at all?

[Answer] It is good that you said "if it exists." Burg unquestionably is acceptable to all, however, we don't have individual leadership. We have never had it, not even during the period of Shapira, who gave the appearance of a leader. Burg does not try at all to appear as an individual leader. However, Shapira tried. Even then there was a collective leadership, and whoever deludes himself that individual leadership can emerge in our movement, is badly mistaken. Never. Many things can happen in the NRP, this will not happen. Not today, not tomorrow, not 2 days later.

The newspapers also exaggerated this. It is true that there were all kinds of organized groups for the purpose of changing Burg into a minority among the religious ministers. However, we knew that this organization had no real strength. We burst this inflated balloon, when we said: Let's have internal elections, they were immediately shocked, and it was over.

The Lamifne faction, incidentally, is not Burg's faction. There is a Lamifne faction which has been in existence for 40 years. We have more young people than the young people have. However, in our case, they have not left, and they have not betrayed us. This did not happen to us. This is also Burg's strength. Burg was able to continue because his associates did not betray him. What happened in other factions, and what is likely to happen, did not happen to us. Therefore, if elections are held, the Lamifne faction would have a majority.

[Question] It is said that not only in the other factions but also in the Likud U'Temura faction there are those who are rubbing their hands--because of the betrayal of Rafael--and saying that the end of the revenge is to come.

[Answer] I do not like to smooth over matters. I cannot be one who examines the reins and heart. I do not know what people are thinking. From what I hear in conversations, even with Abu-Hatzeira's opponents, at this time there is sympathy for him. At this time he is being pursued, and there is solidarity with him. I hear this more than the other voices. It is possible that somewhere inside there is someone who holds animosity, however what is expressed is solidarity.

[Question] What is your opinion of the actual explicit and unequivocal position taken by the chief rabbis, for example. Do you consider this in the category of solidarity?

[Answer] I distinguish between the feeling of solidarity among various minorities--and the religious community considers itself a minority--a natural and normal feeling, and that which official national personalities, such as the chief rabbis, say. I really think that the chief rabbis do not have to intervene. However, as I have explained, they have not intervened. Rabbi Ovadia Yosef by happenstance, completely by happenstance, appeared somewhere and was asked a basic halachic question. And he is a Jew who is an expert, he has no peer. He responds immediately and forcefully! He has an extraordinary and phenomenal memory. It is really a phenomenon. He responds immediately with the sources and he renders a decision at once. He answered in general terms, he did not refer to the actual situation. Of course, the communications media immediately made an issue of this.

Someone apparently later asked Rabbi Goren and thought that he surely would receive a different answer. This time, however, Rabbi Goren disappointed him.

[Question] You said before that there is no connection between the ministries and your strengthening yourself in all kinds of places. Why then do you insist on holding certain ministries? Understandably, the Ministry of Religious Affairs. But why the Ministry of Interior? Why didn't Dr Burg agree to take the Ministry of Foreign Affairs instead? Could you perhaps reveal to us the secret of the charm of the Ministry of Interior?

[Answer] Why is it necessary to look for answers to something which is so simple? What were Dayan's reasons when he left the Ministry of Foreign Affairs? Because without the autonomy matter, it is not worth much. What would be chosen by an ordinary person, who holds the main thing, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and has one more ministry, regardless of which one? Should he give up a ministry and three-quarters in order to receive one-quarter? This is the calculation. Burg never said at the time of the elections that he must hold the Ministry of Interior! I will tell you something else. The Ministry of Interior oversees the municipalities and local councils. Certainly it has influence. And which party accepts ministries so as not to have influence? Each one works things out. The Ministry of Interior has a certain influence. Had it depended upon me, I would not have selected it. The influence of the Ministry of Interior is waning. What influence can the Ministry of Interior have on Teddy Kollek and Cheech? The party cannot influence Cheech, and it cannot influence Kollek--so, can the Ministry of Interior influence them? Every other ministry has more influence. I assure you that if we

have to choose in the next government between the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Interior, we will choose Education.

Not the Revelation of Eliyahu

[Question] Let's return to your problems in the NRP. You seem to mock, or not take seriously the case of the Ministry of Interior and the appropriations because you say everyone is doing this--and the system is an old one....

[Answer] This is because I know the issues. I have been working in the Finance Committee many years. I know the national budget. How should I say: Almost like "Happy are they who dwell in thy house." This is a prayer well known to the simplest Jew. I know the budget and all its details. I know this system of budgeting....

[Question] Does this distribution go through the Knesset Finance Committee or is it actually done autonomously by the ministries?

[Answer] It depends. The entire budget is approved, and afterwards there are changes in the budget, and it again requires parliamentary approval....

[Question] But the internal distribution of the appropriations is not the responsibility of the Finance Committee?

[Answer] Absolutely. It's in front of us, everything is clear. For example, the proposed budget of the Ministry of Interior lists various types of grants, including grants designated for other purposes which require only one thing--the decision of the local authority. There is no limitation on what to give and how to give it. This is written in the budget which the Knesset approved. There is a budget law and there are regulations. Every detail is there. During the year there are many changes in the budget, and then every budget disbursement, from section to section, requires approval. In this case, there is a Budget Subcommittee of the Finance Committee, of which I have been its chairman for 11 years, and I know every detail.

[Question] That is to say that this matter of budget disbursements is not concealed from the Finance Committee?

[Answer] Absolutely not, generally speaking. We do not always go into the details of the institutions. But sometimes we do. How many times have you read in the newspapers detailed lists...?

[Question] It seems that according to you Toledano's revelation was not a revelation at all?

[Answer] Toledano's revelation was not a revelation of Eliyahu. Perhaps for him it was a revelation. He should have known this. When he was in the executive arm, he knew exactly how funds were disbursed to the Arab local authorities. He also knows the kinds of transformations they made and the kinds of funds there were, both hidden and open. He should have known this better than anyone else, but perhaps he thought that the moment he entered into a "change"--how is it said today?--the system changed. Unfortunately, it continues.

[Question] Do you think that this system should be changed once and for all and some revision made?

[Answer] Certainly. I can have the state comptroller--and I am one of his main supporters--testify for me. Regarding the change of the system, he protests about this in every one of his reports, on every ministry. I am one of the few who have supported him consistently, also concerning the defense budget. There was a time when I was the only one in the committee. When they were discussing the deficiency in the Ministry of Defense, both the Herut-Likud opposition and the Alignment would stand at attention and sing the Hatikvah [Israel's national anthem]. I was the only one who expressed complete reservation. Bar'am, who was then the chairman of the coalition, ran after me to prevent me from doing so, but I stood my ground.

[Question] Are you talking about the system?

[Answer] Yes, about this system, the one we are talking about. Such cases have been repeated in the Ministry of Defense. I wanted to introduce the reservation. There were those who said, the other ministries--all right. But the Ministry of Defense? It was holy. This is how it was until Yom Kippur, in an extreme form. After Yom Kippur, it was already less.

[Question] Let's return to your party. Until the revelation of the recent cases, they were speaking in the NRP about advancing the elections, especially in your faction Lamifne. Now, it seems, everyone is waiting in the NRP to see how things turn out. Do you believe that there is still an objective basis for advancing the elections?

[Answer] I have not changed my opinion. There is no connection between the cases. But I am a realist. I have seen that I talk and talk, but I do not have a majority on this issue for various reasons. We had an informal consensus that we should hold the elections in the spring. I had the impression that Burg also agreed with this, and he was one of those who was not so enthusiastic about advancing the elections. The same applies to Hammer, who was extremely against it, and also other members.

Those who were in favor of it are also in favor of it today, and it is possible that there will still be an opportunity. I don't know what is happening with RAFI. If RAFI concedes to Levi in the Likud, then they have no right to exist--not within the Likud and not as such. It is certain that the minister of finance will be unable to continue even 1 day if he concedes to Levi, if he retreats from his view. How will it look for him?

If he does not concede to Levi, then Levi and the others will be unable to implement the policy they want. Therefore, I believe that it can still be brought up any day. Those members who are in favor of it will do everything they can to advance the election.

Not an Opposition Party

[Question] Let's leave the internal matters for the moment. Dr Burg, the head of the Lamifne faction, is now conducting Israel's main negotiations with Egypt and

the United States. You are certainly current on the development of those negotiations and primarily its prospects. Do you believe that there are prospects that the negotiations will be completed with an agreement acceptable to all parties?

[Answer] I believe that these talks are futile. This has been my opinion for some time despite the fact that my associate and friend is the one conducting them. He is conducting them as a representative of the government's policy. The present government is incapable of making progress in this matter. As for all these talks, everyone is thinking: After the flood. Actually, I don't know what they are thinking. Why should I get involved in it? I say what I see: Futile talks which will advance nothing.

This government is incapable of moving ahead. It took one step at the time with Egypt, and afterwards, they apparently became frightened and began a psychological withdrawal. Now they are conducting talks. Dr Burg is doing the best he can in order to implement the government's policy which, in a certain respect, is one of sitting and doing nothing on the autonomy issue. He is conducting them with great intelligence, humor, and wisdom, and superficially it looks like negotiations. However, in sum, the government has decided to sit and do nothing. Whether or not it has made a formal decision does not interest us. It is incapable [text missing].

[Question] Those who know your views are aware that the Likud is not your ideal. Whatever doesn't happen, there will be elections in November 1981 at the latest and the NRP will have to decide the direction in which it is to go. Will your party continue its partnership with the Likud in any situation, or will it perhaps try to renew its partnership with the Alignment? Has perhaps in general the time come for the NRP to sit in the opposition and conduct a self-appraisal?

[Answer] There is no doubt that ideologically the Likud is not the orientation of my life, and I have also drawn personal conclusions. I have not wanted to continue as the chairman of the faction in the Knesset. It should be clear that this was in spite of the fact that I was for the change. We went wholeheartedly for the change. The Alignment contaminated itself and was unable to continue. It had to come down, and the change of administration was what I wanted. There was no alternative. Had there been a third force, I certainly would have chosen it. However, the choice was between the Alignment which had contaminated itself and the Likud--and I was also optimistic about the issue of peace, about which they warned me. I said: The Alignment has already shown that it is not making peace. The policy of Golda and Galili, in my opinion, has led the state into trouble from which we cannot extricate ourselves. I said at the time that perhaps it is precisely from Begin that peace would emerge. And by chance, I guessed correctly. At least regarding Egypt. However, as I have said, I am certainly ideologically and politically distant from them. And after what I have seen them do in the internal area, then, of course, there is no longer a choice but to return the Alignment.

Now regarding the NRP, I don't know. I can say one thing, that we will not remain in the opposition only in order to preserve our connection with the Likud. It is possible that the Alignment will have a clear majority without us. I think that giving them such a power is not desirable. I still don't know what it will do with it. I assume that on social and economic issues it is clear, however in regard to foreign affairs and peace, it is not at all clear.

[Question] What about the possibility of the NRP sitting in the opposition?

[Answer] We are not a party which aspires to the opposition. We want to be partners in implementing things--as always. I also do not assume that the Alignment will draw such policy lines that the party will be unable to accept them. There is a variety of views, moderate and extreme, in the Alignment. Therefore, I do not see any political limitations for our participation in such a government, when it is established.

5830

CSO: 4805

CHIEF OF STAFF ON SYRIAN INVOLVEMENT IN LEBANON

TA271145 Tel Aviv IDF Radio in Hebrew 1005 GMT 27 Dec 80

[Interview with Chief of Staff Lt Gen Refa'el Eytan by Tzvi Shapira; time and place of interview not given--recorded]

[Excerpt] [Question] Syrian soldiers were hit in the latest IDF operation. How do you view this?

[Answer] One should first ask what the Syrians were doing there, what the Syrians are doing in Lebanon. We shot down 10 Syrian planes over Lebanese territory. What are the Syrians doing in Lebanon? What are they doing near the terrorists?

[Question] In your opinion, why did the Syrians react with such force as they did? They should surely know that by their very entry into the region they may be hit.

[Answer] The Syrians are now attacking Zahlah. They are indiscriminately shelling a town of more than 100,000 people. They want to take over Lebanon. They do not want to have in Lebanon any element that cooperates with the State of Israel. This applies to the Christians in the north, whom the Syrians want eliminated from there, and this is surely also true regarding the Christians in southern Lebanon. The Syrians have occupied Lebanon and are quietly annexing it to their territory. It is under the Syrians' protection that the terrorists are acting, organizing, training and setting up bases against us. Almost all their fighting means come through Syria and it is the Syrians who prompt and urge them to act against the Christians and us, from Jordan's territory as well. The Syrians lead them past the Jordanian border. The Jordanians prevent them from this activity as far as they can but they do not always succeed in this although they try. The terrorists, however, do not get there from the outer space--they get into Jordan through Syria. They are encouraged by the Syrians. In other words, one should not clear the Syrians of all of this activity taking place in Lebanon, nor of the anti-Israel terrorist activity either.

[Question] Are there red lines between the Syrians and ourselves [beyond which Israel will not permit further Syrian activity in this regard]?

[Answer] I have not seen any red line on any map.

CSO: 4805

COMMERCIAL AGREEMENT SIGNED WITH GREECE

TA041828 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1700 GMT 4 Jan 81

[From evening newsreel]

[Text] Israel and Greece have signed an agreement to improve the conditions of commerce between them. This follows Greece's incorporation as a member of the EEC. An increase in Israel's exports to Greece is expected to follow the change in the commercial conditions, but Israel is worried about possible damage to several fields. Here is Gadi Sukenik:

Israel has a free trade agreement with the EEC which has 10 members at present. The free trade agreement now also applies to the economic ties between Greece and Israel. From now on, 25 percent of Israel exports to Greece will be duty-free. The rest of our exports to Greece will gradually, over 5 years, gain a full exemption from duty, apart from some exceptions. Moshe Smadar, deputy director general of foreign trade at the Ministry of Industry and Commerce, is convinced that the balance of Greek-Israeli trade, which is even now in our favor, will now improve.

[Begin Smadar recording] We may assume that this incorporation of Greece into the EEC and the liberalization [last word in English] that will occur in that country after its incorporation into the EEC--that Israeli exports to Greece will increase significantly. [End recording]

[Sukenik] However, in the field of agricultural exports, Greek farmers will now gain a great priority in Europe, as members of the EEC. Israel today exports most of its agricultural produce to the EEC countries, and Greek priority in that field is arousing concern here.

[Begin Smadar recording] In the future we will have to keep a very interested watch over the implications for our interests of Greece joining the EEC. It has been agreed with the EEC that if we see clearly that there are negative implications regarding our commercial interests in the EEC markets in the current EEC format, that we will be entitled to raise this matter in the framework of the committee for cooperation which, in fact, supervises the development of our agreement with the EEC. [End recording]

CSO: 4805

BRIEFS

ACTIVISTS ARRESTED--Two more Muslim Brotherhood activists were picked up in Nabulus and East Jerusalem. Two other Muslim Brotherhood movement members were detained last week. Our correspondent Pinhas 'Inbari has learned that the arrests are not connected with the political activity of the clerics but have been carried out for security reasons. There are, however, no signs that indicate a subversive military organizing of the Muslim Brotherhood activists in the territories. A struggle is now being conducted among the Muslim Brotherhood members, the Communists and the National Guidance Committee members. The religious fanatics do not allow their opponents to convene rallies in the mosques. They also act against them in election campaigns in academic institutes. [Text] [TA011127 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1100 GMT 1 Jan 81]

INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION UP--The industrial production in those plants that employ hired labor, except for the diamond branch, has gone up by 4.5 percent in fixed prices in the third quarter of 1980, namely between July and September, compared to the preceding quarter. This follows a 4.3 percent increase marked in the second quarter of the year compared with its first quarter. It should be noted that the first quarter of 1980 experienced a production rate that was lower by about 10 percent than the high level reached at the end of 1979, or between October and December. All the data was calculated after the regular seasonal fluctuations had been deducted. This was reported by the Central Bureau of Statistics. [Text] [TA011104 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 1 Jan 81 p 6]

AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS CATALOG--Starting next month, a catalog of costs of agricultural and building accessories will be distributed in Egypt, Jordan, the administered territories, and among Israeli Arabs. The catalog, which is written in Arabic, represents 40 of the leading companies in the fields of agricultural irrigation and mechanization. They include 'Amidar, Dan Mamterim, Nir-David, Bet Hashitta and others. The catalog appears under the aegis of the Ministry of Industry, Commerce and Tourism and with the cooperation of the Israeli Export Institute. It will be distributed in Egypt through the Israeli Embassy in Cairo. The catalog will be taken to Jordan by an official element, over the Jordan bridges. The catalog will be distributed among the Arabs of Israel and the West Bank and the Gaza Strip by local agents. This is the first time that a professional catalog in the field of agriculture and construction, written in Arabic, has been published. The publisher is the Pri'el Company owned by Sigalit Pri'el, who is a woman working in public relations and specializing primarily in the field of advancing sales of export products. It has also been reported that Pri'el, together with an exporter of flowers and agricultural produce, has established a

company called Top to Market Israeli Agricultural Produce in Egypt. For this purpose the company has rented two warehouses in Cairo and it is going to appoint local agents to push sales of these products. The company intends to maintain a constant exhibition of Israeli produce in Cairo. [Text] [TA021124 Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR in Hebrew 2 Jan 81 p 15]

FINANCIAL AID HALTED--Jordan has halted its financial aid to all the towns and villages in the territories that are getting electricity from Israel. This move is mainly hurting Tulkarm, Qalqilyah and the villages in that area. Hebron has not been affected because the municipality there has already received large sums of money from Saudi Arabia. Our correspondent Pinhas 'Inbari explains that the decision was aimed at hurting Tulkarm Mayor Hilmi Hanun, who was the first to link his town to the Israeli electricity grid, and was later one of the heads of the National Guidance Committee. The decision was made last year, but is only now being implemented. The villages in the Tulkarm sub-district have composed a letter to the joint Jordanian-PLO committee in Amman, asking for the resumption of the aid. [Text] [TA031414 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1400 GMT 3 Jan 81]

NEW SETTLEMENT PLANNED--A new residential neighborhood is to be built near the Radar Hill [Giv'at Haradar] site in the Jerusalem hills, close to Qiryat 'Anavim, across the green line. The new settlement is another link in the settlement system which is to be established in the hilly area west of Jerusalem cross the green line, and which includes An-Nabi Samu'il. The government level decision was made early last week. Jerusalem Municipal council member Eli'ezer Glaubach, who revealed this plan, said that part of the settlement will be inside the green line. He noted that this decision conflicts with the decision of the ministerial committee on Jerusalem to concentrate most resources at this stage on developing the area connecting the Neve Ya'aqov quarter with French Hill. It is feared in Jerusalem that implementation of this plan, together with the construction plan for An-Nabi Samu'il, will seriously affect this project [of connecting Neve Ya'aqov with French Hill], for which land was expropriated and the building freeze recently removed. [Text] [TA040942 Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR in Hebrew 4 Jan 81 p 8]

NEW POLICE CHIEF--Commander Arye Ibtzan was confirmed unanimously by the cabinet today as the new inspector general of the Israel police. Ministers had called for the speedy appointment of a new inspector general following the dismissal of Herzl Shafir by the interior minister on 31 January. For the past few years Ibtzan was the commanding officer of the Israel police force's southern district. [TA051553 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1100 GMT 4 Jan 81]

FOREIGN CURRENCY RESERVES--Israel's foreign currency reserves now total \$2.7 billion after rising last month by \$56 million. Exports in 1980 totalled \$5.5 billion. [TA051553 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0500 GMT 5 Jan 81]

NEW SETTLEMENTS ESTABLISHED--A large-scale settlement project at the foot of the Hebron Hills, on both sides of the green line, is to begin soon. This was disclosed yesterday by Ari'el Sharon, minister of agriculture and chairman of the ministerial committee for settlement affairs. In a lecture to the agriculture faculty in Rehovot, the minister said that the new settlement map would resemble a horse shoe covering the foot of the Hebron Hills. These settlements would act as a buffer between the population of the southern Hebron Hills and the non-Jewish population of the Negev, "on the assumption that, as far as can be seen, in the future there will be firm borders, not the accepted border lines." [Excerpt] [TA060929 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 6 Jan 81 p 4]

EXPROPRIATION OF SILWAD LAND--The military government has expropriated a small tract of land in the village of Silwad in the Ramallah District in order to pave a road to the 'Ofra settlement water reservoir. The military governor submitted the expropriation orders to the Silwad mayor and mukhtars. However, they announced they would not accept the expropriation. [Text] [TA060832 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0800 GMT 6 Jan 81]

SETTLEMENTS NEAR JERICHO--A new settlement will be established between Jericho and the Jordan River, and a Nahal settlement in the same area will become a civilian moshav, an aide to ministerial settlement committee Chairman Ari'el Sharon told the JERUSALEM POST yesterday. He revealed the plans after a ceremony marking the establishment of Vered Yeriho, some four kilometres south of Jericho. The aide said that Nahal Na'ama, about two kilometres north of Jericho, may become a moshav next year. It was not clear when Almog B, a planned kibbutz south of the Jericho-Allenby bridge road will be established. These settlements and Kibbutz Bet Ha'arava--established recently near the Allenby bridge on what had been the main road from Amman prior to the Six Day War--are to be part of Jerusalem's "defense line," Sharon declared at the Vered Yeriho ceremony. The Likud Government has concentrated on establishing settlements near Jericho. They are designed to close the corridor the Allon Plan had envisaged between Jordan's East Bank and the densely Arab-populated West Bank hill country which labor has proposed returning to Jordan in return for a peace treaty. Vered Yeriho is a cluster of 45 small, low buildings situated atop a barren hill overlooking the partly deserted refugee camp on Jericho's southern outskirts. The original plans called for settling the secular residents now living at Mitzpe Yeriho, on the road to Jerusalem, at Vered Yeriho, because of quarrels with their orthodox neighbours. But only four families and two singles had moved to Vered Yeriho by yesterday. As a result, the world Zionist organization accepted other candidates and by yesterday 12 families were already settled there. The residents expect to make a living from tourism, agriculture and industry, according to Ze'ev Ben-Yosef on the WZO's Settlement Department. [Text] [TA311322 Jerusalem POST in English 31 Dec 80 p 2]

IMMIGRATION DATA IN 1980--The Jewish Agency summed up the 1980 immigration situation indicating that there was a large decrease in the number of immigrants who came to Israel in the past year. The number of immigrants in 1980 represents a 44 percent drop from 1979. This is attributed, in part, to a severe drop in the number of Russian immigrants from over 17,000 in 1979 to about 7,000 in 1980. As far as immigrants from the Western world, it is thought that it is largely economic conditions that are keeping them from immigrating. [TA010637 Jerusalem Domestic Service in English 1800 GMT 31 Dec 80]

RATE OF INFLATION--Official figures for 1980 show mixed performance by various financial investments, with investors in shares raking in the biggest profits, and with those who invested in dollars failing to keep up with inflation. The shekel was devalued against the dollar by 113.52 percent, while inflation over the year was estimated at about 136 percent. Government bonds gained about 160 percent.

Gold, which went for about \$510 at the end of 1979, traded yesterday at \$600 an ounce--with considerable fluctuations in between. Bank of Israel figures showed that the shekel was devalued by 105.74 percent in 1980 against a basket of currencies of most of the country's trading partners. The dollar gained about 3.5 percent against this basket during the year, although in the last two weeks the shekel actually gained against the dollar. Government bonds not only kept up with inflation, but produced a 10 percent real yield--three times the yield given by the much less liquid long-term savings plans. Net government income from all bond sales (including those to pension funds and insurance companies) increased 21 percent in real terms to total 5.6 billion Israeli shekels. The Central Bureau of Statistics calculated that shares showed a 50 percent real gain during 1980, with industrial shares going up 200 percent in real terms. But bank shares produced only a 40 percent real return. [Excerpt] [TA010804 Jerusalem POST in English 1 Jan 81 p 1]

POPULATION STATISTICS--Israel's population grew by 83,000 in 1980 and now stands at 3,919,000, according to the year-end report released yesterday by the Central Bureau of Statistics. This reflects an annual growth of 2.2 percent, compared to 2.6 percent the previous year. Natural increase among Jews was 47,000 (70,000 births against 23,200 deaths), and among non-Jews reached 19,600 (22,400 births and 2,800 deaths). The fertility rate (the average number of children a woman will give birth to in her life time) stood at 2.7 among Jews, and 5.3 among non-Jews. In 1980, 507,800 Israelis went abroad for various purposes (compared to 495,600 in 1979) and 476,700 returned (478,000 in 1979). The Jewish population grew by 1.9 percent last year, compared to a 2.5 percent increase the previous year. The decline in the growth rate stems mainly from the drop in immigration. Only 20,500 immigrants arrived last year, as opposed to 37,200 in 1979. [Text] [TA020957 Jerusalem POST in English 2 Jan 81 p 1]

DECEMBER MONEY INFLUX--The treasury injected 600 million Israeli shekels into the economy during December 1980, the Bank of Israel reports. This is a record sum for a single month, and brings to 2.26 billion shekels the amount put into circulation since the beginning of the fiscal year on April 1, 1980. The revised state budget called for a total of 1.63 billion shekels--and the original budget for 205 million shekels--to be injected into the economy for the entire fiscal year which ends on March 31, 1981. Foreign currency reserves have grown \$201 million since the start of the fiscal year, and were \$2.78 billion at the end of December, compared with \$2.57 billion at the end of December 1979. [Jerusalem POST in English 5 Jan 81 p 1]

CSO: 4820

LEBANON

PHALANGIST OFFICIAL DISCUSSES DETENTE, DIALOGUE WITH SYRIA

Nicosia AL-'ASR in Arabic 10 Oct 80 pp 7-8

[Interview with Karim Baqraduni, Phalanges Party Political Bureau Member, by Ibrahim 'Abduh Khuri; "Baqraduni to AL-'ASR: Palestinian Resistance Offers Us Christian State; Potentials for Explosion in Lebanon at Any Moment; Expect Imminent Israeli Strike"]

[Text] In his interview with AL-'ASR, Lawyer Karim Baqraduni, member of the Phalanges Party Political Bureau, has accused the Palestinian resistance of imposing partition on Lebanon and of having tied the Lebanese issue to the Middle East issue. He considers Lebanon the most inflammable country and he has acknowledged the building of an intrinsic power to form the alternative to the army. He has also attacked the National Movement because, in his opinion, it has obstructed the Christian-Muslim detente. He has also stressed that the Phalangist-Syrian dialogue is proceeding as planned and that this dialogue has prevented the occurrence of setbacks in the feeble Lebanese situation. He has also said that Israel will deal the Arab states a blow at the right time. He has further said: The truth of the Iraq-Iran war is that it is a conflict between religion and oil.

Following are the questions and the answers:

[Question] Some of the parties involved in the conflict on the Lebanese arena accuse the Phalanges Party of working for partition within the areas under its control.

[Answer] The Palestinian resistance, which has set up its state on Lebanon's soil, is the side that is imposing the partition and which is making us an indirect offer to set up a Christian state. We will not fall into this snare and will not sell the soil.

[Question] Assuming that the resettlement does take place, what will the Phalanges' position toward it be?

[Answer] We will not acknowledge the resettlement under any circumstances because such recognition means a national treason. Tyre is more important to us than Byblos and Ba'labakk more important than J'ita. We will foil the schemes to resettle the Palestinians in Lebanon as we have foiled the schemes to evict the Christians from it.

Truth of Resettlement

[Question] Let us say, for argument's sake, that the resettlement does take place by either internal will or external will, do you think that it will lead to partition?

[Answer] We will reject the resettlement if it does take place and we will not declare partition because such a declaration would mean relinquishing a part of the homeland. We will continue to consider the areas occupied by the Palestinian resistance occupied areas and will continue to work to liberate them either peacefully or militarily.

We will not succumb to the fait accompli. Had we wished to succumb to this fate, the partition and the resettlement would have taken place in 1976.

[Question] Don't you think that the developments that have cropped up and that continue to crop up daily on the Lebanese arena will open wide the doors of resettlement and of partition?

[Answer] The rapid and entwined events on the Middle East arena and their impact on the Lebanese arena have not ended yet. The battle is still going on in the Middle East and in Lebanon. No faction has yet acknowledged that it is defeated and no faction has declared that it is the victor.

Therefore, the battle goes on and nobody can say what will the area's picture be after the battle.

[Question] What are your visualizations for the coming phase?

[Answer] I believe that there are three indicators or directions for the events:

1. There is no solution for the Middle East without another war and I believe that such a war will erupt in the medium or long range.
2. It is impossible for the Arab situation to continue as it is. Therefore, I believe that certain regimes will fall and will be replaced by others.
3. There is no imminent solution for the Lebanese issue under the canopy of the Arab regimes. Therefore, we are formulating a long-range strategic line and we believe that the ongoing race between the conflicting parties is not a 100-meter race but a 100-mile race.

Separating Two Issues

[Question] How can the Lebanese issue be separated from the Middle East issue and can the two be separated in the near future?

[Answer] The Lebanese issue cannot be separated from the Middle East issue unless Lebanon's issue is separated from the Palestinian issue. As long as the Palestinians in Lebanon act as if they were the authority and the state, they obstruct the establishment of a Lebanese authority and a Lebanese state.

What has tied the Lebanese issue to the Middle East issue is the Palestinian presence, especially the armed presence, in Lebanon. The two issues cannot be separated from one another except through eliminating or regulating the armed presence. I am not optimistic that the Palestinian resistance will implement the agreements concluded between itself and the Lebanese state in the near future. Consequently, I see no imminent separation of the Lebanese issue from the Middle East issue.

[Question] But the armed Palestinian presence is recognized by the Cairo agreement?

[Answer] Lebanon recognizes the Palestinian resistance but the Palestinian resistance does not recognize Lebanon. Lebanon did approve the Cairo agreement but the resistance has implemented none of its provisions. If the Palestinian resistance implemented what it had promised, the situation in Lebanon would be 90 percent better than what it is at present. As long as the Palestinian resistance does not implement even 10 percent of the Cairo agreement, then the situation in Lebanon will remain tense and explosive.

[Question] Having mentioned explosions, there is a wave of pessimism indicating that an explosion will occur shortly. What is your impression in this regard?

[Answer] I am not a prophet to know the unknown. But there are signs indicating that the area is boiling. Lebanon is the most sensitive and inflammable country. This is why I believe that the potentials for an explosion are present at any moment. Consequently, we as a party are taking military action and, at the same time, are making political endeavors to obstruct the chances of an explosion.

There is a race between those who touch off the explosions and those who cause destruction. We have no interest in any explosion touched off on our soil and against our people whereas many of those who touch off the explosions are operating on the soil of others and at the expense of a people who have hosted and honored them.

Detente and Intrinsic Power

[Question] Now, in your opinion, can we prevent such an explosion?

[Answer] There are three ways that we follow, rather three chances that we use, to prevent the explosion.

The first chance is the dialogue with Syria.

The second chance is that of facilitating the Christian-Muslim detente.

The third chance is that of building the intrinsic power that leads to the peace of arms in case the peace of detente is impossible.

[Question] What point has the Christian-Muslim detente reached?

[Answer] There is an Islamic will seeking to meet with the Christian will with the aim of realizing the national charter. But the [word or words presumably censored] intimidation exercised against the Muslims prevents the realization of this meeting.

Moreover, the parties forming the National Movement are trying to monopolize the Muslim street, to act as if they are the sole legitimate representative of the Muslims and to project the issue as if it were an issue of left and right. This is why I believe that the Christian-Muslim detente is obstructed because of the National Movement and of the Palestinian resistance. The resistance is imposing a Lebanese-Palestinian charter, i.e. the resettlement, and the National Movement is imposing a leftist control to change the system. We reject the charter with the Palestinians as we reject to succumb to the Lebanese left. We believe that a national Islamic will must emerge and we are waiting for its emergence.

[Question] Regarding the issue of intrinsic power, there are several parties that accuse the Phalanges of working for self-rule and that say that this intrinsic power is a substitute for the army forces which the Phalanges have refused to let into their areas?

[Answer] We are the only ones who have accepted the army in our areas, as proven by the fact of this army's presence in al-Ashrafiyah, Junyah, 'Ayn al-Rummanah, al-al-Hadath, Bakfayya and Ryblos. Meanwhile, there is no presence for the Lebanese army in any of the areas controlled by the Palestinian resistance or the National Movement, keeping in mind that the resistance and the Movement declare daily their rejection of the deployment of the army in any areas where they exist and that they set impossible conditions for this deployment because they are working for the creation of a separate Palestinian state on Lebanon's soil. Therefore, we are not the ones who have rejected the army.

As for the intrinsic power, we used to consider the Lebanese army our intrinsic power, used to delify it and used to consider it inviolable to the degree that the Phalanges had always been accused of being this army's agents. But the events have taught us that the army can be foiled by sectarian means, can be obstructed by political means and can be neutralized and deprived of any weight or any role. This is why we consider that our intrinsic power is the substitute to the foiled and incapable army. The aim of this power is to become as strong as that of the Palestinian resistance so that a balance may be established between the Palestinian forces and the Lebanese forces and so that the Palestinian may no longer hope to occupy Lebanon or to set up the Palestinian state on part of Lebanon's territories. Our power may be the best service we offer the resistance so that this resistance may despair of Lebanon and turn toward the occupied Palestine.

Dialogue With Syria

[Question] On the mention of the Phalangist-Syrian dialogue, what point has this dialogue reached now that you are shuttling between Beirut and Damascus?

[Answer] The Phalangist-Syrian dialogue has realized its first step, namely that of moving from the phase of hostility to the phase of truce. We are now preparing for the second phase of the dialogue, i.e. the phase of moving from truce to understanding. Under the canopy of the success of the first phase, many things which would not have moved without the Phalangist-Syrian dialogue have actually moved forward.

In this regard, let me note that the first contact between the Phalanges and Syria took place during a visit which I paid to Syria and which has remained secret. We were able at the time to prevent an explosion in the Lebanese situation in the wake of the assassination of Pierre al-Jumayyil's daughter. There was a common conviction at the time that an explosion would serve neither Lebanon nor Syria and that the interest of both states lied in stability. I also want to note that withdrawal of the Deterrence Forces from Sinn al-Fil, Jisr al-Basha and some parts of northern al-Matn took place under the canopy of that dialogue.

This is where the idea of the need to draw up a security plan to begin deployment of the Lebanese army arose. This idea is still the subject of negotiation.

Thus, the Phalangist-Syrian dialogue has produced, even in its initial phase, results that have had a positive impact on the Lebanese situation. This dialogue has also prevented the occurrence of several setbacks that could have affected the feeble Lebanese situation negatively.

After formation of the government, we hope to resume the dialogue which we have started and to move from the truce situation to the situation of understanding.

[Question] In case a new government is not formed, will the Phalangist-Syrian dialogue come to a halt?

[Answer] This dialogue started before the government resignation and is going on at present. We hope that this dialogue will move to the new phase after formation of the government because neither we nor the Syrian side want the issue of the government to be a subject of negotiation between us. The issue is not connected with the relations between the Phalanges and Syria but with the relations between the state of Lebanon and the state of Syria. We do not want to replace the government in our dealings with Syria. Moreover, Syria is careful not to consider any Lebanese faction as the substitute to the state.

[Question] What are the dimensions of this dialogue?

[Answer] We are ready to take this dialogue to the furthest limits. But we are aware that there are elements that will play a role to foil this dialogue. We are also aware that the pressure-exerting events on the Lebanese arena may delay this dialogue or may expedite it and give it unexpected dimensions.

It is a dialogue that is flexible in its goals and dynamic in its approach. It is not a rigid dialogue following an ideological approach or a conventional policy. It is a dialogue of a very special kind. I consider it a historical dialogue because it is the result of a historical misunderstanding [sic] between Syria and Lebanon in the past and a dialogue that may lead to historic resolutions in the future.

[Question] What are these resolutions?

[Answer] It may be that I know them but it is certain that you don't.

[Question] Is there any harm in mentioning some of them?

[Answer] No, but this is the secret of the negotiation.

Israeli Blow

[Question] You say, Mr Baqraduni, that the Middle East area is approaching an explosion. Do you think that the war which has erupted between Iraq and Iran is a prelude to this explosion or will Israel be the alternative timed-bomb?

[Answer] The Iraq-Iran war may be the prelude for touching off an explosion in the Middle East area and a sign for changing the regimes in it. I believe that a halt in the military war will not mean a halt in the political war between Iraq and Iran. Outwardly, this war is a struggle for territory but in fact it is a struggle between two regimes and this war will not end before the fall of one of the two regimes because it is a struggle between religion and oil.

There is no doubt that Israel will try to take advantage of the conflict within the Arab states and the conflict within the Islamic states to deal its military blow at the right time and to the weakest spot.

8494

CSO: 4802

SHI'ITE LEADERS COMMENT ON SITUATION, IMAM AL-SADR'S FATE

Nicosia AL-'ASR in Arabic 17 Oct 80 p 7

[Article: "Fate of Imam al-Sadr Tied to Solving Lebanon's Crisis; Shams-al-Din: Al-Qadhdhafi Is One Who Kidnapped Imam; Rabab al-Sadr: Entire World Has Displayed Cowardice in Regard to My Brother's Disappearance"]

[Text] Lilian (Perriet), a correspondent of the (GAMMA) NEWS AGENCY who visited Lebanon recently, has interviewed Shaykh Muhammad Mahdi Shams-al-Din, the chairman of the Supreme Shi'ite Council; Rabab, the sister of Imam Musa al-Sadr, and others on the issue of the disappearance of Imam al-Sadr. What have they said and how have they described the current situation of the Shi'ite sect in Lebanon?

The Shi'ite sect in Lebanon has now begun to become aware of its identity. In this regard, the sect enjoys the support of Iran's Shi'ites. The disappearance of Imam Musa al-Sadr since 1978 has not prevented this sect from making itself heard every day.

It is well known that Imam Musa al-Sadr had adopted a comprehensive action program at both the political and social levels. In his absence, Rabab al-Sadr Sharaf-al-Din, the imam's sister, and Shaykh Muhammad Mahdi Shams-al-Din, the chairman of the Supreme Shi'ite Council, continue to exert ceaseless efforts to put the Shi'ite sect on an equal footing with the Sunni and Maronite sects in Lebanon.

As for the imam's supporters, the imam's fate is tied firmly, in their view, to solving Lebanon's crisis, especially southern Lebanon's crisis.

The imam's political goals seek to eliminate oppression, deprivation and feudalism and this is why he wanted to establish the Supreme Shi'ite Council.

It is well known that the Sunni sect in Lebanon has had such a council for a long time. The imam's efforts in this regard produced positive results for the sect which was splintered in the past and which is now united behind the Supreme Shi'ite Council and behind its leader.

The members of the Shi'ite sect are spread in Beirut, the capital, in al-Shiyah and in al-Biqah, in addition to the south where their main concentration is found.

The Shi'ite sect members have suffered numerous catastrophes and extensive destruction as a result of the repeated Israeli attacks.

Shaykh Qablan, the Shi'ite mufti, describes the destruction caused to his sect members in the south as a result of the Israeli shelling as a "war of real annihilation," adding: "It is indubitable that we, of all the Arabs, are paying a high price for the sake of the Palestinian cause."

Imam al-Sadr has defended the Palestinian cause since the beginning and has described it as a "sacred and just cause" despite the Palestinian presence in the south. But in the wake of the intensive deterioration in southern Lebanon's situation, a situation which affects the Shi'ite sect directly, this sect has re-organized its ranks in Amal Movement.

Shaykh Qablan has expressed his deep regret for the situation reached by the south and has said: "The Palestinians must become real revolutionaries."

Amal Movement, which is headed by Lawyer Nabih Barri, is currently in charge of maintaining order and of protecting the Shi'ites with the force of arms. The Shi'ite mufti has added:

"This is the situation reached as a consequence of the events in Lebanon--a situation whereby each sect is compelled to defend itself with its own means."

The Shi'ites, who have been encouraged by the support of the Islamic revolution in Iran, says that they have their distinctive character and their special goals.

Explaining, Shaykh Qablan has said: "There is absolutely no place for speaking of the possibility of setting up an Islamic republic in our country, even in the presence of Imam al-Sadr. We do not want Shi'ite superiority because this would mean behaving like the Zionists."

The Shi'ites cling to their country and want an independent and absolutely sovereign Lebanon. They say: "We are the oldest sect here." Their main goal is to fight partition and resettlement of the Palestinians.

The Shi'ite mufti of Mount Lebanon and Beirut has said: "We are against any foreign alliance, be it with Iran, Iraq, Syria or any other Arab state."

Whatever the nature of the alliance game, the viewpoint of the Shi'ite officials is summed up in the statement that no action justifying the Israeli presence should be taken.

Even though the Shi'ite sect is represented in the 99-member Chamber of Deputies by 19 deputies, this is no longer significant because in the current state of chaos in Lebanon the issue is one of survival. The disappearance of Imam al-Sadr is causing his supporters deep concern because they believe that this disappearance is linked to the imam's efforts for peace.

There is no doubt that the Shi'ite sect knows how to defend its interests. But the presence of the imam among the sect members can contribute strongly to finding a settlement for the Lebanese crisis, especially in the south. Could this be one of the reasons for the kidnapping and disappearance of the imam?

Shaykh Muhammad Mahdi Shams-al-Din has said: "It is evident that the aim was to create division in the Shi'ite sect, to stifle the Shi'ite enthusiasm and to evict us."

As to who benefits from this crime, Shaykh Shams-al-Din has said: "All those who have plotted against southern Lebanon will bear the consequences of this action. The enthusiasm and vigilance of the Shi'ites will not be paralyzed by this plot. On the contrary, we now know what we want and this issue is about to turn into a Lebanese issue and not an issue concerning the Shi'ites alone. History will be the judge of this scandal, especially since Libyan Chairman Col Mu'ammarr al-Qadhafi, who had personally invited Imam al-Sadr to visit Libya, has kidnapped the imam."

Rabab al-Sadr Sharaf-al-Din will soon exert efforts to awaken the western public opinion, will hold a press conference and will meet with a number of French leaders.

Since Rabab's latest visit to Iran and her meeting with Ayatollah Khomeyni, she has been hoping to see her brother Imam al-Sadr alive.

Rabab has expressed thanks to Ayatollah Khomeyni for the message he sent her recently.

In any case, there is one definite thing, namely that the Italian judiciary will prove shortly that Imam al-Sadr's feet never touched Italian soil. "Al-Qadhafi is the party solely responsible for al-Sadr's disappearance," according to Rabab and to the belief of all the Shi'ites.

Rabab believes that Iran's assistance provides an additional opportunity for her to win her case. The Shi'ites in Lebanon and in Iran are tied not only by religion but also by family relations. Al-Sadr's niece is the wife of Khomeyni's son and Khomeyni's daughter is the wife of Imam al-Sadr's son. Despite this, several heads of state and of government, including Lebanese President Ilyas Sarkis, have [not] done anything decisive in regard to al-Sadr's disappearance. Mrs Rabab believes that this is unforgiveable because what is done for an ordinary citizen has not been done for a political and religious leader.

Rabab has added: "The entire world has displayed cowardice vis-a-vis the disappearance of Imam al-Sadr. If the detention of the U.S. hostages in Tehran is a prominent political event, then the kidnapping of the imam is also an important event."

8494

CSO: 4802

APPROACH TO CRISIS SOLUTION CRITICIZED, ALTERNATIVE OFFERED

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 28 Nov 80 p 12

[Article by Amin al-Siba'i: "Lebanese Events: the Correspondence Jargon between East and West Lebanon about the Formula and the Pact Are back in Use; Three Questions about the Destiny of Lebanon"]

[Text] Prime Minister Sa'ib Salam was surprised recently by a letter whose nature and source were political. The letter came to him from one of the active and influential forces in the eastern area.

The immediate reason for the surprise [was due to] the fact that the substance of this letter focused on a political impression similar to that with which the polling operations that are carried out by academies and institutes in western democratic countries and in the United States are executed. These polls played an active role in the United States before the results of the U.S. presidential elections appeared.

The content [of the letter] itself is brief and does not arouse the political interest of politicians, but it does derive some importance from the fact that it comes at this stage in particular as reinforced by the wishes that have begun to surface and to become known about the inevitabilities of looking for a new, political formula to replace the National Pact which was adopted in 1943.

Prime Minister Salam's first reaction after looking into the substance of the letter was to make a preliminary decision that he not respond in detail to the substance of the questions mentioned in the letter and to be satisfied with a few brief observations that derive their substance from the formulation of the questions. [He decided] he would not broach the texts of the settlement projects or the formulas that may be established--if they are established--after Lebanon emerges from the maelstrom of the crisis that is violently shaking everything in it.

What was in the letter of the eastern region to Prime Minister Salam?

The fact is that the letter is contained in one sheet which includes three brief, typewritten questions; it is signed by the political agency that sent it.

The questions laid down what signified [the following]:

The first question: What are the plans and measures whose adoption would firmly establish the Lebanese Moslem's sense that he is a Lebanese citizen and not merely a second class citizen?

The second question: What is the alternative to the Christian formula, which in case it is adopted, would not lead to the establishment of an Islamic formula but rather provide Lebanon with a communal and a positive formula?

The third question: What are the solutions and the suggestions that would contribute, after these two objectives are achieved, to the placement of matters in perspective and to opening the doors to the establishment of a state based on firm and solid principles for the future?

It was Prime Minister Salam's opinion that a mere detailed response to these questions signified writing a comprehensive study to determine the reasons for the errors that were committed; it was these errors that contributed to what Lebanon has come to in the recent war. Prime Minister Salam would then have to present the points of a solution as he envisioned them and to send them in longhand to the political forces that are interested in this subject. He would have to wait for their point of view on each item without having a guarantee that this action will make the achievement of specific, positive results inevitable.

It was Prime Minister Salam's opinion that the opposition of the political groups in the eastern regions to the notion of looking for a new formula for Lebanon and then the crystallization of this opposition into a questionnaire directed to political and party leaders in the western regions was an inadequate step for realizing the results that are being hoped for. Prime Minister Salam thought he was neither compelled by, nor convinced that it was necessary to adopt such a method. He thought that if investigating such points was necessary, a more feasible approach would have been to turn towards positive methods for [establishing] dialogue. After the political forces in the eastern regions declare that they have a specific view on the dialogue and the formula, consisting of these and other suggestions and solutions, the other Lebanese forces would have to look into these suggestions and solutions and to declare their point of view on them. Otherwise, there would be no use to directing brief questions or attempting to throw the ball into other people's court and asking them to propose their alternative formulas to the 1943 Pact or other new projects to develop the regime.

In the context of this understanding and this conviction, Prime Minister Salam responded to the three questions by making brief observations he wrote by hand on the same letter which he decided to return to its senders.

Prime Minister Salam's responses stated that the mere question about

how to impart to the Moslem the sense that he is a citizen and not merely a second class resident of Lebanese territory constitutes an acknowledgment on the part of those who formulated the question that there are reasons and motives that make the Moslem in Lebanon state that he is treated as a second class citizen.

To the second question Prime Minister Salam responded by saying, "Asking about an alternative formula to the Christian formula signifies recognition of the fact that the authorized formula is a sectarian formula that is in existence and in effect.

To the third question Prime Minister Salam said, "The suggestions that may be made to establish a productive and a stable state begin with removing the reasons that make Moslems feel oppressed and establishing firm foundations for a Lebanese national formula that would serve all the Lebanese without exception."

As he considered the substance of the afore-mentioned letter, and then as he read it last week to a limited number of politicians who are close to him, Prime Minister Salam tried to hide the source of the letter and the name of the party or political agency that had sent it to him. Accordingly, he tried not to comment on individual speculations that the source of the letter was one of two agencies. It either came from the Phalangist party in particular or from one of the political studies institutes that may be tied to the scientific team which, after the Lebanese events, undertook the treatment of the causes and consequences of the Lebanese war at al-Kaslik University in Juniyah.

Some of those politicians engaged Prime Minister Salam in a comprehensive debate to determine the soundness of the decision he had made by not responding in a detailed manner to the three questions.

The politicians emerged from this debate with clear impressions stating that the former prime minister did not want to present his full view of the requested solutions or of the new formula in letters that would be exchanged between him and an agency from here or a team from there. This is because in his opinion the importance of the matter does require that every agency commit itself in writing to a formula wherein it would determine its full view for a future Lebanon; it would then present this view for investigation by the various active Lebanese forces. It would ask them to determine their positions in the light of what was mentioned in its proposal. On the basis of this principle Prime Minister Salam thinks that instead of having the leaders of the eastern regions ask the Moslem leaders for the views and plans they may have for a new formula, they have to define their own view and then ask others to discuss that view or to counter it with comparable plans.

Before this significant stage is reached, Prime Minister Salam stipulates that there be a clarity in positions, an earnestness in the proposals and suggestions and a true commitment to what is agreed upon or to what the

wills come to an agreement about as a sound subject for inquiry so that the dialogue would not reach a dead end in mid course--that is, if there is room for dialogue--because this or the other leader shirked his commitment or disavowed what he had agreed to investigate.

Prime Minister Salam believes that he is personally justified in all the components of this position because he did experience what no one else has since the outbreak of the civil war in Lebanon. While the war [with] missiles, the assassinations, the roadblocks and murder upon identification were at their peak, he had tried more than once to visit the political leaders in the eastern regions. He had met there repeatedly with al-Shaykh Pierre al-Jumayyil, president of the Phalangist party and invited him [to participate] in a serious dialogue that would contribute to the reconsideration of the Lebanese situation and cooperation to get Lebanon out of its maelstrom. Prime Minister Salam endured much criticism, campaigns of suspicion and dangers for this purpose because he believed that with this method he was laying down new and firm foundations for a new coexistence. But then he later discovered that what was agreed to and what was said would collapse and disappear as soon as the meeting came to an end. He discovered that there was a double standard in conduct which placed the agreements that were looked into outside the framework of the practices and the resolutions that were implemented.

Some politicians said that the mere inquiry into the format of this dialogue raised the question whether al-Shaykh Pierre al-Jumayyil in particular was taking part in this inquiry in the light of the successive invitations for dialogue he was sending to Moslem and party leaders. [The question was raised about] whether the political and military agreement that took place recently between the Phalangists and the national liberals constitutes the cornerstone for setting up the framework of the desired dialogue or that the questionnaire, one of which Prime Minister Salam had received, constituted merely a voluntary experiment among scores of such useless experiments that are carried out by this or the other organization and at the same time expresses neither a common nor a specific political and party wish.

Those who heard Prime Minister Salam's comments said that he was not satisfied with the course, the dimensions or the objectives of this subject. They said that he was sharp in criticizing the errors of the Christian leaders, holding them responsible for the fact that conditions came to what they did come to. They said that he hinted repeatedly at the states of despair that have subdued citizens and at the extent to which the president of the republic and his positions were responsible for exposing Lebanon to ruin. They said that in the talks he made last week, he was always repeating the statement that the Christian leaders must realize that any step to adopt a new formula that would come from one side will only lead to the establishment of a closed ghetto, and that the suspension of an existing formula without replacing it with a collective formula would consequently push Lebanon towards fragmentation and would emphasize that any sectarian grouping which adopts a closed sectarian formula will pay the price of being closed and will inevitably face the collapse of its formula in the future no matter how long it takes.

MAQSUD DISCUSSES MEANS TO ENHANCE ARAB INFORMATION IN UNITED STATES

Jiddah AL-MADINAH in Arabic 29 Sep 80 p 17

[Interview with Dr Clovis Maqsud, director of Arab League New York Office and Arab League Observer at United Nations, by Paper's Tunis Bureau; "Dr Clovis Maqsud to AL-MADINAH: United States Will Not Change Its Position On Palestine and Middle East Issue Except Through Our Struggle At All Levels"]

[Text] During the meeting of the Permanent Arab Information Committee, held at the Arab League Headquarters (in Tunis), AL-MADINAH interviewed Dr Clovis Maqsud, the director of the Arab League New York Office and the Arab League Observer at the United Nations.

Dr Clovis Maqsud is one of the most prominent information people in the Arab 'home-land. He worked in the Lebanese press for a long time and became chief editor of AL-NAHAR (AL-'ARABI WA) AL-DUWALI. Now, by virtue of his presence on the U.S. arena, he is considered one of the Arab League experts on dealing with issues concerning the Arab information movement in the United States and in drawing up a new information strategy to counter the feverish Zionist information activity.

Obstructing Possibilities of Understanding

[Question] What are the priorities of the Arab information action on the U.S. arena at present?

[Answer] The Zionist propaganda in the United States takes numerous and varied forms aimed at:

First, distorting the Arab image.

Second, obstructing and hindering the possibilities of a U.S. understanding of the fateful Arab issues.

Third, attempting to create in the United States a political atmosphere that believes not only in the presence of Israel but also in its goals in the area.

The Zionist strategy in the United States seeks to keep the U.S. public opinion far from interest in what is happening in the Middle East so that Zionism and its supporters may preserve the ability to monopolize political, informational and intellectual guidance in the United States in the interest of the Israeli objectives.

Arab Information Strategy

Therefore, the Arab information must draw up a comprehensive strategy that is not merely content with confronting Zionism, refuting its allegations and attempting to correct the Arab image which Israel is trying to distort. We must also plant in the U.S. political body the seeds of amending and changing the equation existing on the U.S. political map. This means that we must encourage the decision and opinion makers in the United States to understand and comprehend not just the Arab rights in Palestine and places other than Palestine but also to understand the importance of the cohesion of the human, economic and intellectual forces in the Arab nation as a legitimate and influential force in the international community.

Priorities of Information Action

In view of these U.S. conditions and in view of the Zionist strategic goals in the United States, the Arab information must be established on the following priorities for its movement in the United States. The first priority is to organize the forces sympathizing with and supporting our legitimate causes so that they may be less scattered and more cohesive. This means to a large extent uniting the front of the U.S. Arab expatriates so that the Arab expatriates may form a single conviction regarding the fateful Arab position and may not mirror the Arab differences and disagreements.

The second priority is connected with strengthening the commitment of those supporting the Arab causes in order that they may comprehend not only the firm rights but also the current changes in the area so that these changes may not act as a means for lessening this commitment but as a cause for strengthening it. The third priority lies in trying to penetrate the public opinion sectors whose participation is required so that the sphere of the Zionist action in the U.S. political body may be contained or narrowed. This arena is liable to understand our causes if we, in our turn, enable it to know our goals, causes, heritage and truths at the various civilizational, economic, intellectual, cultural and political levels.

Representation of All Arabs

[Question] How should the Arab information in the United States be?

[Answer] The Arab information in the United States must include all the Arabs. This information must do so with all its dimensions, not just in one dimension to the exclusion of others. For example, when we hold an art exhibition, we are indirectly replying to the distortion in the image. The same happens when we highlight the contributions of the Arab oil producing countries to the third world development projects because we will thus close the door in the face of Zionism which is constantly trying to create rifts between the Arab nation and the third world countries. From this angle, we must also understand the truth of the U.S. society's approach toward the Middle East problem. For example, the latest developments in this regard are the programs of the Republican and Democratic Parties calling for transferring the U.S. Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem [sic]. It is as if these programs want to void the UN resolutions on the one hand and to engage in oneupmanship to win over the Zionist votes in the election campaign on the other hand.

In the face of this immediate position, we must draw the respect of the Americans for our positions more than trying to gain their friendship by abandoning our legitimate options. The American prefers to deal with somebody he respects to dealing with somebody who flatters him. This is the point of weakness, or rather the fatal point, which Israel hit when it managed to negotiate with President al-Sadat at Camp David from the point of abandoning the legitimate options.

Arabs Facing Challenge

This is why we are facing a very serious and difficult challenge in the United States. However, this challenge is not impossible if committed and capable human resources are made available to us. In information action, what is required is committed capabilities. Capability without commitment is tantamount to conveying a position without persuading others of this position and commitment without capability muddles the Arab right more than it serves it.

Uniting Arab Ranks

The main U.S. position is embodied in the belief that the Camp David formula is the only formula that guarantees the area's safety, even though the Camp David formula has proven to be a license for Israel to escalate its aggressions against southern Lebanon, to Judaize the venerable Jerusalem and to implant more settlements in the occupied Arab territories. Therefore, the Camp David accords are a step conflicting with the possibilities of establishing a just peace in the area. Even though the opinion makers, and to a degree the decision makers, in the United States are aware of the futility of these accords, they are determined to cling to them for reasons that have nothing to do with an objective assessment of their consequences in the area but rather for reasons that have made it necessary to highlight this diplomatic failure as if it were an accomplishment--reasons connected solely with the domestic elections.

From this angle, it becomes evident to us that the Arab nation must cling to the unity of its positions which emerged in the Baghdad and Tunis summits and must show the U.S. public opinion that President al-Sadat is renounced at the Arab level. The Arab nation must do so through Arab cohesion and solidarity. The Israeli ferocious onslaught that we see these days in southern Lebanon and in the act of the coercive annexation of Jerusalem and of declaring it Israel's capital against the will of the international community--this onslaught is the result of the belief among some Americans that the Arab differences are deep-rooted and not transient differences. We must make it clear to all that the difference that occurs every now and then in the Arab positions is a transient difference that does not affect the fateful issues.

Information Challenges

We must understand that the Israeli innovations in fighting the Arab causes, especially in the U.S. political body and at the international level, require firm positions and creative flexibility of approach on our part.

Harmonizing these two requirements is the challenge facing the Arab contemporary information. This is why we in the Permanent Information Committee hope, with the guidance of Secretary General (Chedli Klibi), that the Arab information will be more dynamic, more effective and more purposeful.

Naturally, mistakes will be made, as they are made in any dynamic action. However, these mistakes will remain slight in comparison to the sins of silence, inactivity and of burying the head in the sand. Confrontation is required at all fronts and all levels because the challenge posed by Israel is not just an information challenge but also a challenge against our survival.

Saudi-Iraqi Communique

[Question] What is your opinion of the Saudi-Iraqi communique on severing political and economic relations with any country recognizing Israel's decision to annex East Jerusalem?

[Answer] The declared Arab position must be credible and for it to be credible, it must contain procedural aspects. I believe that this communique is about to put man in the Arab position of confronting the fascist fangs in Israel (sic).

[Question] How do you view the reverberations of this communique and of Prince Fahd's call for holy jihad against the U.S. position toward the issue of Palestine and of the Middle East?

[Answer] We always work within the framework of the international legitimacy because our fateful pan-Arab goals are compatible with the international legitimacy. Therefore, we always resort to peaceful means to demand our rights. However, this doesn't at all mean that we have abandoned our legitimate options to struggle at all levels. It is within this framework that the Saudi-Iraqi communique and the call of His Highness Prince Fahd for holy jihad have come.

There is no doubt that our economic dealings with the United States are among the factors affecting the decision making. Therefore, our legitimate political demands must be tied to our economic relations.

Egypt's Return

[Question] We constantly hear about a change in the positions of the U.S. administration toward the Arab causes, especially the Palestinian cause. But nothing of the sort has happened. What is the reason for this?

[Answer] As long as the United States believes that it can divide the Arab ranks, then regardless of how much conviction is created in the U.S. public opinion concerning the legitimacy of our positions and our causes the U.S. administration will continue to be more responsive to the Zionist pressures. This situation will continue for as long as the United States believes that it can divide the Arab ranks. Therefore, our pan-Arab priority must be the return of Egypt to the Arab ranks so that al-Sadat's step may not constitute a precedent in abandoning the Arab nation's position and its fateful confrontations.

[Question] Do you believe that there will be a backing down in the Egyptian position responding to the open Arab call?

[Answer] I believe that the elements of correcting the Arab society are capable of rescuing Egypt from its temporary departure from the Arab ranks.

[Question] Finally, how should we view the c.S. elections and what can we expect of them?

[Answer] We must not make our fateful causes the hostage of repeated election timetables.

8494

CSO: 4802

ENVOY TO TEHRAN DISCUSSES INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 22 Dec 80 pp 1, 4

[Interview with Ibrahim Younes, Syrian Ambassador to Iran, by KEYHAN INTERNATIONAL; date and place not given]

[Text] In an exclusive interview recently given by Mr. Ibrahim Younes, the Syrian Ambassador to Iran, to "Kayhan International", the diplomat stressed the critical need for solving the Palestinian issue according to the international resolutions, because the Palestinian question is the central issue of all the tensions in the Middle East. The Ambassador gave a picture of the Syrian views on several international problems and stressed his country's support for the "brother nation" of Iran after the victory of its historical Islamic Revolution. Ayatollah Khomeini, he said, "is a great man of history and he has led a revolution which is more important than the French Revolution ... Ayatollah Khomeini turned over all the strategies of the world."

Ambassador Younes began by outlining the fundamentals of Syria's foreign policy. The prime objective of this policy was Arab unity, he said. It was through this unity that Syria could work for the just overall solution to the Palestinian issue and to achieve complete withdrawal of the Israeli troops from the areas they occupied in the 1967 war; to work for the maintenance of liberty, independence and the national unity of Lebanon ... besides this, the Ambassador stressed, Syria feels

committed to work for the solution to differences in the Arab and Islamic countries; additionally, Syrian foreign policy supports the issues of peoples especially in Africa, Asia and Latin America, striving to further bolster liberation movements. "We struggle against all kind of discrimination and hegemony — especially in the Southern part of Africa", the Syrian Ambassador said.

Struggle Against Zionism for All Arabs and Islamic Countries

Syrian foreign policy aims at supporting the development of the non-aligned movement, he added, and at the creation of a new economic system with just provisions for the Third World in international trade relations. Syria's foreign policy is a policy of defense and seeks better cooperation between Arab and Islamic nations in the international field.

"We consider the struggle against zionism to be one for all Arabs and Islamic countries. We must work for the mobilization of all capabilities in the Arab and Islamic countries," Ibrahim Younes said. He emphasized that the balance in defense capabilities had been disturbed by Egypt's move towards the zionists, and it was in the interest of a re-establishment of balance in the region that the treaty of friendship and cooperation between Syria and the USSR had been signed. "We realize that the U.S. is making out of Israel a frontal line

in the military arms race. Therefore, Syria is trying and will continue all attempts to re-create a balance (of power) in the region," the diplomat affirmed. "It is to meet this basic need that the treaty between Syria and USSR was signed." Asked whether the Syrian-Soviet treaty includes any joint measures in case of an Israeli attack on Syria, Ibrahim Younes answered that the treaty is a legitimate and righteous one. "In case of, for instance an Israeli attack on Syria, the Soviet Union should make available all the devices which would enable us to defend our country," he said, adding, that Syria for the purpose of counterweighing the zionist threat in the region would be willing to sign other treaties of this type.

Syria's foreign policy is based on the struggle against Israel, the Ambassador continued, because this concerns the very existence of

the people of Syria. Facing Begin's plans not only to annex Southern Lebanon but all Lebanon, to take it as a base to resume its assaults on Syria, the Ambassador said Syria took it as its historical responsibility to support Lebanon in its struggle against the Israeli assaults and to link this struggle to the struggle for strengthening the national unity in Lebanon, to save state sovereignty and to liquidate all centers cooperating with Israel.

It is for the same goal of re-balancing the forces in the Middle

East, that Syria works to reinforce the "front of steadfastness and confrontation," and to stabilize the front, the Ambassador underlined, is to counter the Camp David conspiracy after Sadat's move from the Arab to the Israeli side.

Camp David Treaty Against All International Resolutions

"It is obvious that the Camp David treaty from the international point of view is violating the U.N. decisions and resolutions as well as all international treaties. The Camp David Accord neglects the rights of the peoples to self-determination, because it denies the national rights of the Palestinians. This treaty only recognizes regional autonomy (not self-determination) and considers this autonomy only for the Palestinians living in the Occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip without concerning itself with all the Palestinian people who are scattered all over the world. It further does not object to the Zionist settlements, as for the economic factor it recognizes only the rights of Israel. This treaty is in contradiction to all international resolution on the Palestinian cause. Today there is no people (of any nation) in the world that has to exist outside its lands except the Palestinians. They have to live without rights or as refugees all over the world. This Camp David Treaty, neglects the rights of sovereignty of a people for their own land and plans to impose a "provisional stage" for the Palestinians in the Occupied areas. What kind of a "Revolution" is it for the Palestinian issue when it does not give any rights to the Palestinian refugees who had to flee after the 1967 war and cannot return home, except as visitor? The Camp David Accord violated all decisions of the international community," he said. Resolution 338 of U.N. (1973) called for negotiations at Geneva between all the parties involved after the ceasefire, under supervision of the Soviet Union, U.S. and the Secretary-General of the U.N. But the Camp David Treaty ignored all that and rejected the

will of the international community. Israel and the U.S. began to conduct their own negotiations without bothering with the other parties.

We asked the Ambassador about recent reports that the Israelis were trying to draw Saudi Arabia into the Camp David umbrella, and did he think that the Saudis would do so?

Ambassador Younes said that there was no indication that Saudi Arabia would be drawn in. "Arab and all Muslim people are firmly against this (Camp David) conspiracy and will fight any government or regime that would agree to join this conspiracy. This is because the basic factor for all responsible governments in the Arab and the Muslim world is the plight of the Palestinian people."

U.S. Policy Product of System — Not President

Asked if he felt the new Reagan administration is likely to alter the U.S. Mideast policy, in any way, the Ambassador said he did not think so. "We look on the U.S. policy not as planned by any individual president but by the U.S. system. We have had experience with several U.S. Presidents and they have all treated the Mideast issues the same (pro-Zionist) way."

The Ambassador referred to the misconceptions of Egypt's Sadat and Jordan's King Hussein. Sadat seemed to feel that the U.S. was going to construct and develop Egypt but what Sadat did not seem to understand is that the U.S. has no interest in doing this. Hussein has played his role in conspiracies to liquidate the Palestinian cause. His attempts have clearly been neglecting the Palestinian cause and for reconciliation with the Israelis and toward the Camp David Accord. "We consider the PLO as the only legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and there is no "compromise" in this question."

Iraq Aggression Condemned by 116 Organizations at Tripoli

We asked the Ambassador to comment on the Iraqi invasion of Iran. "This mad war," he said, "this damaging war which only

serves the interests of imperialism and Zionism — we are totally against this war. This is the feeling not only of Syria but of all members of the Steadfastness Front and not only of the Steadfastness countries but of all Arab peoples. They are all against this war. The conference of Arab peoples in Tripoli, where 116 political groups and organizations took part, officially condemned Iraq and its aggression. All progressive, political parties and organizations in the Arab countries condemned Iraq," said Ambassador Younes. "If there are differences in territories, military measures, in our opinion, are not at all the way to solve them. We think there should be political, peaceful, direct negotiations because we consider Iran a brother country after its revolution, under the leadership of Imam Khomeini. Iran is a friend to the progressive powers in the Arab world and their struggle against imperialism, Zionism, and reactionary forces in the region. The victory of the Iranian revolution is a victory for us in Syria as well as for all progressive forces in the Arab world. In Syria, we are involved in the victory of Iran and the realization of its struggles for independence and development. So Syria considers this support and reinforcement of the Islamic Revolution in Iran a duty for itself."

Imam "A Great Man of History"

About the Imam, the Ambassador said, "There is no doubt that he is a great man of history. And he has led a revolution that is more important than the French Revolution — one of the greatest revolutions in history. History books of the future will say a lot about this (Islamic) revolution in Iran. Ayatollah Khomeini has turned over all strategies of the world."

The Ambassador voiced concern about the efforts of the enemy to weaken Iran, the struggle of the non-Aligned countries, of Syria itself, and against Zionism required that Iran be strong. Asked about reports that Syria may be aiding Iran with military supplies, Ibrahim Younes said that Iran was a "big power" itself.

and did not need or seek material help from Syria, which is itself in a "confrontation situation with Israel."

There are deep and brotherly ties however, between Syria and Iran, the Ambassador stressed, and these had been strengthened by visits such as those by Majlis Speaker Hoj. Rafsanjani. "All such meetings help because we share common concepts, common ideals and understand the necessity of confrontation with the common enemy."

Asked about the internal situation in Iraq, the Ambassador said "People never forgive their governments when they draw them into a damaging war" and that Saddam Hussein would no doubt fall sooner or later. We asked what kind of government Syria would like to see in Iraq. "We believe in the people's right to self-determination, to chose their own regime" he said and he emphasized the point that each generation must be allowed to make its own decision quoting from Imam Ali: "Leave your sons to their affairs because they are created for a time that is not yours."

Islam " a Religion for All Humanity"

We referred the Ambassador to Imam Khomeini's recent call for a meeting among writers, scholars and leaders of progressive Muslim countries and asked the Ambassador what he thought of the idea. Ibrahim Younes said, "We support this proposal. We are for unity among peoples, and while we all recognize that there may be cultural differences between people from one country and another, we are totally for solidarity between countries whose aims and strategies are alike."

Questioned about the qualifications for countries to be part of the "Steadfastness Front", the Ambassador said that it was open to all, subject of course to acceptance by the current members.

Our final question was with regard to Saddam Hussein's reported claim of "Arab superiority" in Islam and we asked the

ambassador to provide us with his view. He voiced himself strongly against such ethnic attitudes with regard to Islam. "It should be clear that Islam is a religion for all humanity and does not provide any special status to any nation or people." He went on to say that while the Prophet had been born an Arab and nurtured by the Arabs, Arab civilization itself had great contributions from non-Arab Muslims from the start. The Ambassador also pointed to the fact that religious tolerance is also an integral part of Islamic teaching, and cited the fact that in Syria, for instance, 20 percent of the population is Christian and they have the rights and opportunities to the same advancement in life as all Syrians, even within the government.

MINISTER ENUMERATES BENEFITS OF EUPHRATES DAM

Damascus TISHRIN 11 Nov 80 p 4

[Report on interview with Dr Yahya al-Khayir, minister of the Euphrates Dam by Hisham Bashir: date and place not given]

[Excerpts] On the 10th anniversary of the Corrective Movement which coincides with the creation of the ministry of the Euphrates Dam we interviewed Dr Yahya al-Khayir, the minister of the Euphrates Dam. He spoke about the Euphrates Dam, about land reclamation and about the hopes, the present and the future of the ministry of the Euphrates Dam, which the minister described as "the dutiful daughter of the Corrective Movement."

A National, Comprehensive View of the Euphrates Dam

Dr Yahya al-Khayir, minister of the Euphrates Dam says, "The Euphrates Dam is a basic and an important project for the Arab homeland as a whole. It was the Corrective Movement that proposed the Euphrates Dam from the outset as an Arab development project. It made the proposal out of its firm conviction and faith that the future lies in Arab unity, which will undoubtedly be achieved, and that the economic energies of the Arab homeland will be in the hands of the masses as a weapon they will use in all their battles--the battles of construction and development and the battles with world imperialism and Zionism with whom we will inevitably come to blows.

"These are our thoughts which stem from an inclusive notion of the Arab homeland. This is the intellectual and ideological education that we have in our party and that was firmly established by the Corrective Movement and by the leadership of the fellow citizen fighter, Hafiz al-Asad."

Electrical Power Paid Costs of Building Euphrates Dam

Dr Yahya al-Khayir says, "For the Euphrates Dam the 10th anniversary of the Corrective Movement signifies an important accomplishment. This year, and specifically three months ago, the electricity produced by the generators of the Euphrates Dam since it began operations is approximately 10 million kilowatt hours or what is equal to 1.5 billion Syrian pounds. This is more money than was spent on building the Euphrates Dam whose construction costs did not exceed 1.2 billion Syrian pounds."

Utilizing Every Drop of Water from Euphrates River for Power Generation and Irrigation

The Corrective Movement proposed matters through plans that succeeded each other in their proper place. By completing the Euphrates Dam the Corrective Movement had proposed that every drop of water of the Euphrates River be utilized in generating electricity, in reclaiming new land or in irrigating land. What has been achieved and what will be achieved in the future in this area?

In the area of electrical power the minister of the Euphrates Dam says, "The Euphrates Dam can generate up to 2.6 billion kilowatt hours of electricity per year. On the average we generate about 2 billion kilowatt hours per year. This year, [from the beginning of the year] till the end of September, the generators of the Euphrates Dam produced about 1.8 billion kilowatt hours. As I said before the electricity that has so far been generated has paid for all the costs of building the Euphrates Dam."

Implementation of New Flood Control Dam To Begin Next Year

In the context of providing self-sufficiency in low-cost electricity, "without using fuel oil or other petroleum derivatives," and utilizing the hydraulic power of the Euphrates River to generate electricity, we will build a flood control dam near the Euphrates Dam and another in Yusuf Basha near (Jarabilis). The minister of the Euphrates Dam spoke to us about these two new dams and said:

"If we have a year of heavy rainfall and snowfall, the Euphrates River overflows, al-Asad Lake exceeds its capacity and we are compelled to open the gates of the Euphrates Dam to release a larger quantity of water. This, in turn, raises the water level of the river below the Euphrates Dam more than 2 meters over its usual level. This may cause some land to be flooded. We will, therefore, build a flood control dam on the Euphrates River, halfway between the Euphrates Dam and the city of al-Raqqa. This dam will control the flooding of the Euphrates, guarantee protection and prevent the flooding of some lands during exceptional flood years. At the same time this flood control dam will generate about 300 million kilowatt hours of electricity. Special studies and investigations pertaining to that dam have been completed, and implementation is to begin in the middle of next year. Construction of the dam will last three years."

Dam To Generate Electricity at Yusuf Basha Barracks

The minister of the Euphrates Dam adds, "We will try to build a new dam at the end of al-Asad Lake at the Yusuf Basha Barracks near the city of (Jarabilis) on the Syrian-Turkish borders. The purpose of that dam is to have a large power generating capacity that would amount to 1.6 billion kilowatt hours or what would be equal to two-thirds the capacity of the Euphrates Dam. Early next year a group of Syrian engineers will begin their studies, their research and their examinations at the site. This is the same group that conducted the studies for the flood control dam. We will implement these two dams with the assistance of our friend, the Soviet Union, and we will utilize a local professional staff of engineers and workers who have gained vast experience through their participation in the construction of the Euphrates Dam."

What About the Euphrates Dam and New Agricultural Land?

Dr Yahya al-Khayir says, "River water utilization before the Euphrates Dam was built was very limited. There were thousands of small motors scattered along the banks of the river pumping water for very small areas of agricultural land, not far beyond the banks of the river. Now, however, the smallest water pumping station of one of the new projects pumps an amount of water that is equal to that pumped by all the motors that used to be set up all along the river in the past. The principal al-Balikh Canal, which is being implemented now, will irrigate new land in the district of al-Balikh in al-Rahah 'without pumping.' This canal can drain 140 cubic meters per second. This means that this canal alone can give us more water than that which all of the Euphrates River can give us during the month of August every year." Dr al-Khayir adds, "The (Maskanah) pumping group, which is now ready and currently irrigating new land in the district of (Maskanah), can pump 36 cubic meters per second. The two new pumping groups in the district of (Maskanah) have a capacity of pumping 30 cubic meters of water per second too."

What is the significance of an irrigation canal in al-Rahah and of the power stations that pump water for irrigation? What is the significance of the large amounts of water that are provided by the Euphrates Dam and stored in al-Asad Lake? Their significance lies in the fact that new areas of land will be reclaimed, cultivated and irrigated by the waters of the Euphrates Dam. Their significance lies in the fact that the area of irrigated land in the country will be doubled. Their significance lies in agricultural stability, economic stability in the country and the constancy of agricultural production, which used to be controlled by climate conditions and by the presence or absence of rainfall. They signify 640,000 new hectares of irrigated land.

This is the significance of the Euphrates Dam: a tremendous electrical power capacity and new areas of irrigated land. In addition, it signifies--and especially after the flood control dam is completed--putting a decisive end to the danger of the Euphrates' River flooding, which used to cause the loss of many lives and damages to plants and animals.

The Corrective Movement and Socio-Economic Development in the Euphrates Basin

In the view of the minister of the Euphrates Dam the fact that the Corrective Movement completed the Euphrates Dam signifies considerable economic and social changes and development. It signifies [the acquisition of] scientific and technical expertise above and beyond the direct results of building the Euphrates Dam that we mentioned. Let us read what the minister said in that regard.

Dr Yahya al-Khayir says, "During the years of the Corrective Movement and in the course of building the Euphrates Dam, we did develop in our country top-level technical expertise and professional skills in various areas of specialization that were not available.

"We now have top-level expertise in the construction, investigation, implementation and maintenance of dams. It is due to this expertise that we will utilize the local expertise and skills to build the flood control dam and the Yusuf Basha dam.

"We now have top-level experience in the area of land reclamation; international corporations attest to that despite the fact that we are entering this field for the first time. The land reclamation projects that were implemented by the (SARICO) Company and by the Euphrates Dam Land Reclamation Sector were completed on schedule and with top-level technical specifications that are equal, if not superior to, those of any specialized foreign company.

"In addition to the fact that our technicians and engineers have been operating our power installation on the Euphrates Dam, those technicians did lay down the power lines to the Euphrates and al-Jazirah districts. Their output figures were better than the record figures of international companies that specialize in this field. At first, our technicians used to complete 10 percent of the volume of work that was expected of them, but they quickly gained the expertise, and they are now completing 120 percent of the work expected of them. Towards the end, every work team used to complete in 14 days the volume of work it was expected to complete in a whole month."

Socio-Cultural Change, the Result of Familiarity with Machine

Dr al-Khayir adds, "The Euphrates Dam has contributed to the development of economic and social life in the eastern district as a whole. The citizen in the eastern district has lived with and has become familiar with machinery and [especially] heavy machinery which he had not known before. Familiarity with machinery means intellectual development for the farmer or the worker who operates that machine; it means correct treatment, an understanding of the given factors of the age and a cultural thrust. It is true that social change can only be perceived after long years, but many of the social returns effected by these changes can be perceived in some phenomena and distinguishing signs.

"The social returns are currently manifested in the change in people's life styles: the rise in their standard of living; the increase in their demand for consumer goods; and the citizen's concern for his health and with consulting a physician. The farmer of the eastern area who did not consult a physician until he was in the terminal stages of a disease--the farmer whose wife often died without having seen a physician--no longer avoids consulting a physician when he gets sick.

"The mode of thought of the resident of the Euphrates basin has changed. And here I must call attention to the prominent role of the trade union and the farmers' organizations. The resident of the Euphrates basin is now aware of the questions of his homeland and his nation. He takes part in serious discussions, and, in a fully mature manner, he proposes and discusses questions he used to fear.

"Machinery is now part of the life of those who used to fear it. The resident of the eastern district who did not believe that it would be possible to dam the waters of the mighty Euphrates is the same person who built the Euphrates Dam. The person who used to fear the machine is the same person who is now operating heavy machinery. He is the one who is operating the trucks, bulldozers and graders. He is the one who is digging canals and drainage ditches and reclaiming new land."

Land Reclamation Operations Growing with Growth of Expertise and Technical Staff

Regarding the development of operations to reclaim new land that will be irrigated by the waters of al-Asad Lake, the minister of the Euphrates Dam said, "Land reclamation operations grew and the areas of reclaimed land increased every year as the technical expertise and staff grew. At the outset our national companies had not had previous experience in that field, nor did they have the realistic understanding of [these operations] that they have now. The (SARICO) Company was the first company to enter that field. It was followed by the Euphrates Dam Land Reclamation Sector whose employees turned [their attention] to land reclamation operations. It is now a company specializing in land reclamation.

"Despite the fact that our two national companies have only recently entered the field of land reclamation, they have proved their competence and their worthiness in the projects they implemented. At the same time, foreign companies that specialize in this area have floundered.

"The national (SARICO) and Land Reclamation companies executed land reclamation projects that were more complex [than others] with regard to the quarry-like and rocky nature of the land and its technical problems. Nevertheless, they executed their plans carefully, with good specifications and on schedule.

"Foreign firms, however, floundered in executing the projects with which they had been charged. Their operations floundered for reasons that may be due to the operations or the companies themselves. The reclamation of the central Euphrates district, which is 27,000 hectares, was to have been completed and the land accordingly delivered in 1979 and early in 1980. But the firm that is executing the project has not been able to meet its commitment. We do not believe that it will give us more than 10,000 hectares of new land."

If This Is The Standard Of Our Firms, Why Foreign Firms?

Dr Yahya al-Khayir responded to that question by saying, "Our firms and our professionals have actually acquired the skills for reclaiming land, and we no longer need foreign firms in this area. The first with which we are presently dealing are firms that we are dealing with in the context of our international agreements. We are doing business with these firms not because we need the foreign firms and their expertise, but rather because [our work together] is a kind of cooperation, experience sharing and joint action with these countries. We now have the technical capability and the competence. If we have the financial capabilities [also], our national firms will implement our projects through joint action programs with friendly countries."

What About New Areas of Land So Far?

Our past plan was very optimistic; many of its given assumptions had no scientific basis. But in addition to the innovative project, there will be an area of 10,000 hectares in the central Euphrates which will be ready by the end of the year. This is the figure that the ministry promised us in its statement to the People's Assembly. There are 14,000 hectares that are ready in West (Maskanah); and 10,000 hectares are ready in Bi'r al-Hasham in al-Balikh Basin. These lands will be put to use as soon as the upper (al-Salajiyah) Canal, whose implementation

had been charged to the (SARICO) Company, is completed. This means that what was implemented during the last plan is between 45,000 and 47,000 hectares of new irrigated land.

The Commander's Directions: Reclaiming Vast Areas of New Land

Dr Yahya al-Khayir says, "When we returned from our recent visit to the eastern district and met with the president and commander, his directions to us were [as follows]: greater attention and focus on the agricultural sector; completing the reclamation of as much land as possible during the next Five-Year Plan; and preparing all the technical and material conditions and capabilities for executing this plan. Our next plan in the agricultural and land reclamation sector is an ambitious one, but it is realistic and based on scientific factors. We will not create new companies for reclaiming land, but we will rather expand and support existing companies. Our next plan will mean [that we will have] 106,000 hectares of new land: 26,000 hectares are in projects that are currently being implemented and will be completed during the next Five-Year Plan; and 80,000 hectares of new land will be reclaimed."

Our National Firms To Reclaim 106,000 Hectares During Next Five-Year Plan

"Our national companies will be the ones to reclaim these new areas of land. The (SARICO) and the Land Reclamation Company will reclaim the 106,000 hectares. As I said, this is an ambitious plan, but it is a realistic one. When we prepared this plan we said, 'If the (SARICO) Company with its assets, its capabilities, its staff and its expertise can reclaim 4,000 hectares, we will charge it with the implementation of these areas only. But we want it to reclaim more than that, and we said that to do so it will need additional technical staff, machinery, liquidity, etc., and we will make all this available to it.'"

Priority To Stopping Encroachment of Salinity On Lower Euphrates Basin

The minister of the Euphrates Dam says, "Stopping the encroachment of salinity on the lands of the lower Euphrates--and these are the lands that extend on the banks of the Euphrates River from Dayr al-Zawr to (Albu Kamal)--was given priority in land reclamation during the next Five-Year Plan. This is what we stated in our ministerial statement.

"The importance of stopping the process of getting agricultural land out of production is as vital and as basic--if not more so--as reclaiming new areas of land. In a matter of days we will begin implementing operations to stop the encroachment of salinity. These operations will be carried out by the Industrial Projects Implementation Company with the cooperation of specialized public sector firms. Work will be completed in 17 months. Beginning the process of stopping the encroachment of salinity, which destroys 4,000 hectares of land every year, means that, from now on, we will not allow one inch of agricultural land to get out of production. During this period we will also flush the salty soil, and we will drain the water. This also means reclaiming the land that had been destroyed by salinity in past years."

What About Housing and Social Development Programs In The New Areas?

The minister of the Euphrates Dam thinks that the last Five-Year Plan did not take this important and basic aspect into consideration. The plan was to have completed a study of a regional plan for the districts of the Euphrates Basin according to which people would be distributed among centers of production. "We cannot put such distribution into effect and say we are establishing a village here and a village there without research. This would be unscientific and unacceptable."

The minister adds, "Therefore, we formed a team of specialists, with the agreement of the Ministry of Housing, from the first days of the new ministry. This team has been working for six months on a regional plan for the districts of the Euphrates Basin. We are also working with the Ministry of Tourism to come up with a plan for tourism so that the al-Asad Lake can be utilized for tourism purposes. This is an important matter that would stimulate the area and create interaction between its residents and the residents of other districts of the country. Besides, this will stimulate the tourist industry in this district which is full of antiquities and wonders that are well-known all over the world. It is an area that has been associated with ancient civilizations."

New Firm for Social Development and Agricultural Investment

The minister of the Euphrates Dam says, "We will try to overcome the deficiencies in the social aspect of the past plan. We will try to divide the Euphrates Valley Corporation, which is responsible for land reclamation, agriculture and social development, into two corporations. The ministerial committee that was formed for this purpose has approved that division, and it will be presented to the Council of Ministers at its next meeting. The engineering sector will form a land reclamation corporation, and the social and agricultural sectors will form the Euphrates Valley Investment and Development Corporation. Specialization will be achieved through the latter corporation, and interest will be focused on man, on social development and on agricultural investment." The minister of the Euphrates Dam also believes that social change must not be spontaneous; it should rather be programmed. Such change can only be achieved by social workers who specialize in that field and who know how to deal with and to treat social questions. The minister says, "We have seen what the social workers are doing in the Euphrates Valley Corporation and the positive results they are bringing about. But there are few of them. Therefore, we must re-open the Higher Institute for Social Service, and we must reactivate its educational programs in the light of previous experience and the given factors and circumstances of every district in the country." He adds, "It is also very important for us to find the means of preparing cadres of social workers. We need large numbers of them, and we do not think that anyone else can bring about the required social change. Nor do we believe that a spontaneous change is possible or desirable."

The Commander Was Generous In Everything Pertaining to the Euphrates Dam and Land Reclamation

The Euphrates Dam Ministry is the child of the Corrective Movement. It was established by the president and commander to execute the Euphrates Dam, to reclaim land and to create a scientific, technological revolution in agriculture. We

have made good strides in that field. However, we have not accomplished everything the Corrective Movement and our fellow fighter Hafiz al-Asad wanted when he created this ministry because dealing with the land and making it tractable requires great resources, patience and tirelessness. But we are on our way to accomplish a great deal.

The president and commander was generous regarding everything pertaining to the Euphrates Dam, the land and new land reclamation. His gifts were unrestricted because he knew that all the gifts were gifts from the people to the people and to the future of the homeland and all the Arab nation.

8592

CSO: 4802

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

STATISTICS SHOW GROWTH OF UAE ECONOMY

Sharjah AL-KHALIJ in Arabic 4 Dec 80 p 2

[Article: "Growth Rates For the State Rise 42.5 Percent Each Year: 100,000 Dirhams Per Capita Share in Local Production This Year"]

[Text] In 1980, general expenditures amounted to 35.658 billion UAE dirhams, thereby realizing a huge increase over past years, inasmuch as 1972 expenditures amounted to about 2.167 billion dirhams.

This increase in the state's general expenditures over the 9 years of the federation is part of the goal to raise the individual standard of living, provide educational, health and social services, and build a developed economic basis for the state.

Statistics indicate that the per capita share of general expenditures was about 1,000 dirhams in 1972, rising to 7,000 dirhams in 1980, thereby achieving a 42.5 percent yearly rate of growth.

In another context, state per capita income from local production achieved a 22.2 percent yearly growth rate from 1972 to 1980.

In a Planning Ministry report it was shown that the per capita share of local production amounted to about 20,000 dirhams in 1972, rising to 100,000 dirhams in 1980.

Statistics indicate that the per capita share of consumption expenditures amounted to about 5,400 dirhams in 1972, rising to about 27,800 dirhams in 1980.

Government expenditures per capita amounted to 3,000 dirhams in 1972, rising to 14,500 dirhams in 1980. This is an index of the increase in services provided by the state for the individual.

As for investment expenditures and the use of state revenues in development projects, the per capita share in investment expenditures rose from 5,400 dirhams in 1972 to 28,900 dirhams in 1980.

The state has witnessed extensive investment activity during the federation years, for fixed investment rose to 2.856 billion dirhams this year, a yearly growth rate of an estimated 42 percent.

During this period, investments encompassed all commodity and service sectors. In the animal and fish resource sector, this year's investments amounted to 560 million dirhams, as opposed to only 13 million dirhams in 1972. In the strategic industries, investment rose from 473 million dirhams in 1972 to 9.463 billion dirhams in 1980. Investment in the conversion industry sector amounted to 983 million dirhams this year.

In another context, local production increased 40.5 percent each year over the last 9 years, amounting to about 130.5 million dirhams in 1980. Thus production increased more than 15 times during these years.

Even though the crude oil sector still accounts for a large part of local production, major investment expenditures in other non-petroleum sectors also realized significant growth.

It is known that the state's crude oil production amounted to 4.550 billion dirhams in 1972, rising to 97.007 billion dirhams in 1980. The revenues from other sectors' production amounted to 4.029 billion dirhams in 1972, rising to 60.451 billion dirhams in 1980.

8559

C80: 4802

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

BRIEFS

DIRECTORY OF AGREEMENTS COMPILED--The Ministry of Economy and Trade has prepared an encyclopedic directory dealing with the economic, commercial and technical cooperation agreements concluded between the UAE and other countries.

This directory has been divided into five main sections, covering agreements on the Gulf level, whether bilateral or multi-lateral; agreements concluded on the Arab and the international levels, whether bilateral or multi-lateral; agreements concluded with joint Arab and international banks, organizations and federations; and special agreements with international organizations and authorities.

Deputy Economy and Trade Minister 'Abd-al-Rahman Ghanim stated that this guide will be a reference work for persons engaged in commercial and international affairs in the UAE, and will help them easily comprehend these agreements. It will be printed and distributed to the parties concerned next month. [Text]
[Sharjah AL-KHALIJ in Arabic 4 Dec 80 p 2] 8559

CSO: 4802

YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC

MACHINE WORKSHOP FALLS SHORT OF PRODUCING AUTOMOBILE ENGINE

San'a' AL-THAWRAH in Arabic 6 Dec 80 pp 5, 7

[Article by Radiyah Ihsan: "A Yemeni Car In 5 Years"]

[Text] In spite of the state's activity in signing assorted agreements with various countries of the world, and the extensive attention given by the information agencies to these agreements, I find myself asking what comes after the agreement is signed, and after television, radio and the Saba' News Agency finishes playing out their customary, usual role vis-a-vis each agreement. I ask because I have inquired about some projects and have learned that they are either in their final death throes or else died right after the agreement-signing celebrations.

I say this after a visit to the technical machine workshop--the Korean project--at al-Hudaydah. I will let Project General Director Engr 'Abd-al-Rahman al-Marir do the talking.

"The project was conceived in 1972, with the signing of a protocol with the Korean Democratic Republic following the visit of a high-level delegation from the Yemen Arab Republic to Korea. The preliminary study included in the protocol stipulated that Korea would provide Yemen with the machines and equipment needed for the project, and would send experts to install the equipment and train the Yemeni personnel. Yemen would provide the land and buildings needed for the project, and housing, food and transportation for the experts. The protocol defined the project's production capacity, but did not go into the details of the project's economic feasibility. It took 5 years to complete the designs and to get ready for construction, and construction began in 1976. The project received top priority of the Five-Year plan. It was to be completed in 6 and one-half years, but because of various problems the buildings were not completed on time, thus delaying the project another year and a half. The project was inaugurated in 1979. Because of other problems, the project was unable to function as planned until now, for a very petty reason--the necessary approval was not obtained for opening a separate gate from the workshop to the street, to allow access to people and vehicles, since the workshop buildings are located within the port. It was only on 17 November 1980 that a permit for opening a gate was issued, after 3 years of continuous effort. We hope that the authorities in San'a' and al-Hudaydah will cooperate with us in providing the necessary work requirements and the

appropriations. If the authorities would help us obtain casting furnaces, the project would be able to produce most of the spare parts needed for automobiles, tillers, agricultural machinery, and other mechanical equipment."

[Question] Can the workshop produce a Yemeni automobile?

[Answer] With the provision of these furnaces and some other equipment currently unavailable, it will actually be possible to produce a complete automotive engine, except for the electrical equipment, accessory rubber items, and delicate hose connections. Production of a car is not impossible, but there must be other plants to produce rubber, plastic and electrical equipment, or these must be obtained from overseas. An automobile, tank or tractor doesn't cost much, but the producing countries benefit more from the sale of spare parts than from the sale of the vehicles. The project is capable of manufacturing spare parts for various kinds of automobiles, even Mercedes, and to maintain automobiles and agricultural machinery.

The workshop can train the technical manpower--Yemeni, not Indian--in a very short time, since there is a very good concept of development. In only 5 years, the shop will be able to achieve everything the project was intended to achieve, and will be able to supply all the project's equipment, manpower and auxiliary material needs. Everything is possible if it is headed in the right direction.

I wanted to get the opinion of Korean Expert Ho Jil before touring the workshop. He said, "We feel quite reassured because of the concern shown by the shop director, the economy ministry and the Yemeni workers. The workshop, a gift from President Kim Il Sung to the Yemeni people, began operation last year. We are making gigantic efforts to develop both the workshop and the solidarity and friendship with the Yemeni people. In order to achieve a high degree of technical skill, we offer the new Yemeni workers a 40-minute practical class each morning, to give them new ideas. Right now, the workers' level is average, but in the future it will reach a high level, because they catch on quickly and their expertise is growing."

I asked one of the workers in the shop's electrical section about the training program. He said that as a basis for gaining expertise, they need a steady source of living and assurance about the future. Each one of them is paid 1,000 Yemeni riyals, without any uniforms being provided. For this reason, some are forced to seek additional work. Worker Hamid Hasan Ibrahim works at the shop in the morning, in a carpentry shop in the afternoon, and at the scientific institute at night. He says that language is an important factor in learning; the experts' poor command of Arabic deprives the workers of a lot of information and depth of understanding. As an example, he says that he worked for 2 months with a Yemeni electrician and gained a great deal more benefit and expertise.

Ahmad 'Umar, who is responsible for the lathe section, says, "We don't have any internal regulations telling the workers what they get and what is expected of them." He, along with others, complains about delays in handing out salaries, and says that the workshop has a large capacity and could serve the whole area if only the project were completed, for it is a huge industrial project.

'Adnan 'Abd-al-Wali says, "This expertise which we are acquiring gets priority in other countries." He and his colleagues want to acquire greater expertise and deeper knowledge, and to attend special training courses. Almost all the workers are young students in the prime of life, who at the same time are responsible for a family or are helping lighten their families' burdens.

I asked the workers why the formation of labor unions has been delayed, even though the state has encouraged it and the president of the republic has called on the citizens to set up unions. They say that they are ready to join any union that might be set up, but that the workers don't know how to establish unions. This may be the obstacle. We hope that the state will help the workers form themselves into unions and organize training courses for union leaders, to eliminate the doubts and fears about the policy in the past, when associations were repressed and combatted, their intentions were doubted, and the democracy for which we are aspiring existed only in popular organizations.

We are submitting this investigation to Economy Ministry officials, especially the minister, so that benefit can be obtained from this important, vital project, so that the projects will not come to an end and die right after the ribbon-cutting and inaugural ceremonies.

8559

CSO: 4802

END

END OF

FICHE

DATE FILMED

9 Feb. 1981